Support for Taiwan is often presented as a binary: the West either defends a fellow democracy or abandons it to authoritarianism. But the real dilemma is not moral. It is strategic. For all the attention given to allied resolve, far less is said about the internal resolve of Taiwan itself. And as the threat from Beijing intensifies, that asymmetry becomes harder to ignore.
It is now commonplace to speak of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, through submarines, alliances, and multilateral forums. Yet deterrence is not a gift. It is a relationship. It requires reciprocity. And the unspoken anxiety among allies is this: what if Taiwan does not hold up its end of the bargain?
This is not about blame. It is about realism. Taiwan’s military service, until recently, lasted only four months. Conscription evasion remains widespread. Defence spending has increased but still falls short of the urgency implied by official rhetoric. Civic mobilisation is growing, but slowly. And public opinion remains ambivalent, supportive of autonomy, but unsure about confrontation.
All of this creates what might be called the conditionality dilemma: should the United States, Australia and others continue to provide political, technological and even military support to an island that may, under sustained pressure, choose not to resist?
Taiwan’s defence, if it is to be sustainable, must be led by Taiwan.
This is the uncomfortable question at the heart of the alliance conversation. And it has no easy answer.
The false symmetry of moral language
The Western political lexicon often defaults to the language of shared values. Taiwan is democratic. China is not. Therefore, Taiwan deserves support. But strategy is not built on sentiment. It is built on credibility. And the most important signal that a state can send is its willingness to endure pain to preserve sovereignty.
In this respect, Ukraine has changed expectations. It fought back, not because it was urged to, but because it had planned to. It had trained, stocked, drilled and prepared to suffer. In doing so, it earned global support. Taiwan, by contrast, is still in the early stages of building that social contract. The risk is not that its leaders are weak, but that its institutions remain untested.
Beijing understands this. Its strategy may well be to exploit ambiguity, not to provoke a kinetic war, but to create an environment in which the cost of defiance always seems marginally higher than the cost of accommodation. Over time, that calculus erodes resolve from within.
The quiet logic of misallocated deterrence capital
For allied planners, this introduces an operational hazard. Deterrence is expensive. It requires not only military platforms but political capital, diplomatic bandwidth and often the exposure of sensitive technology. In the case of Taiwan, all of these are on the table. But if Taipei were to collapse under grey-zone pressure, through elite capture, psychological erosion or calculated surrender, then much of that deterrence investment risks being co-opted.
Advanced weapons can be reverse-engineered. Shared intelligence may be exposed. Training protocols and defence planning could fall into hostile hands. The West would not only lose a partner, it would risk enhancing its rival. This is what misallocated deterrence capital looks like: a transfer of advantage under the guise of support.
It is for this reason that some within allied capitals have begun to speak, carefully, of conditionality. Not as a threat, but as a recognition that partnership must reflect shared stakes. Taiwan’s defence, if it is to be sustainable, must be led by Taiwan.
The politics of preparation
To its credit, Taipei has begun to adjust course. Military service has been extended. Civil defence is gaining attention. Cognitive warfare, once ignored, is now discussed in official circles. But the messaging remains partial. And the tempo remains slow. Taiwan’s democratic culture, open economy and global integration should be strategic strengths. But they can only function as such if they are backed by institutional stamina.
Democracies do not default to resilience. They must build it, deliberately and continuously. That means a shift not just in defence posture but in political culture: from comfort to vigilance, from assumption to action. For Taiwan, this is the most difficult transition, and the most vital.
Allies, meanwhile, must manage their own political expectations. Public support for Taiwan cannot be built on abstract narratives. It must be grounded in visible commitment. If citizens in Canberra, Tokyo or Washington are to back deterrence, they must believe it is not unilateral. They must see that those most at risk are preparing to endure what is necessary.
The long game of credibility
The challenge ahead is not just to defend Taiwan. It is to ensure that Taiwan is preparing to defend itself. This is not an argument for abandonment. It is a call for alignment, between rhetoric and readiness, between support and sovereignty.
In the end, the credibility of any alliance rests not on treaties or statements, but on shared purpose under pressure. If that purpose is lopsided, if one side bears all the risk while the other reserves judgment then deterrence becomes fiction.
Taiwan has much to admire: a free society, a capable economy, a dynamic culture. But none of this guarantees strategic resilience. That must be earned, not assumed. And the window to earn it is closing.
