United States, explained.
Adm Christopher W Grady, Vice Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivers remarks at the US Air Force B-21 Raider unveiling ceremony, Palmdale, California, 2 December 2022. (US Air Force/Flickr)
The impact of the President’s second term on the global nuclear order could be profoundly negative.
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Trump and the global nuclear orderTrump and the global nuclear order
Donald Trump’s comeback to the White House poses a substantial challenge to the global nuclear order. His previous administration had contempt for arms control agreements. The United States’ exit from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty removed a vital guardrail to nuclear escalation in Europe. This move, while deemed legitimate by the US in reaction to Russian transgressions of the Treaty, considerably weakened the international framework for arms control. Moreover, the hesitance of his first administration to prolong New START, the last existing nuclear weapons limitation treaty between the US and Russia, nearly led to its rupture prior to the Biden administration obtaining a five-year extension. This reluctance originated from Trump’s insistence on including China in future arms control talks.
Just having more nuclear weapons during the Cold War did little to make the United States safer.
The transactional approach to arms control in Trump’s first-term is casting a long shadow on the future of the global nuclear order in his second term. His America First platform is expected to reinforce his pursuit of unilateral nuclear programs.
The impending expiry of New START in February 2026 could be a pivotal moment in the stability of the global nuclear order. Trump was previously either uninterested in renewing the treaty or sought renegotiation under conditions disadvantageous to Russia. The good news is that both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin have signalled a willingness to restart nuclear arms talks as soon as possible. However, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal is a complication because Trump insists on China being a party to the talks.
Even if there’s a breakthrough on this front, there won’t be any stopping the massive US nuclear modernisation program already underway and costing $1.7 trillion over 30 years or nearly $75 billion per year from 2023 to 2032. The plans include “a new class of ballistic missile submarines, a new set of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, a modified gravity bomb, a new stealthy long-range strike bomber, and associated warheads … for each delivery system”. Trump’s expected backing for this program, combined with plans for new systems like the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) and the potential deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the Indo-Pacific and European theatres, contribute to a resurgence of nuclear arms development on a global scale.
Furthermore, Trump is backing the upgrading of US missile defence shield by adding an interceptor layer in space. He laid out his vision for missile defence in his first term, saying in 2019: “[W]e will recognise that space is a new warfighting domain, with the Space Force leading the way. My upcoming budget will invest in a space-based missile defence layer. It’s new technology. It’s ultimately going to be a very, very big part of our defence and, obviously, of our offense”. If Trump pursues a nationwide missile defence shield, it could lead Russia and China to build more numerous and sophisticated offensive missile systems to overwhelm and evade American defences.
To make matters worse, the United States may resume nuclear testing for the first time since 1992. Breaking the long-standing tradition of refraining from nuclear testing may see other nuclear-armed states follow suit. According to several analysts, the US does not need to start testing again to preserve the credibility or efficacy of its nuclear weapons, with current modelling and simulation methods enough to guarantee the safety and dependability of nuclear weapons. Therefore, critics argue, recommencing testing would be solely a political decision to demonstrate strength. Supporters argue that although simulation is improving, it cannot fully replace real world testing, especially for new weapon designs.
The potential impact of Trump's second term on the global nuclear order is profoundly negative. His previous acts, as well as the declared goals of those in his orbit, indicate that unilateral policies that emphasise short-term gain over long-term global stability will likely be maintained and intensified. The consequences – an unregulated nuclear weapons race, the loss of global norms, and heightened regional instability – call for immediate action from the international community.
The United States may resume nuclear testing for the first time since 1992.
The absence of a balanced strategy risks ushering in a period of increased nuclear peril. Experts and advocates working to reduce nuclear threats should remind US authorities that just having more nuclear weapons during the Cold War did little to make the country safer. Rather, the accidents and miscalculations generated by the pursuit of nuclear superiority nearly led to Armageddon on several occasions.
About the author
Anubhav S Goswami
Anubhav S Goswami is a Doctoral Student of Politics and International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Science, Murdoch University, Perth.
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