Economically, ASEAN remains far from achieving its vision of a single market and production base. Intra-ASEAN trade continues to hover around 20–25% of total trade, and regulatory harmonisation remains challenges despite various facilitation frameworks. The ASEAN-X model, while enabling pragmatic flexibility, has entrenched a two-speed system that may undermine integrative ambitions. An example is that while the six founding members (ASEAN-6) achieved tariff reductions, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam have moved at a slower pace thanks to their differentiated levels of development.
Diplomatically, the Myanmar crisis has further exposed ASEAN’s limits. The Five-Point Consensus, once seen as a modest starting point, has stalled, with no enforceable commitments and little appetite for acceleration. The junta continues to defy ASEAN’s nominal pressure with impunity. Rather than mediate or isolate, ASEAN has defaulted to exclusion-without-action, suspending high-level engagement with Myanmar but offering no meaningful alternative.
In the South China Sea, ASEAN faces a familiar impasse. Member states are split between claimants and fence-sitters. China continues to exploit these divisions through bilateral deals, economic inducements and political influence, especially with Cambodia and Laos. The long-awaited Code of Conduct remains aspirational. ASEAN’s strength as a convenor has not translated into strength as a collective actor.
Even internal disputes reveal institutional gaps. The leaked phone call incident between Thailand and Cambodia escalated into a domestic crisis in Thailand, a formal investigation and the suspension of the Thai Prime Minister. With the Thai government facing possible collapse, the episode has severely strained bilateral relations. Yet ASEAN remained silent, offering no platform for de-escalation.
These are not isolated setbacks. ASEAN’s current operating model, centred on consensus and non-interference, is insufficient for the scale of the problems it now faces.
The “ASEAN Way”, with its emphasis on informal diplomacy, consensus, and non-intervention, has long been credited with keeping peace in a diverse region. And rightly so. But norms that once enabled cohesion now often obstruct it. Consensus gives every member a veto, leading to inaction on issues that demand urgency. Non-interference, once a shield against external imposition, has become a barrier to addressing crises within.
Timor-Leste’s accession will likely reinforce this dynamic. Its dependence on Chinese-backed infrastructure and economic support could complicate ASEAN’s already-fractured positions on regional geopolitics. Or its democratic credentials could unsettle ASEAN’s internal balance, where democratic norms, though officially encoded, are often downplayed in favour of regional cohesion and consensus. If the bloc cannot coordinate responses to existing tensions, adding another diplomatically unpredictable member may further dilute its ability to act.
What is now at stake is not just operational but reputational. ASEAN’s claim to “centrality” in regional affairs depends on shaping outcomes, not just being present.
