China, explained.
Televisions broadcast North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un at the 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, 26 February 2026 (Jung Yeon-je/AFP via Getty Images)
Pyongyang’s party congress sets out five more years of military expansion, hardline diplomacy and estrangement from Seoul.
Subscribe to The Informer for monthly expert analysis, and to Events for advance notice of visiting world leaders and distinguished guests.
You may unsubscribe from Lowy Institute newsletters at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are here to stayNorth Korea’s nuclear ambitions are here to stay
A meeting held last month in Pyongyang by North Korea’s sole ruling political party offered the clearest indication yet of the direction the country intends to take over the next five years. The 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea reviewed the leadership’s achievements, set the strategic line, and reaffirmed the central role of nuclear weapons in North Korea’s security doctrine. Of note, it significantly hardened the country’s stance towards South Korea, leaving a narrow opening for talks with the United States and emphasising continued military modernisation alongside economic development.
At the meeting, Kim Jong Un emphasised the non-negotiable status of nuclear weapons in that military modernisation. “The DPRK’s position as a nuclear weapons state has been consolidated to be irreversible and permanent,” he said.
The weekend strikes on Iran by the United States and Israel will likely reinforce Kim’s determination not to bargain away the regime’s nuclear lifeline. They are also deepening distrust of Washington, complicating diplomacy with a US president willing to negotiate yet equally likely to resort to force if talks falter.
According to the final report on the congress, Pyongyang intends to increase both the number of nuclear weapons and the systems capable of delivering them. Kim stated that North Korea has “a long-term plan to strengthen the national nuclear force on an annual basis” and will focus on “increasing the number of nuclear weapons and expanding the means and space for nuclear operation”. This suggests continued investment in diverse delivery platforms, including ground- and submarine-based systems, as well as the development of integrated nuclear command systems.
The report also highlighted plans for advanced weapons systems including intercontinental ballistic missile complexes, AI-enabled uncrewed attack systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and anti-satellite weapons. It emphasised the deployment of tactical missile systems capable of targeting South Korea, including 600mm and 240mm multiple rocket launchers designed to strengthen “the core part of war deterrent”. Taken together, these plans point to a strategy of layered deterrence combining nuclear forces with increasingly sophisticated conventional strike capabilities.
The report characterised North Korea’s stance towards the United States as highly confrontational but strategically conditional. The congress described the United States as the primary source of instability in the international system, criticising its “hegemonic policy” and “America first” approach. At the same time, Kim left open a narrow pathway for improved relations, stating that “if the US respects the present position of our state specified in the Constitution of the DPRK and withdraws its hostile policy towards the DPRK, there is no reason why we cannot get on well with the US.”
Relations with South Korea were addressed in far harsher terms. At the congress, Kim explicitly rejected the possibility of reconciliation or reunification.
This formulation reaffirms that Kim won’t be open to talks until the United States recognises North Korea as a nuclear state and abandons the goal of denuclearisation. The report also stressed that the future of North Korea–US relations “depends entirely on the attitude of the US side”, signaling that North Korea will not initiate concessions but remains willing to respond to shifts in US policy.
Relations with South Korea were addressed in far harsher terms. At the congress, Kim explicitly rejected the possibility of reconciliation or reunification, declaring that “the DPRK has nothing to discuss with the ROK, the most hostile entity, and will exclude the ROK from the category of compatriots forever”. Although South Korea had been holding out some hope of reviving inter-Korean engagement under new President Lee Jae-myung, Kim unequivocally rejected the possibility, calling the current administration’s approach to North Korea “a clumsy deceptive farce”.
Despite the North’s stance, Lee responded to the comments by saying Seoul would continue to pursue “peace and stability”.
Economically, the congress lauded recent achievements as the biggest success “in the past three decades”. The next economic plan will be “a phase of stabilisation and consolidation” aimed at strengthening key industrial sectors and improving living standards. Priorities include the modernisation of heavy industry, expansion of agricultural productivity, and continued regional development projects such as the Regional Development 20×10 Policy, which aims to build industrial and social infrastructure in cities and counties across the country. The regime also emphasised emerging sectors such as new energy, space technology, and artificial intelligence, reflecting an ambition to develop advanced technological capabilities despite international sanctions.
One notable feature of the congress was the absence of explicit references to China or Russia, likely reflecting Kim’s effort to portray the past five years’ achievements as the product of domestic leadership and self-reliance rather than external support. This narrative was reinforced shortly afterwards when state media unveiled what appears to be the first sculpture depicting Kim himself, underscoring continued efforts to strengthen his cult of personality.
In his closing remarks, Kim emphasised that the congress’s goal was to “consolidate” recent achievements – signaling that Pyongyang views the past five years as a success and intends to largely maintain its current course, one of military expansion and strategic leverage over the United States and South Korea.
About the author
Gabriela Bernal
Dr Gabriela Bernal is a Korean affairs analyst based in Seoul, South Korea, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies.
The most-pressing world events explained by Lowy Institute experts and global contributors, in your inbox, every Thursday.
You may unsubscribe from The Interpreter at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
