My first trip to the Lowy Institute was in 2011. It was a different era. It was the year of Barack Obama’s “pivot” to Asia. The joint statement that followed Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington was full of warm words about co-operation and mutual benefit. Joe Biden, then vice-president, visited Moscow to pursue the administration’s “reset” in ties with Russia. That world seems unrecognisable now.
I was fortunate enough to return to Lowy in November last year as a distinguished visiting fellow. After conversations with a wide range of informed people across Sydney and Canberra – during the week of the American election, as it happens – I thought it might be useful to reflect on some of the themes of my trip.
China loomed large, of course, and what struck me was the contrast between the short- and medium-term challenge. In the short term, the view among officials is that China wants to calm things abroad to focus on economic and political stability at home. It is not in the mood to take big risks or pick big fights. That might explain, for instance, its decision to thaw out the relationship with Australia and agree to a military disengagement on the disputed border with India. I would also point to reporting, by my colleagues at The Economist, that the corruption scandals and purges in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have also reduced Beijing’s confidence that its forces are on track to be able to invade Taiwan by 2027, an issue explicitly raised in the Pentagon’s latest report on Chinese military power.
Yet insiders in Australia believe that the political-military balance is still moving in China’s favour, though perhaps more slowly than before. The PLA, I was told, is becoming more professional, capable and “joint” in its exercises and in its operations. Its aircraft-carrier task groups are improving steadily. And Sino-Russian joint exercises mean that battlefield knowledge from Ukraine is trickling east.
What, exactly, deters Xi Jinping, and is it different to what deterred Soviet and Russian leaders?
There is increasing attention being paid to the risk of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan, rather than just an amphibious invasion. The fact that each year China’s navy grows roughly by the size of the entire UK Royal Navy means that it has enough hulls to dominate the waters around Taiwan and also to venture into the second island chain with growing frequency. But Taiwan is not the only flashpoint of concern. I was told that Australia has wargamed in detail a number of non-Taiwan scenarios that would involve the commitment of the entire Australian Defence Force and national mobilisation. The assumption is that a crisis in the South China Sea would escalate not just vertically but also horizontally, spreading across the Indo-Pacific theatre, inevitably touching Australia. “There is no tradition of proxy or limited wars in Asia,” one senior figure suggested to me.
I found that many people were interested in discussing the question of how Australia would deter Chinese attacks on the Australian homeland, particularly against American facilities in the north. AUKUS is obviously part of the answer to this problem, though officials were keen to stress other long-range strike options that will enter service long before that, somewhere between 2027 and 2030. But the question of how America contributes to this through extended deterrence is also increasingly important. Australia is banned by treaty from hosting American nuclear weapons on its soil, as NATO allies do. But might it welcome American nuclear-armed submarines? Should it encourage America to pursue and deploy “sub-strategic” (i.e., lower-yield) nuclear cruise missiles on attack submarines to signal to China that America has a range of nuclear retaliatory options?
This prompted bigger questions. What, exactly, deters Xi Jinping, and is it different to what deterred Soviet and Russian leaders? Will China be deterred more by threats to its own nuclear arsenal or to other capabilities? In a speech earlier this year, Vipin Narang, then a senior nuclear official at the Pentagon, described how NATO had recently put a lot of work into “raising and refreshing … nuclear IQ” – the practical and intellectual aspects of planning, preparing for and deterring nuclear use. Australian officials want to do the same. And that is in part because of serious concern over escalation through misunderstanding.
Another big theme was the relationship between Europe and Asia. The introduction of North Korean troops to the battlefield in the war against Ukraine has accentuated the link between the two theatres. The focus is less on European military assets and more on economic deterrence: what economic pain would Europe inflict on China in the event of a war? I don’t think anyone has a good answer to that yet. As Agathe Demarais notes, Europeans do have credible options if they want to develop and use them: “the EU can work with its G7 allies to design trade measures that would deal China a serious blow but have only a moderate impact on European economies.”
At the diplomatic and political level, the situation is not entirely gloomy. There is a recognition that China has had a rough year. A number of regional partnerships – Japan and South Korea, say, or Philippines-Vietnam-Singapore – have firmed up. “The sinews are coming together,” argued one official. That is certainly the story the Biden administration likes to tell. But there is also a broader malaise that the transfer of capability between Russia, China and North Korea (and, to a lesser extent, Iran) is growing more quickly and decisively than Western partnerships are coming together. America is still focused on military objectives in Asia, goes the complaint, rather than economic or diplomatic ones. “Corporate America buys things, rather than investing in Southeast Asia,” grumbled one official. “The US is not playing a good ground game on trade.” That seems unlikely to change under Donald Trump.
I’m grateful to the Lowy Institute for hosting me, and to Sam Roggeveen, in particular, for accompanying me. See you again in the Trump years, Australia.
Shashank Joshi's visit was supported the Australian Department of Defence through the Strategic Policy Grants program.
