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China, explained.

While cooperation among illiberal states is real, routinised, multidimensional and increasingly well resourced, there is not yet a coherent global bloc (Getty Images)
China, Russia, Iran and North Korea make up thin illiberal coalitions with points of vulnerability that democracies can exploit.
About the author
Nick Bisley
Nick Bisley is Pro Vice-Chancellor Research and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University.
Since 2024, North Korea has deployed more than 12,000 troops to fight alongside Russia's forces in Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy used his recent trip to Washington (Opens in new window) to warn that Pyongyang is preparing to send 30,000 more troops. The Ukrainian president has long argued that Russia has been supporting a growing network of authoritarian states. He's right.
But battlefield support is only a fragment of a troubling trend in which authoritarian and illiberal states are cooperating to undercut liberal institutions and ideas, and to remake the international order to suit their interests and values.
China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are the most visible, but not the only, illiberal states reshaping multilateral institutions, building new bodies and contesting the central rules and norms of international politics.
Australia is not taking this threat seriously enough. It must act with others to see off the long-term challenges to the order on which it depends.
Military cooperation is the sharp end of this activity, running from the provision of troops and munitions to the transfer of technology. These alignments have become increasingly formalised. Russia and China inked a partnership (Opens in new window) in February 2022, just prior to Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, while Russia and North Korea signed a security treaty (Opens in new window) in 2024.
Rather than trying to replace these terms, they seek to hollow them out and fill them with concepts aligned with illiberal interests to create a world made safe for authoritarianism.
The Russia–China agreement fundamentally shifts the geostrategic setting in Asia. The 2022 joint statement reads as something of an Atlantic Charter for an illiberal age, setting out a distinctly authoritarian slant on the key ideas at the heart of international order.
Illiberal powers have also learned to advance their shared interests institutionally. The sclerosis of many North Atlantic institutions allows them to build new bodies that better serve states that feel underserved by the old ones.
They are also energised by America’s inward lurch. China has been steadily advancing its influence at the UN – it is now the second-largest contributor to the UN regular budget – and has placed its nationals in key leadership bodies across the UN system.
Meanwhile, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has expanded to include Iran, Belarus, India and Pakistan, and now comprises 40 per cent of the world’s population and more than 60 per cent of the Eurasian landmass. Six of ASEAN’s members sent leaders to the 2025 summit along with the ASEAN Secretary General.
Illiberal states are also coordinating their efforts to attack concepts central to the current order. China, Russia and others work to reinterpret key ideas, such as human rights and democracy. Rather than trying to replace these terms, they seek to hollow them out and fill them with concepts aligned with illiberal interests to create a world made safe for authoritarianism.

Russian President Vladimir Putin shares tea with Chinese President Xi Jinping, 20 May 2026 (Kremlin/Wikimedia Commons)
They are also adept manipulators of the information space, attacking democratic systems and sharing techniques through programs that bring editors, producers and media managers to Beijing and Moscow to learn and coordinate their information assaults. They also push out their ideas through think tanks, summits and forums, such as Hungary’s Danube Club, Russia’s Valdai Club and China’s Xiangshan Forum, among many others.
Entrepreneurial and creative as they have been, the movement remains partial. There is not yet a coherent global bloc. The foundations of cooperation remain weak, while the interests and values of the group are diverse and diverging; there is no accepted global leader.
But cooperation among illiberal states is real, routinised, multidimensional and increasingly well resourced. Their ideas have strong appeal in a rising global tide of illiberalism.
As a country whose interests and values are bound up in the liberal order, Australia must recognise the challenge it faces. The turbulence of the current period is not just the product of Sino-American competition or Russian revanchism. It is also driven by coordinated efforts to recast the ideas and institutions on which the global system operates.
What can be done beyond recognising the reality and scale of the contest?
Canberra must work with others to repair the institutional setting whose shortcomings gave authoritarians the opportunity to build alternatives.
Australia should also develop collaborative networks to harden the social and economic infrastructure of open societies. Supply chain resilience, critical infrastructure, internet governance standards and social cohesion all need shoring up. International cooperation can advance those goals while strengthening the broader collaborative environment.
Illiberal states are working together to upend the international order that has served Australia well. But their coalitions are thin and their interests divergent. Australia and like-minded countries should apply pressure to those cracks to fracture the rising illiberal order before it becomes better organised and entrenched.
Nick Bisley’s Analysis paper, The rise of authoritarian cooperation: A new illiberal order? (Opens in new window) was published by the Lowy Institute this week.