Pakistan, explained.
Supporters of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party hold a demonstration demanding the release of jailed party founder and former Prime Minister Imran Khan, in Peshawar, Pakistan, 5 August 2026 (Hussain Ali/Anadolu via Getty Images)
As Imran Khan’s supporters plan to mobilise, army chief Munir juggles Iran diplomacy and possible reconciliation with the PTI.
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Pakistan’s September showdownPakistan’s September showdown
At the age of 73, Imran Khan has been behind bars in Pakistan for three years, yet his enduring popularity, combined with widespread public discontent with the ruling elite, has made the cricket world’s iconic all-rounder an extraordinarily difficult political problem for the country’s powerful military establishment. His supporters are preparing to take their campaign back to the streets nationwide in September.
This comes as Pakistan’s military leadership is acquiring greater prominence abroad in the wake of the US-Israeli war with Iran.
Khan has been imprisoned since August 2023 after a succession of convictions and remains entangled in a sprawling web of legal cases. His supporters regard the prosecutions as politically motivated. Pakistan’s authorities maintain that he is a convicted prisoner being held under the law.
In the 2024 general election, independents backed by Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party won more directly elected National Assembly seats than any other political grouping, although PTI itself was prevented from contesting under its electoral symbol, the cricket bat, and a coalition government subsequently took power.
Pakistan is approaching September with two seemingly contradictory messages.
One of Khan’s closest aides, Zulfikar Bukhari, recently told Reuters (Opens in new window) that, if released, Khan would not confront the powerful army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir – the Pakistani military leader who has cultivated an unusually close relationship with US President Donald Trump and whom Trump has publicly praised. Bukhari suggested that Khan would be prepared to put aside personal grievances and accept a “healing hand” from the military chief.
That is a strikingly softer message from Khan’s camp. But it needs to be treated carefully: it is Bukhari speaking about what Khan would do, rather than Khan himself making a public commitment.
Meanwhile, the PTI plans to mobilise nationwide on 27 September to demand his release. Sohail Afridi, his party’s chief minister for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has said he will lead the march towards Adiala Jail.
That means Pakistan is approaching September with two seemingly contradictory messages: confrontation on the streets and the possibility of reconciliation behind the scenes.
Field Marshal Asim Munir has become an increasingly consequential interlocutor between Washington and Tehran. Reuters reported that Trump spoke directly with Munir before the army chief travelled to Tehran, urging Pakistan to use its influence to encourage Iran back towards negotiations. Munir subsequently travelled to Tehran with Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi, and Pakistan later said the talks had made “significant progress”.
There is a delicate foreign policy balancing act behind Pakistan’s new prominence. Islamabad has strong reasons to cultivate its relationship with Washington and has developed a notably close channel with Trump. But Pakistan cannot simply choose Washington over Tehran. It shares a border and substantial trade interests with Iran, maintains a deep strategic relationship with China, and has important religious, security, and economic relationships with the Gulf states.
Munir’s role in Iran diplomacy therefore reflects both Pakistan’s growing diplomatic relevance and the extraordinary concentration of foreign policy influence in the hands of the military leadership.
For Khan’s supporters, the irony is obvious. The military establishment they accuse of keeping their leader politically excluded is simultaneously presenting itself internationally as a pragmatic force capable of talking to Washington, Tehran and other regional capitals.
And this week, Khan’s extraordinary crossover from cricket legend to political icon was on display again. During the England–Pakistan Test, former England captain and broadcaster Michael Atherton interviewed Khan’s sons, Sulaiman and Kasim, during the lunch break about their father’s imprisonment.
The Pakistan Cricket Board subsequently complained (Opens in new window) to Sky Sports about the broadcast. The episode reportedly became so tense that there were discussions about whether Pakistan’s players would return to the field after lunch, although play ultimately resumed.
Azan Awais of Pakistan crossing into the members pavilion at Lord's Cricket Ground, 30 August 2026, London, England (Sam Mellish/Getty Images)
Khan’s sons made serious allegations about his treatment in prison, including claims of prolonged isolation and deteriorating health. Those are allegations from his family, not independently established facts, and should be treated as such. Pakistani authorities have rejected allegations of mistreatment, while international human rights organisations have expressed concern about Khan’s access to adequate medical care.
But the symbolism of the Atherton interview was difficult to miss.
For Australians, many of whom can still recall Khan lifting the 1992 World Cup trophy at the Melbourne Cricket Ground, his transformation from cricketing hero to Pakistan’s most consequential opposition leader gives this story resonance.
And it is not only nostalgia. Australia maintains defence, law enforcement, and counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan and has a Pakistani-Australian community of more than 100,000 people. Two-way trade in goods and services was approximately A$3.4 billion in 2025.
If the softer message from Khan’s camp represents a genuine willingness to de-escalate, the September mobilisation could become the beginning of a political opening rather than another confrontation.
If not, Pakistan risks entering another cycle of street mobilisation and political repression just as its military leadership is being asked to play a larger role in the region.
The question is no longer simply whether Imran Khan can be kept in prison. It is whether Pakistan can become a more significant global player while leaving its biggest political question unresolved at home.
About the author
Shadi Khan Saif
Shadi Khan Saif is a Melbourne-based journalist and a former Afghanistan/Pakistan correspondent for Reuters and Deutsche Welle.
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