Japan, explained.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung at the White House last month (Emily J. Higgins/White House Photo)

Peacemaker, Pacemaker, Playmaker: The three-way formula for engaging North Korea

A coordinated US-South Korea-Japan approach could succeed where previous bilateral efforts with Pyongyang have failed.

Jiwon Kim

9 September 20254 min read

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung assigned a role to Donald Trump and himself during their recent talks in Washington, respectively that of “Peacemaker” and “Pacemaker”. This framing was deliberate. Trump could bring North Korea’s Kim Jong-un back to the table as the peacemaker, and Lee would sustain the effort as pacemaker.

But if engagement with North Korea is to gain traction, a third role is needed: a “Playmaker”. That’s where Japan enters the picture – and why a three-part division of labour could offer a new blueprint for results-driven diplomacy. Japan’s domestic political turmoil will be a hurdle for such an approach, but regardless it is still a role the next prime minister will see benefits in taking on.

Trump remains the only US president to have met Kim Jong-un in person and developed a relationship that stood out from the usual diplomatic pattern. Despite the spectacle surrounding the past summits, he remains the only American leader since the end of the Korean war who came close to brokering a deal with Kim that could have mattered.

For Lee, this represents untapped political capital. If Trump believes that renewed diplomacy might boost his legacy, or even support his dream of a Nobel Peace Prize, it could revive dialogue where pressure has failed.

Any renewed diplomacy will still need to confront the question of North Korea’s nuclear program. The country’s arsenal has steadily grown, while the United States, South Korea, and Japan remain publicly committed to denuclearisation. But during his visit to Washington, Lee signalled a shift, acknowledging that pressure-based approaches of the past haven’t worked. This doesn’t mean accepting North Korea as a nuclear state. It means recognising the need for an approach grounded less in ideal end-states and more in incremental progress, mutual incentives, and aligning diplomacy with what both sides are actually prepared to trade.

Kim Jong-un shakes hands with Donald Trump in front of US and North Korean flags in a meeting room at the DMZ on the North and South Korean border (Shealah Craighead/White House Photo)

Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump may have generated a spectacle, but they got close to brokering a deal that could have mattered (Shealah Craighead/White House Photo)

If Trump can reopen the door, Lee’s job is to keep it from slamming shut. His choice to meet Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba before heading to Washington was carefully made. By reinforcing alignment with Tokyo first, Lee helped ensure that any US-North Korea breakthrough would unfold within a coordinated, three-way effort. That’s the essence of his role as Pacemaker, not to lead the talks, but to set the tempo and hold the process together.

Lee seems to recognise an uncomfortable truth: South Korea, on its own, lacks the leverage to compel North Korea to act. But that doesn’t mean Seoul lacks influence. As Pacemaker, Seoul can align efforts, manage the logistics of engagement, and keep momentum alive once talks begin. It can also help bridge US and Japanese priorities, ensuring they don’t fall into competing tracks. While South Korea may not steer the entire process, it is well positioned to guide its pace and help shape what’s on the table.

That’s where the Playmaker role comes in, and where Japan has something unique to offer. Lee and Ishiba confirmed a shared interest in engaging North Korea, and Japan signalled readiness to be more than just a bystander. This should be carried through by Ishiba’s successor. Japan brings leverage on long-shelved human rights issues, most notably the Japanese abductees, and the repatriation of Zainichi Korean and Japanese citizens under the “Paradise on Earth” campaign. Coordinated with South Korea’s own Prisoners of War (POW) and family reunification concerns, these issues could form the basis for a reciprocal humanitarian gesture that could give Pyongyang the kind of political capital it needs to justify its own moves.

If South Korea, the United States and Japan can back up their alignment with practical steps, this opening may gain momentum.

Diplomacy rarely hinges on what one side is willing to offer. More often, it depends on what the other side is prepared to receive. That makes the design of bargaining cards critical. A trilaterally backed tourism zone in Wonsan or Mount Kumgang could attract foreign visitors while generating hard currency. A joint health corridor could enable humanitarian aid without threatening regime control. A working-level infrastructure forum might lay groundwork for future cooperation. None of these ideas are magic bullets, but each represents a potential building block in a portfolio of incentives that can be tested, tailored, and sequenced.

However, even the best-designed ideas will falter without a structure to carry them forward. The 2014 Stockholm Agreement between Japan and North Korea collapsed in part because there was no structure to track commitments and no clear way to enforce accountability when they fell through. To avoid repeating the same mistake, the United States, South Korea, and Japan should consider creating a coordination team that monitors progress, aligns messaging, and strengthens accountability when implementation falters. Without such a mechanism, even the strongest diplomatic signals risk drifting into silence and collapse.

Coordination among the United States, South Korea, and Japan on North Korea is not unprecedented. But the clarity of roles now emerging is. There is an opportunity for Trump, Lee, Ishiba and whoever follows him to uniquely position themselves to play distinct parts as Peacemaker, Pacemaker, and Playmaker. If the three actors can back up their alignment with practical steps, this opening may gain momentum and not fade away like so many efforts before it.

For now, the roles are clear. What matters next is whether they’re played.

About the author

Jiwon Kim

Jiwon Kim is a MEXT Scholar and research student at the University of Tokyo, specialising in Japan-North Korea relations with a focus on human security.

Topics

Japan North Korea South Korea United States