The half-life of Bangladesh’s Russia deal

Bangladesh has just entered into one of the longest and most consequential foreign partnerships in its modern history – with Russia.

The Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (Opens in new window) is Bangladesh’s first foray into nuclear energy. The plant, which started loading fuel in April this year, was built by Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom, at a cost estimated at close to US$13 billion.

The project is not simply about electricity generation. It ties Bangladesh to Russia financially, technologically, and institutionally for decades to come. Nearly 90% of the total cost has been drawn (Opens in new window) from Russian financing.

The deal stems from a 2013 visit to Moscow (Opens in new window) by then prime minister Sheikh Hasina, when the two countries signed agreements on nuclear cooperation and Russian financing support. Russia has agreed to supply nuclear fuel, train Bangladeshi engineers, assist with maintenance, and remain involved in technical operations throughout the plant’s life cycle, expected to stretch roughly 60 years.

That creates a relationship Bangladesh cannot easily walk away from.

Unlike roads, bridges, or coal plants, nuclear infrastructure creates long-term dependence. Once a country enters a nuclear partnership (Opens in new window), it becomes tied to the supplier through uranium supply chains, spare parts, technical expertise, software systems, and waste management arrangements. In Rooppur’s case, Russia has also agreed (Opens in new window) to take back spent nuclear fuel, adding another layer of long-term dependence.

For Bangladesh, the decision makes sense in many ways.

The country has struggled with energy insecurity for years. Domestic gas reserves are declining (Opens in new window). Bangladesh has also faced repeated electricity shortages that affected industries and households alike. Nuclear power offers something successive governments have long searched for: stable baseload electricity that is less vulnerable to global fuel price shocks. Once fully operational, Rooppur is expected to generate 2,400 megawatts of electricity.

The agreement is also founded on a long history. For decades, relations between Dhaka and Moscow were shaped largely by Soviet support (Opens in new window) for Bangladesh’s independence, including backing at the United Nations when the United States and China sided with Pakistan. Soviet assistance later helped (Opens in new window) clear mines and sunken vessels from Chittagong port, while several Soviet-backed industrial and power projects became part of Bangladesh’s early state-building efforts.

But the nuclear project also fits into a much bigger Russian strategy.

Over the last two decades, Rosatom has quietly become one of Moscow’s most important foreign policy tools (Opens in new window). Russia may have lost much of its economic influence after the Cold War, but nuclear diplomacy remains one area where it still competes globally with the West and China.

Rosatom operates or builds projects across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Countries including Turkey, Egypt, Hungary, and Bangladesh have all entered long-term nuclear agreements with Russia.

Unlike trade agreements or infrastructure loans, nuclear cooperation lasts generations. A government may change, foreign policy priorities may shift, but reactors continue running. Engineers still need training. Fuel still needs to arrive. Technical support still needs to continue. Hasina is gone, overthrown in a 2024 uprising, and yet the plant remains.

That is what makes Rooppur important beyond energy policy.

In many ways, the project is creating a small but visible Russian footprint inside Bangladesh itself. Around Rooppur, hundreds of Russian workers and engineers have been living for years. Restaurants, markets, and shops in nearby areas now display Russian-language signboards, menus, and imported products. Locals sometimes describe the area as a piece of Russia (Opens in new window) inside Bangladesh.

The symbolism matters because the project has unfolded during sustained pressure on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.

Bangladesh has traditionally tried to avoid taking sides in geopolitical rivalries, maintaining relations with powers including China, India, the United States, Japan, European nations and Gulf countries.

The deeper Bangladesh becomes tied to Russian nuclear systems, the harder it becomes to separate politics from infrastructure. This does not mean Dhaka is entering Russia’s camp. Bangladesh will continue balancing multiple relationships, particularly because of its dependence on ready-made garments exports to Western markets. But infrastructure dependence naturally limits flexibility over time.

The Rooppur plant is a further example that major powers no longer compete only through military alliances or ideological blocs but seek influence through systems countries cannot easily replace – ports, telecom networks, semiconductor supply chains, energy grids, and nuclear reactors.

Russia’s nuclear diplomacy receives far less attention than China’s Belt and Road Initiative. But in some ways, it creates even deeper forms of long-term presence.

During the ceremony marking the delivery of uranium fuel to Rooppur in 2023, Vladimir Putin remarked (Opens in new window) in a video meeting with Hasina that Russia and Bangladesh were building “not just a nuclear power plant, but the entire atomic industry”.

That may be the clearest description yet of what Rooppur actually represents. Not just electricity generation, but a long-term Russian presence inside Bangladesh’s energy sector – and a foothold in South Asia.