India, explained.
In the past, even under the ambit of the Indo-Pacific, Australia’s engagement with the Indian Ocean has largely taken place in context of the military predominance of its treaty ally – the United States (Getty Images Plus)
Embassy openings and patrol boat gifts signal Canberra's recognition that Indian Ocean influence requires active engagement.
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Putting the “Indo” in Indo-Pacific, Australia’s westward pivotPutting the “Indo” in Indo-Pacific, Australia’s westward pivot
Taken together, Maldives and Sri Lanka might not appear priority visits for Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles. Yet these two Indian Ocean island states are crucial in a growing regional contest. With Marles having high-level meetings in both countries this month, alongside a trip to India and Indonesia, Australia is signalling a “look west” effort to forge closer ties with actors in the Indian Ocean.
Australia has long neglected the Indian Ocean. Canberra historically largely depended upon allies, first Britain and then the United States, to secure its interests in the Indian Ocean. Yet Asia’s development has forced a conceptual shift in Australia’s strategic thinking, especially with the embrace of the “Indo-Pacific” concept, which geospatially refers to the interconnected space between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
In the past, even under the ambit of the Indo-Pacific, Australia’s engagement with the Indian Ocean has largely taken place in context of the military predominance of its treaty ally – the United States. This has allowed Canberra to invest its resources and energy in building partnerships in the Pacific, where its key national security interests lie. For Washington, Australia’s strategic geography provided it with necessary leverage in ensuring a favourable balance of power in the region. While this mutually beneficial partnership has served Canberra well, growing concerns surrounding US strategy and reliability under President Donald Trump have forced Australia to re-think its foreign policy posture and regional relationships.
Having rejected Washington’s push to boost defence spending to 3.5% of its GDP – well above the government’s stated goal of increasing defence spending to 2.3% of the GDP by 2033 – the Albanese government has shown that Australia will exercise independence within the bounds of its alliance relationship with the United States. It is in this context that Australia’s Indian Ocean outreach becomes important.
Defence Minister Richard Marles, right, visiting Sri Lankan Navy Headquarters in Colombo, Sri Lanka (Kym Smith/Defence Department)
By enhancing partnerships in the northeastern Indian Ocean, which is largely ignored in Washington’s Indo-Pacific policy, Canberra has signalled its own priorities. The 2024 National Defence Strategy identified northeast Indian Ocean as part of what it calls its “immediate region.” In 2022, Canberra committed $36.5 million over five years to support opportunities for trade, investment and connectivity in the northeast Indian Ocean. Evidently, Canberra has doubled down on efforts to forge closer ties in the region which have yielded real results, as countries including Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka see Australia as a benign partner devoted to building their capabilities and contributing to regional stability.
Marles’ visit, shortly after Albanese’s re-election, sends a message that Australia is committed to increasing engagement in the Indian Ocean. Another important indication is the appointment of Tim Watts as Australia’s first-ever Special Envoy for Indian Ocean Affairs, who has been a strong advocate for Canberra to play the role of an “engaged partner, not a passive bystander” in shaping the Indian Ocean region.
While Australia has explicit ambitions to be the preferred security “partner of choice” for Pacific island nations, it has no such ambitions in the Indian Ocean.
During his visit to Maldives, Marles gifted Malé an Australian-built Guardian-class Patrol Boat, describing it as a “significant step towards enhancing Maldives’ capability to protect its sovereign waters and contribute to maritime security in the Indian Ocean.” As part of the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, Australia has been providing these vessels – designed for a range of maritime operations – to Pacific countries. This marks a rare instance of gifting the boat to a nation outside the Pacific. Marles was also present at the inauguration of the first Australian embassy in the Maldives, where he spoke about the prospects of defence cooperation between the two countries. Sri Lanka also received equipment from Australia including the KA-350 Beechcraft aircraft and a state-of-the-art Shallow Water Multi-Beam Echo Sounder sonar, which significantly enhance the island nation’s surveillance capabilities. Australia has long held concern about people smuggling syndicates in Sri Lanka but this latest support appears an extension of Canberra’s policy objective of supporting small states in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
At the same time, by visiting India, Marles sent an important signal that it recognises and respects India’s central role as a security provider in the Indian Ocean region. While Australia has explicit ambitions to be the preferred security “partner of choice” for Pacific island nations, it has no such ambitions in the Indian Ocean, due to pragmatic considerations stemming from resource constraints. However, by engaging with multiple actors in the Indian Ocean – instead of relying solely on India as the security guarantor for the region as Washington does – Australia is well positioned to navigate the complex regional setting.
Given the long history of relative neglect, Australia will have to work hard to integrate itself in the Indian Ocean community. However, the nascent steps taken by the newly re-elected government, emphasising collective security through engagement and collaboration, are undoubtedly welcome developments.
About the author
Rushali Saha
Rushali Saha serves as the Asia Desk Team Lead at Horizon Intelligence, a Belgium-based threat intelligence firm, and is an independent researcher specialising in Indo-Pacific geopolitics.
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