Russia is about to host 29 world leaders at its annual Victory Day parade, commemorating the Soviet Union’s defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War. But this year, the parade carries a significance that extends far beyond historical memory. Marking the 80th anniversary of the victory, the event is also a display of Russia’s attempt to project that it still has allies or partners willing to stand by an isolated Moscow – even as Ukrainian drone attacks target the city.
Among the attendees is China’s Xi Jinping, paying a three-day state visit to the country. As the foreign leaders take their place alongside President Vladimir Putin at the celebration, a larger question emerges: Is this parade a display of counter-Western and pro-Russian solidarity, or a signal of a shifting global order defined by multipolarity?
From Munich to Moscow: The long arc of Russia’s ambition
For a country facing unprecedented sanctions and diplomatic isolation from the West following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the presence of these leaders in Moscow is no small matter. The optics of global engagement – particularly from non-Western states – reinforces Russia’s central narrative: the world is not unipolar, and Western efforts to isolate Russia have not entirely succeeded.
Despite the grand imagery of a united front in Moscow, the coalition of leaders attending the parade should not be mistaken for a coherent alliance.
This effort to reassert Russia’s place on the world stage is not new. It echoes themes from Putin’s 2007 Munich Security Conference speech, where he criticised the post-Cold War dominance of the United States and rejected unipolarity in the international security architecture. That speech marked a clear turning point: a declaration that Russia would no longer accept a subordinate role in a Western-led global order. Instead, Moscow would pursue what it calls a multipolar world – a more balanced system where power is distributed across several centres and regional actors can assert themselves without submitting to US or NATO influence.
What brings these leaders to Moscow?
The answer lies in this same idea of multipolarity. Over the decades, many of the countries represented in Moscow have benefited from the institutions of the US-led international order. But increasingly, they see diminishing returns in defending a system that has not always served their interests. Instead, they seek greater agency and autonomy in shaping regional and global affairs. As it is well known to the realist school of international relations, states are driven by self-interest in an anarchic system where there is no world government or police. It appears that what we see in Moscow today is simply realism at play in the international system.
Their presence in Moscow may not necessarily endorse Russia’s war in Ukraine. Rather, it may signal unity behind the idea of an international system that accommodates diverse powers with distinct spheres of influence. These leaders are not aligning themselves with Moscow; they are staking their claim in a multipolar future.
While many Global South leaders celebrate multipolarity as a means of reclaiming sovereignty from Western dominance, there is a danger that multipolar competition may undermine the very autonomy they seek, particularly if major powers – Russia, China, the United States – begin imposing their own visions of order in contested regions.
Multipolarity in action: The case of Central Asia
Central Asia is a telling example of how multipolarity is playing out on the ground. Long considered part of Russia’s “near abroad” or traditional sphere of influence, the region is now a contested geopolitical space.
This year’s parade highlights a stark irony: a celebration of the Soviet victory over fascism amid Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, a conflict widely condemned by the international community.
China has increased its presence in the region significantly through initiatives like the C5+China platform, which brings together the five Central Asian republics for diplomatic, economic, and infrastructure cooperation. This reflects Beijing’s broader effort to reshape regional connectivity and energy flows through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, while avoiding overt military entanglements.
The result is a more complex balance of power in Central Asia, where Russian, Chinese, Western, and regional interests intersect. Multipolarity, in other words, is not just a theory, it is an emerging reality in Central Asia, where competition over infrastructure, trade, and security arrangements is becoming increasingly visible.
Commemorating victory amid war
This year’s parade also highlights a stark irony: a celebration of the Soviet victory over fascism amid Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, a conflict widely condemned by the international community. Just days before the event, the Kremlin announced a three-day ceasefire, which Ukrainian officials dismissed as a “theatrical” move and aimed at enabling Russia to hold the parade without disruption.
In official rhetoric, the war in Ukraine is frequently portrayed as a continuation of the fight against fascism. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently emphasised that Russia was still fighting Nazi ideology that aspired for the strategic defeat of Russia – this time against Europe collectively.
Despite the grand imagery of a united front in Moscow, the coalition of leaders attending the parade should not be mistaken for a coherent alliance. Their motivations are diverse, and their relationships with Russia are often pragmatic rather than ideological. Some seek defence cooperation, others economic deals or energy discounts. For others, attending is simply a way to signal that they will not be dictated to by the West, without necessarily endorsing Moscow’s worldview. Xi’s visit is also symbolic – a reaffirmation of China’s “no limits partnership” with Russia. In other words, these states are acting in their own national interests, as they understand and interpret them.
While the Victory Day parade in Moscow will be rich in historical symbolism, it is unlikely to change the current architecture of international security. It does, however, suggest that multipolarity is becoming more of a reality for many in the Global South, accelerated by the cracks in the liberal international order caused by Donald Trump’s policy. The gathering in Moscow reflects a broader trend, a shifting global order in which countries increasingly seek to assert their autonomy and forge new alignments, whether with the West, China, Russia or each other.
