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Defence cooperation between China, Russia, and North Korea accelerated in 2026, alongside closer economic ties.
China maintains a strong defence relationship with Russia. They are each other’s top partners for joint trainings, and second for arms trade. In contrast, China’s defence ties with North Korea are more limited, despite their treaty alliance. The two held no public joint exercises or defence meetings in 2026. However, at a leaders’ summit in June, they discussed expanding their military exchanges. Russia’s ties with North Korea have strengthened further since the two formalised their alliance in 2024. Arms trade between them is now valued at $264 million, and an estimated 11,000 North Korean soldiers are fighting in Ukraine.
Economic ties among the three have deepened. Trade between China and Russia grew to almost $250 billion in 2025, more than a third of Russia’s total trade. This is nearly double its 2022 level, when sanctions followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The increase offsets more than half of Russia’s lost trade with the European Union. Meanwhile, two-way trade between China and North Korea rose to $2.85 billion, nearly double its 2025 value. This lifted North Korea two places, from last, in Economic Relationships.
North Korea has also profited from its military cooperation with Russia. One report estimates that North Korea’s military support for Russia has earned it between $7 billion and $14 billion — 20 to 40 per cent of its GDP. Their economic ties also extend beyond the military sphere. In September 2026, the two countries opened their first road bridge. Through their economic relationships with China, North Korea and Russia have both weathered the sanctions imposed on them.
Despite increasing bilateral collusion, there has been no trilateral engagement. North Korea also remains outside both BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — international groupings that present themselves as alternatives to Western-led forums like the G7. If a trilateral partnership were to develop, it could threaten the region’s existing security architecture and pose a significant challenge for the United States and its allies.
About the authors
Hunter Marston
Dr Hunter Marston is the Director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute and Project Lead for the Asia Power Index.
Jack Sato
Jack Sato is a Data Analyst for the Asia Power Index at the Lowy Institute.
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