A new theory of victory: How Ukraine can fortify and prosper in the age of Trump

After three years of war, Ukraine faces new challenges in the era of strategic chaos marked by Trump 2.0. What are its choices?

The context is the following:

1. As long as Vladimir Putin is alive, this war is likely to continue. Putin is only 72 years old. He is in good health, exercises daily, drinks moderately, if at all, and comes from a family with a history of longevity: both his father and his grandfather died in the second half of their 80s.
2. Russia’s economy can sustain the war effort. Economic problems are unlikely to “prompt the Kremlin to rein in its ambitions in Ukraine … Russia will be able to generate the necessary economic resources to sustain enough military power to wage war in Ukraine.”
3. The United States might not support Ukraine in the future.
4. Negotiations are unlikely to end this war in the current configuration.

What could “victory” realistically look like in this context? Until recently, Ukraine defined “victory” as the liberation of all Russian-occupied territories, including Crimea. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy now agrees that such an outcome is unlikely. Instead, Ukraine is fighting for the preservation of its democratic statehood and against subjugation by Russia.

A flexible alliance has the advantage that it does not rely on the complex decision-making mechanisms of NATO, the European Union, or the United Nations.

If “victory” means the long-term preservation of Ukraine’s democracy, a few steps follow:

1. Stabilisation of the frontline. Ukraine has been extremely successful in denying Russia victory, but Russia has kept advancing in 2024 and, more slowly, in 2025. Ukraine needs to be given the military means to stop the Russian advance and then fortify the current line of contact to such a degree that Russia cannot advance any further. Given that defence tends to be less costly than advance, this task should be easier than equipping Ukraine to become successful again in large-scale offensive operations. This would freeze the conflict in something resembling the division of Germany during the Cold War or Korea to this day. This settlement could include NATO membership, but would not have to, circumventing a course of action with currently very limited prospects.
2. Defence of the sky. Ukraine needs to be given the means to continue defending its cities from aerial attack, and indeed its skies more generally. This will require significant investments both in Ukraine’s air force and in its air defences.
3. Acceptance of the de facto occupation of the lost territories, without de jure recognition. There is precedence for such an approach: during the Cold War, most democratic countries, including Australia, did not recognise the Soviet Union’s Second World War annexation of the three Baltic states. This symbolic refusal of the status quo eased their renewed independence once circumstances allowed.
4. Building prosperity through massive investment in Ukraine’s economy, akin to the Marshall Plan that turned western Europe from a war-torn hotbed of authoritarianism into a prospering centre of democracy. Again, this could include EU membership but would not necessarily rely on it or have to start with it.

A prosperous, democratic Ukraine in the current de facto borders, with a heavily fortified frontline and secure skies, is a better option than a continuing war of attrition. Absent better options, it should be defined as victory, as it denies Putin his main goal: a Ukraine subjugated to Russia. And it would be more likely to entice Russia to sign a ceasefire than the current situation of slow but steady advance and the prospect of a collapse of international support for Ukraine.

Arming Ukraine sufficiently is a matter of money and industrial capacity outside the United States. Until the latter is built up further, deliveries from the United States will still be vital. It is possible that the US government will not allow exports to Ukraine. But given the transactional nature of the Trump administration, it might well accept third parties providing the finances to underwrite US military industry, jobs, and profits.

Thus, prosperous democracies, including Australia, should provide the financial support necessary through a global coalition of the willing. Such a flexible alliance has the advantage that it does not rely on the complex decision-making mechanisms of NATO, the European Union, or the United Nations. It will be less prone to vetoes by individual countries, and therefore more resilient to the shocks electoral policies can inflict on international relations. An ally who would lose interest in the alliance would simply drop out, not impede further help to Ukraine.

The same global alliance of democratic states could then also invest in the rebuilding of peacetime Ukraine. This effort might well involve a public-private partnership. In Australia, Andrew Forrest has already committed $500 million for a reconstruction fund. Others might well follow. Russian frozen assets might also be seized to build such a fund.

Democracies like Australia have a duty to support Ukraine, a fellow democracy. But they should also do this out of self-interest. Given that the United States has vacated the leadership of the democratic world, a global coalition of the willing to make both the stabilisation of the frontline and the postwar rebuilding of Ukraine possible might well turn out to be the first step to something else altogether: a global alliance of democracies who support each other in a world increasingly threatened by neo-imperialism, be it of the Russian, the Chinese, or the US variety.