China’s “Global Security Initiative”, China’s vision for the international security order, has just turned three years old. The emerging picture of the GSI presents China as the leading responsible power committed to multilateral engagement and the provision of comprehensive security as a global good. But when read against China’s domestic security agenda, there are grounds for other countries to be concerned about China’s vision when it comes to traditional security.
The GSI was first proposed by Xi Jinping at the Bo’ao Forum for Asia in 2022, and subsequently fleshed out in a “concept paper” in 2023. It presented six “core” principles of common “comprehensive” security. National sovereignty was given heavy emphasis, along with adherence to the UN Charter. Taking “legitimate security concerns of all countries” seriously was another, as well as dispute resolution through dialogue. It also presented a commitment to security in traditional and non-traditional domains including health, environment, and AI.
A video released last month to mark the third anniversary presents the GSI as China-led but multilateral, showcasing China’s engagements with the UN and G20. Cooperation with all regions of the developing world is emphasised through China’s multilateral engagements, focusing on dialogue and cooperation with regional organisations such as ASEAN and the African Union, but also presenting an array of bilateral cooperation initiatives from health provision in Benin, to water cooperation in Sri Lanka, and civil aviation in Zimbabwe.
China has yet to back up its support for dialogue with genuine efforts at mediation and conflict resolution.
The video also references bilateral ties with Russia, Germany, and France – a nod to productive relations with major powers – while the United States is conspicuously absent. The GSI is a challenge to a US-led security order that China sees as rooted in military alliances as a tool of hegemony. Amid the uncertainties created by the second Trump administration, China is likely to find a ready audience for presenting itself as the responsible global power committed to multilateralism.
This is especially true in the Global South, where China has proven ready and willing to help with domestic and human security – assisting developing nations with health and infrastructure provision as well as through police training. These are welcome offerings for many countries, as with China’s Belt and Road projects, with alternatives from elsewhere often lacking.
However, the GSI’s vision of domestic and human security is not purely pragmatic. It bears a very close resemblance to a core concept in China’s domestic politics: Comprehensive National Security. The implications of this concept are exactly as they sound: virtually all aspects of national activity are considered matters of security, including resource access, health, economics – and China’s overseas interests. This does not mean the GSI will serve as a mechanism for China to export its political system, but it does suggest that GSI-linked initiatives will spread China’s understanding of security abroad, especially where this strengthens host countries’ capacity to protect Chinese investments and development projects.
When it comes to more traditional security concerns, the central role of the UN in China’s vision should be read against its emphasis on conflict mediation through “dialogue and consultation”. GSI-linked efforts here include China’s calls for peace negotiations over the Russia-Ukraine war. However, in practice, while rhetorically upholding the principle of national sovereignty, China has continued to provide economic support for Russia and deepen bilateral ties. China has yet to back up its support for dialogue with genuine efforts at mediation and conflict resolution.
This points to a tension between the GSI’s principles of sovereignty and countries’ “legitimate security interests”. The broader implication is that some countries’ security interests are more legitimate than others. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in the South China Sea. China’s pursuit of its own perceived security interests through maritime intimidation and land reclamation comes at the expense of the interests of other claimants – and is justified through its own claim to sovereignty. Meanwhile, China’s participation in talks on the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is presented as an example of the GSI in action.
This suggests that major powers which China views favourably have greater leeway to pursue their “legitimate security interests” at the expense of others’ sovereignty. Any conflicts this creates are to be mediated by dialogue and consultation – something that has proven ineffective so far both in the South China Sea and in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the effect being to further the interests of the stronger party.
So, while the GSI will likely prove attractive to many developing countries in areas of non-traditional and domestic security, it is a far cry from a solution to international conflict. The close link between GSI rhetoric and Comprehensive National Security should give pause, especially when a key component of Beijing’s broader strategy for military modernisation – something kept rhetorically separate from the GSI – is building global military capabilities to protect China’s interests.
The GSI has genuine potential when it comes to human security, and perhaps in future the same will be true of conflict mediation. But prospective partners should be willing to challenge China now on the GSI’s core principles to ensure it does not simply become a mechanism for China’s “legitimate interests” at the expense of others’ sovereignty.
