Army soldier standing below a flying South Korean flag

Russia and China are no longer in need of Seoul’s loans and investments and are contesting the US-led order (Choi Yoonhyeok/DVIDS)

South Korea no longer holds the cards against the North

Seoul built its North Korea policy on leverage it no longer has – and Pyongyang is in no hurry to negotiate.

Khang Vu

29 April 20264 min read

Almost a year since South Korean President Lee Jae-myung assumed office, South Korea has not found a formula to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. Lee has been disappointed in his efforts, having adopted a largely similar agenda to that of his liberal predecessor Moon Jae-in, prioritising a resumption of inter-Korean exchanges with no pre-conditions and to serve as a “pacemaker” for future US-North Korea talks. Pyongyang’s growing diplomatic clout has made it more confident to wait out Washington and Seoul.

However, Seoul’s declining diplomatic leverage is also to blame.

South Korea’s post-Cold War policy toward North Korea is built on former President Roh Tae-woo’s (1988-93) “Nordpolitik”. In the closing days of the Cold War, when the communist bloc was mired in both economic and political crises, South Korea launched efforts to establish ties with socialist countries. In exchange, these countries got access to South Korean loans and investments. Seoul’s logic was to isolate North Korea from its socialist allies by economic and diplomatic means to restrain its nuclear program and military provocations. Once North Korea was isolated, South Korea could offer incentives to denuclearise via economic rewards and diplomatic recognition.

China’s and the Soviet Union’s thirst for foreign capital led them to reciprocate South Korea’s diplomatic outreach. Seoul isolated North Korea from the two patrons when it established ties with Moscow and Beijing in 1990 and 1992 respectively. Seoul used its economic might to undermine Moscow’s and Beijing’s security commitments to North Korea. Moscow allowed the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with North Korea to expire in 1996 and did away with the military support clause in the successive 2000 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness, and Cooperation. China kept its 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with North Korea, but scaled back economic and diplomatic assistance to the point of enforcing United Nations sanctions on North Korea.

Seoul and Washington had many opportunities to translate their advantage into a concrete political outcome, but they let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

Seoul’s campaign to isolate Pyongyang succeeded, illustrated by the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea and North Korea’s ratification of the safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1992, which it had refused to do a few years earlier. The US post-Cold War unipolar moment tremendously helped with enforcing economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation on North Korea when it failed to comply with nuclear inspections. Periods of South Korea-led engagement with the North during the Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003), Roh Moo-hyun (2003–08), and Moon Jae-in (2017–22) administrations were built on the implicit threat that if North Korea did not denuclearise, it would face more sanctions and diplomatic isolation not only from the West but also from Russia and China. Due to sanctions and isolation, North Korea reciprocated Seoul’s peace initiatives.

Now, the geopolitical basis of Seoul’s isolation campaign no longer holds.

A photo released by North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency said to show Kim Jong Un participating in a commemorative photo session with soldiers who were involved in the construction of the Sinuiju Combined Greenhouse Farm in North Pyongan Province, North Korea (Via Getty Images)

Unlike the early 1990s, Russia and China are no longer in need of Seoul’s loans and investments and are contesting the US-led order. They have been more tolerant of North Korea’s provocations and nuclear program. China’s decision to renew its alliance treaty with North Korea in 2021 and Russia reviving its treaty in 2024 mark a reversal of fortune for Seoul’s three-decade effort to undermine their security commitments to Pyongyang. North Korea has ensured that it will not be abandoned again by adopting Russia’s and China’s key foreign policy objectives. Not only does it continue to provide military support for Russia’s war against Ukraine but also – for the first time – publicly endorsed the “one-China” principle and China’s aim to realise its territorial integrity, as signalled during Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent visit.

The end of the US unipolar moment hurt Seoul’s ability to sanction Pyongyang. China’s and Russia’s establishment of an alternative system of payment and the weakening of the petrodollar system due to the US war against Iran has enhanced North Korea’s ability to circumvent sanctions.

The overstretch of the US military also undermines Seoul’s diplomatic leverage. Its withdrawal of air defence assets from South Korea in recent months in service of US military aims in the Middle East – and its demand for Seoul to pay more for US protection – means North Korea will not have to press for a scale-back of the US military presence as a part of an arms control deal. Washington also partially restricted sharing intelligence on North Korea-related technology with Seoul after South Korea’s Foreign Minister Chung Dong-young allegedly leaked US intelligence on North Korea’s third nuclear site at Kusong. The restriction hurts US-South Korea coordination on their respective North Korea policies.

Over the past three decades, Seoul and Washington had many opportunities to translate their advantage into a concrete political outcome, but they let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Efforts to end the Korean War during the Kim, Roh, and Moon administrations received Chinese and Russian support. North Korea was willing to freeze its nuclear program in 1994, 2012, and 2019. An arms control deal in exchange for partial sanction relief then would have been enough to lock in the gains. However, tying the peace talks to the denuclearisation talks meant that any achievements fell short of total.

The opportunities to strike a deal with North Korea on Seoul’s terms have passed. For Seoul, searching for a post-post-Cold War formula to engage North Korea will require abandoning the assumption that it holds the upper hand in inter-Korean relations.

About the author

Khang Vu

Khang Vu is a visiting scholar in the Political Science Department at Boston College.

Topics

North Korea South Korea United States China Diplomacy Russia