China, explained.
The T-Dome is envisioned as a multi-layered defence system capable of intercepting missiles and drones across multiple ranges and altitudes (Getty Images)
Modelled on Israel’s Iron Dome, Taiwan’s proposed defence trump card has many shortcomings.
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Why the “Taiwan Dome” won’t survive a Chinese attackWhy the “Taiwan Dome” won’t survive a Chinese attack
In October 2025, Taiwanese President William Lai proposed the establishment of a special defence budget, emphasising that the country’s future defence posture will prioritise innovation and advanced technologies, including the integration of artificial intelligence. One of the key objectives of this additional allocation is the construction of the Taiwan Dome (T-Dome), a system modelled on Israel’s Iron Dome. The T-Dome is envisioned as a multi-layered defence system capable of intercepting missiles and drones across multiple ranges and altitudes.
The recent deterioration of relations between Beijing and Taipei has left Lai with little choice but to take concrete steps to strengthen Taiwan’s defences. Taiwan requires robust defensive capabilities at a time when the People’s Liberation Army continues to modernise and Beijing maintains its military option in managing cross-Strait relations.
Lai is yet to clearly articulate whether the proposed T-Dome is consistent with Taiwan’s broader effort to develop an asymmetric defence posture. Even if the T-Dome is intended as an expression of asymmetric strategy, critical questions remain as to whether it is capable of withstanding a PLA campaign that would likely be multi-domain in nature and potentially characterised by saturating attacks.
If the T-Dome is indeed modelled on Israel’s Iron Dome, then it would be insufficient. The Israel Defence Forces operate within a layered air and missile defence architecture, of which the Iron Dome is only one component among several integrated systems. The Iron Dome is primarily intended to intercept short-range projectiles employed mostly by non-state armed actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. For long-range detection and interception, Israel relies on the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 systems. Bridging the gap between the Iron Dome and Arrow systems is David’s Sling, which is optimised to engage short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Israel has also integrated electronic warfare components into its missile defence posture.
Yet even such advanced multi-layered systems still exhibit vulnerabilities. Although the IDF stated it successfully intercepted up to 86% of incoming threats from Iran in June 2025, this is lower than its usual rate, which typically exceeds 90%. Since the Hamas attacks of October 2023, the IDF has contended with Iranian strikes at a much more intense level than Israel has traditionally faced. Iran’s salvo attacks, involving large quantities of drones as well as cruise and ballistic missiles, have made complete interception impossible. At times, Israel has also required the assistance of other states, as demonstrated in April 2024 when the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Jordan intervened to help counter the attacks.
In a Taiwan scenario, it is highly likely that the PLA would conduct a combined missile and drone salvo. An initial phase employing decoys is also plausible, aimed at saturating Taiwan’s air defence assets before transitioning to precision target-specific strikes. Beyond missile systems such as the Dongfeng series, China also possesses large-scale rocket artillery capabilities, including the Weishi multiple rocket launcher systems.
To have any hope of combating these systems, Taiwan will need a comprehensive and resilient network architecture.
To have any hope of combating these systems, Taiwan will need a comprehensive and resilient network architecture. The ability of Taiwan to integrate command-and-control systems with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance will be key, particularly if the country seeks to incorporate AI into these systems. Even Israel required an extended period of testing before achieving full integration and operational effectiveness of comparable architectures.
Contemporary warfare, such as that employed by the United States in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, demonstrates that beyond traditional domains, capabilities in areas such as cyber, electronics, and space will be critical in any future engagement. For Taiwan, this begs the question of whether its military personnel have the requisite capabilities to operate such highly complex integrated systems.
There are also the financial implications. The Iron Dome utilises Tamir interceptor missiles, each costing approximately US$50,000, while the Stunner missiles for the David's Sling system are priced at around US$1 million each. In total, Israel expended an estimated US$1 billion to counter the Iranian attack of 14 April 2024. Of note, Israel’s annual defence budget (Opens in new window) is US$33.7 billion, while Taiwan’s is only US$18.9 billion.
To date, Taiwan’s budget formulation remains mired in legislative deadlock. Lai’s greatest obstacle to realising his agenda lies within the legislature itself, where his party, the Democratic Progressive Party, holds only 51 of the 113 seats. Legislators from opposition parties argue the proposal lacks adequate specificity and risks necessitating reductions in other critical government expenditures, including education and social welfare programs.
A wiser approach would be for Taiwan to pursue a defence strategy that emphasises survivability, dispersion, and sustained resistance rather than technological prestige. Instead of investing in expensive, technically ambitious systems as standalone solutions, policy efforts should prioritise integration, sustainability, and cost-effective capabilities that complicate PLA operations across air, maritime, cyber, and space domains, while ensuring political consensus and institutional readiness to endure a prolonged high-intensity conflict.
About the author
Aswin Lin
Aswin Lin is a postdoctoral fellow at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.
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