By contrast, there was a certain tone of humility in the way Scholz addressed Germany’s European partners on Monday.In particular, his remark that, in the provinces of migration and fiscal policy, “ideology has given way to pragmatism” might be read as a statement of repentance for what others have criticised as German imperiousness in EU affairs during the Merkel era.And by impelling a shift in the continent’s mental geographies (“Europe’s centre is moving eastwards”), Scholz held out the assurance that the Union’s eastern states would no longer be viewed as second-class Europeans.
The war in Ukraine, of course, is what gave this speech its import.By focusing minds on the fundamentals, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February this year has injected an evident sense of urgency into European matters. Through the way Europeans had generously taken in Ukrainian refugees and collaboratively recalibrated the continent’s energy supply, Scholz declaimed, “we have breathed new life into the word solidarity”.
To take the German chancellor at his word, one would think that the war has changed everything. Much has been written about the so-called Zeitenwende (“Change of Era”) announced by Scholz in an extraordinary session of the Bundestag three days after the invasion. This would presage a new epoch of muscular German presence in European affairs, buttressed by an immense increase in military spending. But the precise meaning of the Zeitenwende for Europe has remained unclear. Rectifying this lacuna was the central point of Scholz’ speech.
The Zeitenwende accordingly provided the impetus for Scholz’s boldest and most consequential intervention: locatingsecurity and defence at the very heart of the European Project, and thus furthering the idea of “a sovereign Europe”. In the view of the German chancellor, the war in Ukraine demands a complete transformation in how Europe must see itself. A European Union that began as an “inward-looking peace project” must now concentrate its energies on external threats, he said. Scholz proposed a European air defence system, in which Germany would “invest heavily”. He also called for an “Independent Council” of Europe’s Defence ministers, analogous to those in the fields of Environment and Agriculture. The European Union would in addition have its “rapid reaction force” ready by 2025.
In the end, what was perhaps most consequential about Scholz’s Prague speech was not its specific contents, but the mere fact it took place at all. Behind the characteristically dull and bureaucratic delivery was the promise of a new approach to Germany’s relationships with its European neighbours and allies.Perhaps, after all, this was indeed “vision” – albeit expressed in a very German way.