Seoul’s defence pivot to Europe

North Korea’s troops in Ukraine have given South Korea and European nations new reasons to work together.

Gabriela Bernal

15 September 20264 min read

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has just returned from France, where his state visit produced a series of agreements (Opens in new window) across defence, security and defence industry. One notable outcome was an updated agreement on the protection of classified military information, alongside plans for greater military interoperability, strategic exercises and defence-industrial cooperation. French President Emmanuel Macron framed (Opens in new window) the relationship in unusually stark terms, stating that greater cooperation between France and South Korea could help the two countries avoid becoming “vassals of any major power”.

The visit is the latest sign of something broader: Seoul’s defence relationships with Europe are expanding rapidly. Although cooperation between South Korea and European states predates the Ukraine war, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the return of Donald Trump to the White House have given it new urgency.

Two challenges in particular are pushing Seoul and European governments closer together: uncertainty over US defence commitments to its allies, and the increasingly consequential military partnership between Russia and North Korea.

For Europe, North Korea is no longer just a Korean Peninsula issue. Pyongyang has supplied Moscow with ammunition, missiles and troops, making it part of the wider security challenge created by the Ukraine war, as NATO increasingly links (Opens in new window) European and Indo-Pacific security. For Seoul, the worry is North Korean troops are gaining combat experience from Russian ties, which could accelerate Pyongyang’s military capabilities through sensitive technology transfers by Moscow, and raise the risk of a potential conflict on the peninsula becoming a wider war.

This matters strategically because it creates relationships that are deeper than conventional arms sales.

This convergence of threats is increasingly translating into concrete cooperation between Seoul and Europe.

At the EU level, Brussels and Seoul signed (Opens in new window) a Security and Defence Partnership in November 2024, creating a formal framework for cooperation on maritime security, space security, cyber and hybrid threats, counterterrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation and conflict prevention. The partnership has quickly moved beyond political declarations. A first security and defence dialogue between the EU and South Korea was held (Opens in new window) in Brussels in November 2025, followed by a second (Opens in new window) in Seoul in May 2026, at which the two sides further vowed to deepen defence cooperation.

Cooperation in the maritime domain has been particularly tangible. South Korea participated (Opens in new window) in the EU’s Operation Atalanta, and the two sides conducted (Opens in new window) a joint naval exercise in early 2026.

In addition, NATO provides another important bridge. South Korea has been a NATO partner since 2005, but cooperation has accelerated as the alliance has sought closer engagement with its Indo-Pacific partners. Korean and NATO military officials held staff talks (Opens in new window) in Seoul in May 2025 and again (Opens in new window) at NATO headquarters in Brussels in June 2026, discussing interoperability, standardisation, cyber exercises and military training. Seoul has also participated (Opens in new window) in NATO initiatives involving cyber defence, new technologies and countering hybrid threats.

South Korea has participated (Opens in new window) in NATO’s annual Locked Shields cyber-defence exercise since 2021 and also joined NATO’s enhanced science and technology partnership in 2025.

South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Lieutenant General Dae Won Kwon at the "Partners in the Indo-Pacific" meeting with NATO in January (NATO/Flickr)

Perhaps the most visible expression of Europe’s growing interest in South Korean defence capabilities, however, is the dramatic expansion of arms cooperation.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine created an urgent demand for weapons among European states, while South Korea could offer relatively rapid deliveries of modern systems at competitive prices. Poland emerged as the centrepiece of this new chapter of defence cooperation. Its enormous procurement agreements (Opens in new window) with Seoul have included (Opens in new window) K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers, FA-50 aircraft and Chunmoo rocket launchers. The relationship is now moving beyond purchases toward joint production and technology transfer, including a planned (Opens in new window) Polish facility for K2 production and a joint venture to manufacture Chunmoo missiles.

This matters strategically because it creates relationships that are deeper than conventional arms sales. Training, maintenance, technology transfer, local production and interoperability can turn defence procurement into long-term security partnerships.

The latest France–South Korea meeting was emblematic of the trend. The agreements signed in France this month envisage regular military exercises, stronger information exchanges and greater interoperability. Notably, the French Pégase air mission is also scheduled (Opens in new window) to stop in South Korea, while the revised classified-information agreement should facilitate more sensitive defence cooperation, which could be particularly relevant in monitoring North Korea–Russia military cooperation.

While deeper cooperation between Europe and Seoul does not mean either side will replace the United States as its primary defence partner anytime soon, the changing international environment is giving both stronger incentives to diversify their strategic relationships. Over time, this could strengthen their ability to withstand growing security threats and greater uncertainty over the scope and reliability of US defence commitments.

What began largely as economic cooperation is evolving into a more consequential security relationship as the threats facing the EU and South Korea become increasingly interconnected.

About the author

Gabriela Bernal

Dr Gabriela Bernal is a Korean affairs analyst based in Seoul, South Korea, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies.

Topics

South Korea EU North Korea Defence & security Russia