China and the United States are trapped in a cycle of misperception that threatens to escalate into conflict. The problem is structural, not something better communication can fix.
Recent events demonstrate this dynamic perfectly. China's deployment this month of both its aircraft carriers in major regional exercises offers a textbook case of identical military activities generating completely opposite interpretations. China’s official media consistently frames these exercises as “routine training” and “defensive in nature”. Yet US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth's warning that the United States is prepared to “fight and win” against China demonstrates how the Trump administration’s deterrent messaging often gets misinterpreted by Beijing as preparation for pre-emptive action, and vice versa.
This isn't deliberate misrepresentation – both sides genuinely believe in their interpretation. It instead reflects fundamentally different worldviews about legitimate security behaviour and international order.
The tempting solution is a call for better communication. Surely if both sides explained their intentions more clearly, misunderstanding would diminish? Unfortunately, the evidence suggests otherwise.
Consider US Freedom of Navigation Operations, or FONOPs. China consistently interprets these as “provocative military activities” as evidence of “gunboat diplomacy”. The US frames identical operations as “routine naval activities” upholding international law. But regional actors add another layer of complexity. Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations hold divergent views, even among themselves. The Philippines actively confronts Chinese activities, Vietnam quietly builds island outposts while managing tensions, and Malaysia maintains that disputes won't hamper ASEAN's blue economy goals despite ongoing maritime confrontations.
Misperception may be inevitable, but escalation is not.
Meanwhile, Australia faces direct Chinese military pressure, shown by a Chinese naval group circumnavigating the country and conducting live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea, while China accuses Australia of “deliberate provocation” for routine surveillance flights in the South China Sea. Japan responds by deepening defence cooperation with Philippines through military aid and reciprocal access agreements, creating new alliance networks that complicate traditional bilateral dynamics.
Several factors explain why communication cannot resolve these misperceptions. First, there’s a crucial distinction between technical misunderstandings and structural disagreements. Technical problems can be clarified through dialogue – different time zones for military exercises, equipment specifications, operational procedures. But fundamental disagreements about international order persist despite diplomatic engagement.
Second, nuclear dimensions amplify misperception risks. Carrier operations near nuclear-capable missile bases create dual-use ambiguity, where conventional exercises appear as potential nuclear strike preparation. Modern warfare’s compressed timelines leave no opportunity for clarification during crises, creating a speed-versus-understanding trade-off that favours suspicion.
Finally, political communication styles matter. The Trump administration’s characteristically direct rhetoric – intended as deterrence – frequently gets interpreted by Chinese analysts as aggressive rather than defensive posturing. Research shows that seven years of FONOPs have seen China move “from measured rejection of US messages to more explicit hostility.”
The focus must shift to managing consequences. Four practical measures could significantly reduce escalation risks while acknowledging persistent misunderstanding.
First, establish a 24/7 crisis hotline protocol modelled on US-Soviet precedents. Military-to-military communication channels must operate independently of diplomatic tensions. When carrier groups encounter each other unexpectedly, professional naval officers need direct communication lines, not diplomatic bureaucracy.
Second, implement an exercise notification agreement requiring 48-hour advance notice for major naval operations beyond the Second Island Chain. This wouldn't eliminate misperception about intent but would reduce surprise and create predictable windows for preparing measured responses rather than reactive escalation. ASEAN's ongoing efforts to conclude a South China Sea Code of Conduct with China by 2025 could provide a regional framework for such mechanisms.
Third, create separate nuclear and conventional signalling channels combined with joint protocols for preventing escalation during carrier incidents. Dual-use ambiguity – where conventional exercises might appear as nuclear strike preparation – represents the highest-risk escalation scenario.
Finally, establish quarterly Track 1.5 interpretation forums focused on explaining each side's strategic logic rather than changing it. Regional actors such as Singapore and Malaysia, which maintain balanced relationships with both powers, could host these dialogues, providing neutral ground that neither Beijing nor Washington dominates.
The critical point bears repeating: the communication measures that follow are not designed to eliminate misperceptions or achieve mutual understanding – both impossible goals given structural realities. Instead, they accept that misreading intentions is inevitable and focus solely on preventing those inevitable misunderstandings from triggering dangerous escalation.
Misperception may be inevitable, but escalation is not. The key lies in building systems that function despite misunderstanding.
Near-term opportunities include a direct summit at the leaders-level between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump to establish communication ground rules and use neutral venues like Singapore for military-to-military dialogue. Recent trilateral exercises between the United States, French, and Japanese carriers demonstrate how allied coordination can provide alternatives to purely bilateral dynamics. Success should be measured not by reduced misperception – an impossible goal – but by reducing crisis escalation time from hours to days while maintaining deterrence credibility.
This approach acknowledges that China and the United States will continue to misread each other's intentions while building practical mechanisms to prevent those misunderstandings from triggering catastrophic escalation. Both sides must learn that managing existential risks may be more achievable than resolving fundamental disagreements about intentions.
The alternative – continuing to treat misperception as a communication problem rather than acknowledging it to be a structural reality – risks catastrophe. In an era of great power competition, the goal should not be mutual understanding but rather competition without conflict. That requires accepting misperception as permanent while making it less dangerous.
