Syrian governments are notoriously opaque. Syria’s new regime under transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa, is no exception. Having cancelled the existing Syrian Constitution, al-Sharaa governs with the help of his previous Idlib-based Syrian Salvation Government cabinet until a new constitution can be drafted and general elections held. How this happens, if at all, will reveal the character of the new government.
Once with al-Qaeda, Al-Sharaa presents as a moderate Islamist, but is that credible? Moderacy suits Western hopes and those of several Arab states such as Egypt. But there are flaws with the notion that the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a progressive, inclusive interim president of Syria. Al-Sharaa’s transition from Sunni extremist is a legitimate question, but perhaps more importantly, what of HTS itself, and its members and factions? Will they follow?
At the time of writing, the Australian government’s website, Australian National Security, lists HTS as “a Sunni Islamist religiously motivated violent extremist (RMVE) group based in north-western Syria ... [which] aims to replace the government with an Islamic caliphate”. This description seems to be the view of the United Nations and many other countries that maintain sanctions on Syria as well as HTS. It is implausible that HTS leaders and rank and file have changed so much on taking power. If so, it is a modern “road to Damascus” conversion.
Scepticism is warranted. There are reports of the new government changing the national school curriculum to be more Islamic, and of a minister attending the execution of a woman accused of “corruption and prostitution”.
Syrian women will likely worry about HTS’s governance of Idlib since 2017. It enforced strict Islamic dress codes, restrictions on movement, education and employment, and Islamic punishment for actions deemed crimes according to Sunni extremist ideology. This is common knowledge in Syria and beyond in the Middle East but barely punctures the West’s attachment to simplistic narratives, especially of good versus bad, with former president Bashar al-Assad being the poster boy of bad to the West.
Not surprisingly, public statements by Arab government leaders are commonly viewed cynically in the Middle East, both by their people and leaders of other governments.
In the background is the reality al-Sharaa must answer to – a militant base of fighters who are unlikely to have fought a war to establish a progressive and inclusive government in Damascus, and backers such as Qatar and Türkiye whose interests are served by conservative Sunni Islam.
Accordingly, interim al-Sharaa and the HTS movement will come under pressure not just from the West, but also from its base, and regional players to show its real spots. Al-Sharaa’s statements and those of his ministers are now geared to gain western support, relief from sanctions and deliver money. These are likely contradicting the facts in Syria. For al-Sharaa, his main focus is on his relations with his neighbours and Arab donors. Therefore, the West’s actual influence will be limited.
The Egyptian government has a position on developments in Syria. Unsympathetic to the Iran-aligned Assad regime, and in favour of a Sunni-led government in Damascus, Cairo’s real interests remain domestic. Cairo is firmly focused on the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, a pan-Arab Sunni political movement running conservative Islamist counter-government rhetoric and operations in a number of Arab states, including Egypt.
From 2011 to 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood governed in Egypt – an historic achievement after decades of oppression by the Mubarak regime. However, it overreached with fundamentalist perspectives and policies, and was overturned by partially public but mostly military action. The subsequent el-Sisi government dusted off the Mubarak playbook and looks anxiously for any sign of Muslim Brotherhood revival. In this context, a hardline Sunni regime in Damascus is far from pleasing, especially given the potential for it to influence Egyptians and their neighbouring Gazans.
Qatar, on the other hand, has been quick to engage al-Sharaa and HTS. Doing so entrenches Iran’s loss of Syria as both an agent provocateur and transit point for sustaining Hezbollah; outcomes that are celebrated across the Gulf. More importantly for Qatar and other conservative Sunni regimes, the rise and ascension to power in Damascus of HTS establishes a new seat of power for conservative, if not fundamentalist, Sunni Islam, overturning a Shia-leaning regime.
Qatar in particular is keen to expand its influence in Syria through al-Sharaa and HTS and Gaza through whoever governs there in the future. Qatar was described to me by an Egyptian diplomat as “a dwarf with a megaphone”, but its money has great influence. This was evident at the start of the Syrian civil war, where Qatar bankrolled Sunni rebels in the war against Assad, only to have many of those rebels morph into the later Islamic State movement.
Indeed, Qatar and Türkiye are now the apparent powers behind the new Damascus regime. Türkiye’s involvement in the rise of HTS is well known. However, the level of its coordination with Qatar is less obvious, but likely influential, as evident in the meeting between the Turkish and Qatari intelligence chiefs in Damascus in December 2024.
Türkiye’s priority is seeking to eliminate the US-supported Syrian Kurdish Syrian Defence Force (SDF) which it sees as part of the wider separatist and Kurdish movement across Syria, Iraq and in Iran as well as Türkiye itself. Türkiye offered al-Sharaa to take over SDF management of several large camps of ISIS-linked fighters and families that are now a problem for the West in terms of possible repatriation to ISIS adherents’ countries of origin. If accepted, this would reduce SDF influence and create a point of leverage for Türkiye in its dealings with the West. Türkiye itself was at one time a busy transit point into Syria for ISIS foreign fighters.
Al-Sharaa’s public statements recognise the potential influence of the West, but likely assess that once appeased by rhetoric, the West will have little appetite for substantive engagement. In the background is the reality al-Sharaa must answer to – a militant base of fighters who are unlikely to have fought a war to establish a progressive and inclusive government in Damascus, and backers such as Qatar and Türkiye whose interests are served by conservative Sunni Islam and the marginalisation, if not elimination, of Kurdish independence aspirations and capabilities. Al-Sharaa is walking a tightrope, but in reality, only his armed militants and foreign Sunni-government supporters can keep him in power.
