Ukraine, explained.
By Zelenskyy’s own account, Fedorov and Syrskyi clashed so badly that they would only cooperate when the president stepped in to mediate (Tetiana Dzhafarova/AFP via Getty Images)
The general and the minister must work – and be seen – as a team.
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Ukraine’s new command team faces its first three testsUkraine’s new command team faces its first three tests
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has again reshaped the top of Ukraine’s war effort. On 21 July, after six days of protests, he dismissed (Opens in new window) General Oleksandr Syrskyi as Commander-in-Chief and appointed Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi in his place (Opens in new window).
The change followed the earlier removal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, whose sacking set off the demonstrations and exposed a civil-military crisis within Ukraine’s government and military establishment. Fedorov has been offered a role overseeing defence technology, an acting minister, Yevhenii Khmara, is in place, and rallies on the street demand Fedorov’s return.
However this is resolved, Ukraine now has a new military command team. It has a leadership pair whose fortunes are joined. Neither can win the war alone, and neither can afford to work against the other.
Ukraine’s recent history shows how quickly civil-military relationships can break down. Since February 2022, civil-military relations at the top have at times been fraught. General Valerii Zaluzhnyi fell out with Zelenskyy over strategy, the failed 2023 counteroffensive and mobilisation, and was moved to London (Opens in new window) as ambassador in early 2024. Syrskyi, who replaced him, drew steady criticism for his top-down, Soviet-style command culture. Both previous commanders-in-chief had problems dealing with the civilian defence minister and bureaucrats.
When Fedorov arrived with a reform agenda built on data exploitation, digitisation of command and control, drones and cleaner procurement, he and Syrskyi clashed (Opens in new window) so badly that, by Zelenskyy’s own account (Opens in new window), they would only cooperate when the president stepped in to mediate. That is not a command team. It is two centres of power pulling in different directions while hundreds of thousands of soldiers fought to prevent Russia extinguishing Ukraine.
Protests in Kyiv on 20 July against the dismissal of Mykhailo Fedorov as defence minister by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Paula Bronstein/Getty Images)
Drapatyi and his new ministerial partner have a chance to break this pattern. Since he first rose to prominence in 2014 (Opens in new window), Drapatyi has built a reputation as a modern, soldier-focused commander who seeks input from his subordinates, supports innovation – including the initial development of Ukraine’s drone line – and accepts responsibility when things go wrong. He resigned (Opens in new window) as Ground Forces commander in 2025 after Russian strikes killed troops at a training ground, a rare act of accountability in any army. Paired with a reforming minister, Drapatyi’s leadership and reform instincts could finally bring the political and military spheres of Ukraine’s war effort into a fully unified state.
Three priorities will test the new team quickly.
The first is to sustain Ukraine’s current momentum. Ukrainian forces have clawed back ground around Kupiansk in the north-east and constrained Russian advances everywhere else. Ukraine’s mid- and long-range strike campaigns (Opens in new window) have separately hit Russian oil refineries, defence factories, air defence, operational logistics and shadow fleet. Occupied Crimea has been isolated by the Ukrainians and is increasingly difficult to sustain. This pressure is imposing serious costs on Russia, and forcing it to choose between holding Crimea and defending the Russian homeland. The danger now is that a change of command creates a period of uncertainty while new leaders find their feet, and Russian forces exploit it. The new team’s first job is to make sure the reshuffle does not slow the tempo of operations at the front, deep inside Russia – or innovation inside the Ukrainian military.
Neither can win the war alone, and neither can afford to work against the other.
The second priority is to fix Ukraine’s mobilisation system. Front-line units are weary and short of people, and the average age of front-line soldiers is well over 40 (Opens in new window). The practice known as “busification” (Opens in new window), in which recruitment officers seize men in the street and bundle them into vans, has damaged trust between the army and the society it defends. A more sustainable approach to recruitment is now urgent. Zelenskyy has directed personnel reforms in the past (Opens in new window) but these have been slow to materialise. It is also a task that neither the minister nor the commander can complete alone. The minister owns the policy and the legislation; the commander owns training and the way soldiers are employed. This priority is sharpened by potential events in Russia. Moscow holds State Duma elections in September, and there is a chance that Vladimir Putin could order a fresh wave of mobilisation (Opens in new window) once the vote is behind him. If Russia moves to regenerate mass, Ukraine cannot afford a broken system (Opens in new window) for generating its own.
The third priority is to rebuild and sustain the relationships with Western counterparts that keep Ukraine in the fight. Confidence frays when Ukraine’s leadership looks unstable. The (temporary) minister must build trusted relationships in Western capitals and with the Ramstein contact group’s 50-plus members pledged to support Ukraine, while the commander sustains the military-to-military ties that turn promises into deliveries and Ukrainian fighting power. There is a final, less obvious dimension to this relationship. Ukraine’s experience with digital command and control, electronic warfare, robotics, deep strike and rapid adaptation is being studied by Western militaries that have not fought a large-scale war in decades. The flow of lessons from Ukraine to its partners – alongside its drone technologies – is now one of the most valuable things Ukraine offers. A confident, well-run partnership between minister and commander keeps both flows moving. Sustaining that exchange is a defence priority, and it rests on a leadership that Western partners can trust and predict from one month to the next.
Ukraine’s civil-military process must still be resolved. Drapatyi and whoever eventually leads the defence ministry will inherit a war that remains a very tough journey for the Ukrainian nation. The best chance for the new Ukrainian military command team of managing all three priorities above lies in a simple idea that Ukraine has struggled to put into practice since 2022. They must lead as a civil-military team, not as two individuals.
About the author
Mick Ryan
Mick Ryan is a Senior Fellow for Military Studies in the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program.
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