Bougainville’s future: A roadmap for development

Despite an overwhelming vote for independence in the 2019 referendum, Bougainville’s continued underperformance in socio-economic development casts doubt over its future as a sovereign polity. The singular focus of Bougainville’s elected leaders on the goal of independence has overshadowed the practical challenges of running a new country and how political independence will deliver prosperity for Bougainvilleans.

Prosperity should be measured in terms of improved quality of life for Bougainvilleans. The partisan narrative of “independence or nothing” has encouraged a belief that independence is the panacea to development challenges. Yet to achieve real prosperity, the PNG and Bougainville governments must cooperate and undertake reform at the political, institutional, and technical levels.

Nestled in the northeast corner of Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) territorial waters, the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, with an estimated population of around 300,000 people, [1] has aspirations to be the first independent country since South Sudan in 2011. [2]

These aspirations are shaped by Bougainville's experiences of colonial rule, marginalisation, and a civil war spanning more than a decade. The desire for independence is emotionally and historically powerful, as demonstrated by the 2019 referendum, in which 97.7 per cent of Bougainvilleans voted for independence over an option for greater autonomy. [3] Bougainville’s leaders have since committed to declaring Bougainville's political independence from Papua New Guinea’s sovereign authority on 1 September 2027. [4]

The PNG National Government has kept its position on this commitment ambiguous, while demonstrating reservations concerning Bougainville’s ability to sustain itself economically. [5] The PNG government’s reservations about Bougainville’s “readiness” for independence are well founded. Bougainville has very low levels of socio-economic development.

The Bougainville Peace Agreement has set the parameters for dialogue between the two governments since it was signed in 2001. But the focus has been on Bougainville's political pathway from autonomy to independence, with the peace agreement and the political narrative since 2001 largely silent on how cooperation can lead to greater development.

The preoccupation with independence by Bougainville leaders has overshadowed a more fundamental objective: the prosperity of Bougainvilleans. Prosperity is not defined by sovereignty alone, but by tangible improvements in the quality of life such as access to basic services, employment, infrastructure, and governance.

Socio-economic indicators in Bougainville are either stagnating or declining, raising critical questions about the effectiveness of governance, and whether development is sufficiently prioritised. This poor performance reflects systemic neglect and raises the question of how political independence will translate into improved wellbeing for Bougainvilleans. With 2027 set as the target year for Bougainville’s independence, these questions carry growing urgency.

Noting the Autonomous Bougainville Government’s adamant stance on declaring independence — unilaterally if it has to — both governments urgently need to agree to a credible, achievable blueprint for supporting socio-economic development in Bougainville.

A clear development roadmap for Bougainville, mutually agreed by the Autonomous Bougainville Government and Port Moresby, would also allow well-meaning external actors such as Australia and New Zealand to more significantly contribute to Bougainville’s development priorities, no longer having to manage potential sensitivities in Port Moresby or perceptions that their efforts are inappropriately “encouraging” Bougainville independence.

This brief explores three interrelated themes in relation to such a roadmap: 1) how the Bougainville Peace Agreement, though foundational, fails to embed a development-focused vision; 2) the deep structural challenges that impede progress in health, education, and economic growth; and 3) the urgent need for capacity-building within the Bougainville Public Service. This brief proposes political, institutional, and capacity-building reforms that are vital for a Bougainville that is both politically independent and economically sustainable.

Development is not divorced from independence, but it is the measure by which the practicality of any future political status should be assessed. This is not a rejection of Bougainville’s pursuit of sovereignty, but a call to refocus attention on what it is ultimately meant to deliver: a better life for Bougainvilleans.

Bougainville's relatively short but tumultuous contemporary history is best understood through the consideration of four key phases.

The first phase, beginning in 1964, marked the origins of the relationship between the Australian territory of Papua and New Guinea and its Bougainville District (later Province). [6] Key events in this period included the confirmation of significant mineral deposits in Bougainville's Crown Prince Range by Conzinc Riotinto of Australia, and the first nationwide elections forming the basis of PNG’s legislature, the House of Assembly. [7]

The Panguna copper mine in central Bougainville was opened in 1972, operating until its forced closure in 1989 by aggrieved landowners. The mine operators’ lack of consideration for local concerns, [8] and the fact that Bougainville only had four seats in the PNG House of Assembly, signalled to Bougainville leaders that, to determine their own destiny, moves towards independence had to be made before PNG obtained its independence. [9] This led to Bougainville's first attempt at a Unilateral Declaration of Independence on 1 September 1975. To discourage similar secession attempts, the newly established PNG Government adopted a decentralised system, giving provincial governments greater powers over their affairs. [10] In the period from PNG’s independence to Panguna’s closure, Bougainville contributed to approximately 44 per cent of PNG’s export earnings and generated 17 per cent of the National Government’s internal revenue, [11] with only two per cent of profits returning to Bougainville. [12]

The second phase was the Bougainville Crisis (1988–98), described as the “most intense conflict in the Pacific since the Second World War”. [13] The conflict involved fighting between PNG security forces (primarily the PNG Defence Force) and Bougainville’s separatist groups, mainly the Bougainville Revolutionary Army.

While the forced closure of the Panguna mine was a catalyst, the underlying causes of this conflict were complex and myriad, including disagreements over royalty payments for customary landowners, environmental damage caused by mining operations, and pre-existing tensions between Bougainvilleans and other Papua New Guinea ethnicities. [14] The effects of the conflict were devastating: an estimated 15,000 deaths, displacement of more than 70,000 civilians, [15] and the near-total destruction of the island's social and economic infrastructure. [16] The conflict yielded no decided victory; instead, war weariness and a military stalemate provided the momentum for a negotiated settlement between representatives of Bougainville and the National Government. [17]

The third phase saw three years of negotiations that led to the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement between the PNG Government and Bougainville parties to the conflict in 2001. The Bougainville Peace Agreement signified the end of the conflict and accorded Bougainville the freedom to exercise a highly autonomous model of sub-national governance. [18] This model consists of three organs: Bougainville’s House of Representatives as its legislature; a dual executive arm led by the President of Bougainville and the appointed Bougainville Executive Council; and the Bougainville Courts. [19] This arrangement formally commenced with the establishment of the Autonomous Bougainville Government in 2005.

The Bougainville Peace Agreement is underscored by three pillars that have been implemented to varying degrees: autonomy; disposal of weapons; and a non-binding referendum on independence. [20] To oversee the effective implementation of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, the Joint Supervisory Body was established as the forum for dialogue and consultation between the two governments. In essence, the peace agreement institutionalised Bougainville’s desire to have the power to manage its own affairs, while imposing an obligation on the National Government in Port Moresby to underwrite this new arrangement through the establishment of an elaborate financial “grant system”. [21]

The fourth phase is the present post-referendum period. The referendum in 2019 saw Bougainvilleans overwhelmingly opt for independence — 97.7 per cent of voters — over the alternative of greater autonomy. [22] This has led to a complex and protracted post-referendum consultation process. It has been overwhelmed by legal and technical wrangles [23] and disagreements between the governments on how referendum results may be tabled for ratification on the floor of the National Parliament, the final decision-making authority. [24]

The prolonged impasse led to both governments agreeing to the appointment of an independent moderator to help resolve outstanding issues through joint consultations. [25] These consultations concluded in June 2025 and culminated in the signing of the Melanesian Agreement on 26 June 2025. [26] While the Melanesian Agreement is being criticised for not meeting expectations and “kicking the can down the road”, [27] it does provide a commitment by both governments to bring the referendum results to the current 11th National Parliament [28] for the ratification vote. [29]

But Bougainville leaders are unwilling to leave their region's political future to the uncertainty of a parliamentary vote. As such, they have committed to declaring political independence on 1 September 2027, regardless of the parliamentary verdict. [30]

The National Government, led by Prime Minister James Marape, has acknowledged the referendum result and committed to adhere to the process set out in the Bougainville Peace Agreement, most recently by signing the Melanesian Agreement. [31] This support of the peace process stops short of giving any indication on a government position that supports Bougainville’s independence. Instead, when the vote on ratification comes about, Marape has instructed for each Party member to be accorded a conscience vote.

On the other side of the negotiating table sits the Autonomous Bougainville Government, led by President Ishmael Toroama, a prominent former fighter in the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and contributor to the peace process. [32] Given Toroama’s history as a combatant who fought for independence, the Bougainville Government’s position to reject any option other than independence is unsurprising. [33]

The Bougainville Peace Agreement has been largely successful in achieving its primary objective of stopping the conflict and securing long-lasting peace. [34] The peace agreement has also shaped the relationship between both governments, prioritising implementation of the political roadmap over achieving development.

The peace agreement provides an exhaustive list of powers to be retained by the National Government, [35] leaving all other powers to be eventually transferred to, and exercised by, the Bougainville Government. The National Parliament is accorded a degree of supremacy over Bougainville's political future as the final decision-making authority on the referendum results. In the peace agreement’s implementation, however, this supremacy is seldom asserted, with both parties engaging in dialogue, through the Joint Supervisory Body, as political equals.

The narrative of these dialogues has been determined by the contents of the peace agreement. Autonomy and independence have dominated the agenda, while development conversations often recede to the background. Section B of the Bougainville Peace Agreement — the autonomy arrangement — comprises more than three-quarters of the document. [36] In comparison, there are only eight broad references to “development” in the Agreement. While the peace agreement establishes the roadmap and preconditions [37] for the constitutionally guaranteed referendum, there is no equivalent roadmap or milestones for achieving development targets.

It is difficult to ascertain why development and economic considerations were not given greater prominence, although some experts have speculated that it is due to the negotiations being led by “lawyers and politicians” as opposed to “economists and development experts”. [38] As a result, the implementation of the Bougainville Peace Agreement and the pursuit of independence has incorrectly become synonymous with achieving socio-economic development, without providing any detail or clarity on what that means or how it will be achieved.

These limitations of the Bougainville Peace Agreement have become more acute over time and are now observed retrospectively. The negotiating parties could not have foreseen all the issues that have arisen two decades later. Observers note that the agreement was underpinned by the misconception, by Bougainville leaders, that the Panguna mine would quickly reopen and the island’s economic activity would revert to pre-conflict levels.

A senior official within the Autonomous Bougainville Government has described the under-representation of development aspirations as an “opportunity to have the freedom to determine our own economic and social pathways”. [39] Taking this glass half-full approach, the Bougainville Government has prepared a strategic policy document, discussed below, to guide the implementation of their development aspirations.

Bougainville’s state of socio-economic development

Fundamental to sustaining any future political system will be Bougainville’s ability to achieve socio-economic development. While development is characterised by many factors, special attention is given here to the education and health sectors, and the general economy, as primary catalysts for improved quality of life for the people of Bougainville.

It is important to note there are significant data gaps for statistics measuring Bougainville’s socio-economic development levels. The most comprehensive study available is the Bougainville Socio-Economic Baseline Survey Report 2021, [40] which indicates that Bougainville’s health and education sectors are deteriorating in infrastructure, supplies, and qualified personnel (such as teachers and health workers) to deliver services. [41]

In 2016, health outcomes in Bougainville were worse than the national average, with an infant mortality rate of 55 per 1000 live births, [42] exceeding the PNG average of 33 in the same year. [43] The life expectancy of males and females is 58.8 and 60.4 years respectively, compared to the national average of 64 and 68. [44]

Literacy rates remain low. Fewer than 40 per cent of Bougainvilleans are educated through the formal system, and of this portion, less than half acquire a qualification higher than a Grade 10 certificate. [45] In an interview with Autonomous Bougainville Government education officials, the performance of students during national exams was described as “very low”. [46]

Bougainville’s economic activity is primarily conducted in the informal sector via cash crop farming of cocoa, copra, vegetables, and fish. Basic infrastructure such as ports, roads, bridges, and telecommunications require major rehabilitation. [47] Unofficially, the GDP of Bougainville was estimated to be one billion kina (US$244.8 million) in 2016, with estimates of its GDP per capita equalling roughly US$800. This is less than half of its closest Melanesian neighbour, Solomon Islands.

The development statistics tell a story of modest recovery since the conflict. The numbers are sobering but unsurprising when Bougainville’s development trends are viewed alongside other post-conflict societies such as Timor-Leste.

In response to these challenges, the Autonomous Bougainville Government formulated the Bougainville Integrated Strategic Development Plan 2023–2027 (BISDP). [48] The BISDP is designed to guide development action to ready Bougainville for independence before the deadline of 2027. The broad sector goals set out in the BISDP can be described as aspirational but infeasible. They are written in a manner that cannot be measured, which makes tracking their implementation impossible. The BISDP makes only one reference to the Bougainville Socio-Economic Baseline Survey Report, which brings into question its alignment with the most current data. Yet the BISDP is not the first development plan to be published by the Autonomous Bougainville Government. [49] The absence of data does not prevent development planning, but plans are clearly not being implemented.

Challenges to implementing Bougainville’s development plan

Since its establishment, the Autonomous Bougainville Government has struggled to generate revenue to achieve fiscal self-reliance. [50] The budget for 2024 was estimated to be K761.2 million, with only K50.7 million (6.6 per cent of the total) anticipated to be generated as internal revenue, and 93.4 per cent injected by the government in Port Moresby. [51] To fund its development plan, the Bougainville Government introduced the Sectoral Development Budget under the BISDP. But given the island’s lack of internal revenue generation, the approach since then has been to make the Sectoral Development Budget dependent on funding from the PNG National Government, as well as funding from donor partners. [52]

Bougainville could expand its revenue base by taxing resources such as cocoa, fishing, and tourism. [53] Cocoa and fishing alone are estimated to generate revenue of K162 million annually. [54] Due to a global cocoa supply shortfall, receipts of cocoa exports from Bougainville reached more than K310 million (US$73 million) in the first half of 2025. However, revenue generation from these sectors remains theoretical without a tax administration capable of capturing it. Despite reform announcements for the Bougainville Tax Office in 2024, [55] it lacks the institutional capacity, enforcement mechanisms, and administrative reach to implement and collect taxes effectively.

The Autonomous Bougainville Government also believes reopening the Panguna mine can have a major impact on the economy and its budget, [56] but is cognisant of the sensitivities that must be navigated. [57] No independent study has credibly assessed the economic potential of reopening the mine. However, the mine’s operator, Bougainville Copper Limited, has projected that the mine could generate K120 billion over a 20-year period, with K40 billion in direct benefits to Bougainville. [58] Efforts to reopen the mine have been stalled by a plethora of issues, including a recent class action suit over environmental damage. [59] The decision to reopen must consider environmental risks, as well as a new regulatory regime that ensures equitable distribution of wealth. [60]

Reopening the mine could also have geopolitical consequences. Bougainville’s leadership has demonstrated a willingness to work with any development partner that can deliver consistent results. [61] With a strong desire to open the mine, President Toroama has indicated to American politicians that he may have to turn to China if the United States does not assist. [62] This tactic does not appear to have borne much fruit, since there is no indication of an increased presence by either China or the United States to assist in reopening the mine.

Even if Bougainville resolves its funding shortfall, an equally important challenge is good governance and better management of resources. Improper governance practices contribute directly to Bougainville’s poor performance in achieving its economic potential and encouraging private investment. [63] As of March 2024, the auditor general has only been able to provide audit reports up to 2015. [64] Additionally, Bougainville’s former Finance and Treasury Minister was convicted of misappropriation in January 2025. Despite being under investigation and charged for abuse of office and misappropriation in 2016, [65] he was allowed to remain in office up until his conviction.

Compounding these challenges is the scarcity of educated and skilled workers in Bougainville. [66] The Bougainville Socio-Economic Baseline Survey Report recommends greater investments in technical, administrative, and managerial skills to develop Bougainville’s human resources. [67] The inability to secure and retain skilled workers is also attributed to Bougainville’s struggle to make itself an attractive place for relocation. One senior public servant pointed out the lack of physical infrastructure for government agencies that would incentivise professionals to relocate. [68] Former professionals who have contributed their time to Bougainville have shared similar sentiments relating to the frustration with governance practices and political intervention. These officials cite cases where political actors pressured public servants to approve payments for services that had not followed formal procurement or tender processes, often resulting in little to no service delivery. Collectively, these practices undermine confidence in public administration and deter the skilled workforce needed for Bougainville’s development.

Development partners play a critical role to fill the gap in finance and expertise. Over the past decade, development partners in Bougainville have spent just under US$400 million (K1.5 billion) across a range of sectors, [69] with more than 75 per cent of funds going to projects in the Governance and Civil Society sector, reflecting the convergence of priorities of the Autonomous Bougainville Government and donor partners.

Moving forward, donor partners must support Bougainville’s socio-economic development, while providing guidance to make its development plan more attainable. This is easier said than done, as constructive guidance may be perceived as undermining progress, when the Autonomous Bougainville Government claims donor partners have a duty to align with Bougainville’s stated development priorities. [70] Moreover, because Bougainville remains a sensitive topic in PNG politics, some donors have described having to approach engagements in Bougainville with a “hypervigilance towards neutrality” to ensure they are seen by the government in Port Moresby to be impartial. [71]

The Bougainville Public Service is the institution established to exercise and implement Bougainville’s autonomous powers. Despite its claims of readiness for independence, the Bougainville Public Service remains critically underdeveloped, with approximately 400 employees spread thin across unstable and often temporary workspaces. Departments move between rented, dilapidated buildings due to a complete lack of government-owned infrastructure. Development partners regularly bring programs that cannot be properly housed or implemented, revealing the absence of enabling institutions.

Absenteeism of officers is high, while motivation for those present is low. Senior bureaucrats can be seen travelling back and forth from Port Moresby for approved and unapproved “work trips”. A handful of competent departmental heads carry the administrative burden, while a lag in internal processes causes staff to disengage further. In many departments, the public service exists more on paper than in practice.

Around 67 per cent of Bougainville public servants believe their institutional setup is ineffective to carry out mandated functions, while 33 per cent note current capacity can only sustain basic functions. [72] When asked about the causes, officials highlighted funding constraints and lack of equipment as the primary barriers. [73] Further constraints included insufficient and poorly trained staff, a lack of clarity around policy directives and legal frameworks, and political interference. [74]

These challenges are not unique to Bougainville, and indeed resemble the public service throughout much of Papua New Guinea. But these issues lead to a lack of overall government presence felt within Bougainville society, prevent Bougainville from exercising its autonomy in any meaningful way, and belie its readiness for independence. [75]

Ensuring the Autonomous Bougainville Government can steadily build both technical and institutional capacity will be crucial to the long-term implementation of its development aspirations. This cannot be achieved in a vacuum and requires collaboration with the National Government.

Bougainville’s autonomy was intended to be realised through the gradual transfer of specific powers [76] that would eventually be exercised exclusively by the Autonomous Bougainville Government. [77] This phased approach recognised that the Bougainville government needed to be resourced and given capacity before its autonomous powers could be fully exercised. [78] As such, the yardstick for measuring the progress of the Bougainville Peace Agreement’s autonomy arrangement requires looking not only at the powers that have been transferred, but also whether Bougainville has the capacity to exercise them. [79]

To ensure Bougainville could effectively exercise its autonomy, the process of transferring powers (also referred to as the “drawdown process”) was entrenched in PNG’s Constitution with specific prerequisites. Under this process, where the Bougainville Government seeks the transfer of a power, it must:

• take full account of its need and capacity [through a capacity needs assessment] in relation to the function or power;
• initiate the transfer by giving to the National Government 12 months’ notice of its intention to seek the transfer of the function or power; and
• consult with the National Government concerning the transfer. [80]

At the time of the referendum, the autonomy arrangement had been scrutinised by two independent reviews, both showing limited progress to realising full autonomy, [81] and neither of which was acted upon. [82] Additional literature argues that slow progress is the result of an absence of strategy on how to achieve autonomy, weak inter-governmental coordination on implementation, and capacity and resource constraints in Bougainville’s administration. [83]

Since the referendum, there has been a desire to accelerate the transfer of powers to meet the Bougainville administration’s imperative of demonstrating readiness for, and achieving, independence. The shift was spurred by the signing of the Sharp Agreement between the PNG and Bougainville governments in 2021, which gives Bougainville the mandate to legislate on the powers available to it under the autonomy arrangement without having to comply with the prerequisites, notably the capacity needs assessment and the 12 months’ notice. [84]

But four years since its signing, this has not delivered the rapid transfer of powers that was expected, with only five powers — human resources, consumer protection, community development, investment promotion and business registration, and technical services — having been drawn down.

The Sharp Agreement bypasses a safeguard designed to ensure a managed approach and encourage cooperation between PNG and Bougainville in capacity-building. In doing so, it has created confusion in the power transfer process and in the roles exercised by Bougainville and National Government agencies. One contractor engaged to carry out development in Bougainville recounted an experience where an Autonomous Bougainville Government department deemed to have powers transferred to it deferred to its National Government counterpart in Port Moresby. Yet this counterpart claimed it no longer had authority to exercise power in relation to Bougainville. This disconnect creates unclear lines of responsibility and brings critical development work on the ground to a standstill. As one Member of Bougainville’s House of Representatives warned, the Sharp Agreement carries the risk that Bougainville will inherit powers it cannot practically exercise. [85]

Both governments need clearly prescribed and mutually agreed standardised processes for capacity-building between agencies. These processes should involve:

• structured timelines for a progressive transfer of powers;
• deployment and embedding of National Government officers into Bougainville agencies to provide financial, staffing, and technical assistance; [86] and
• the opportunity for Bougainville Public Service officials to be embedded within National Government agencies for exposure and on-the-job training.

The PNG and Bougainville governments should consider introducing a new item to the Joint Supervisory Body agenda: an agreement to provide certainty on development and to frame their relationship for the future. [87] The Bougainville Peace Agreement's ambiguity on the post-referendum process extends to what the PNG and Bougainville relationship will look like following the ratification vote in the Parliament.

The Melanesian Agreement provides a basis for this, with both governments committing to maintaining a close, peaceful, and enduring relationship. [88] The new agreement should focus on a partnership that lays out Bougainville’s development roadmap, and could be characterised by:

• cooperative efforts for socio-economic development, which are pursued distinctly from any questions of the political future of Bougainville;
• measuring development through quantifiable targets; and
• demarcating the roles and responsibilities of both parties in achieving these development targets, which includes Bougainville’s contribution back to PNG.

Ideally, such an undertaking should be made prior to the PNG Parliament’s vote on ratification of the Bougainville referendum and the 2027 independence deadline set by Bougainville leaders. The timing for this proposal is also fitting, with Bougainville and PNG at political and generational crossroads. With PNG on the cusp of its 50th anniversary, and half of Bougainville’s population born post-conflict, the scene is set for a revitalisation and rebranding of the relationship. [89]

Bougainville also needs a new mechanism for implementing its development initiatives. Together with the PNG Government, it should create, under statute, a special-purpose authority to administer development projects in Bougainville, which could be called the Bougainville Development Authority (BDA).

This idea is not new. In 2006, Bougainville’s House of Representatives passed legislation [90] for the creation of a Bougainville Restoration and Development Authority (BRDA), repealed in 2012. [91] Similarly, in 2021 a review of the National Coordination Office of Bougainville Affairs recommended the establishment of an authority responsible for the management and delivery of projects agreed by both governments. [92]

It is likely the establishment of the BRDA was influenced by the success of the Gazelle Restoration Authority (GRA), the special authority created for restoration and development efforts following the 1994 volcanic eruption in East New Britain Province. The scope of functions of the BRDA mirrored that of the GRA, allowing it to oversee and coordinate all restoration and development of physical infrastructure and physical works in Bougainville. The most comprehensive analysis of the GRA was a 2010 World Bank report, which concluded that the success of such reconstruction efforts is underpinned by strong political will and adherence to quality standards and transparent processes. [93]

Considering the World Bank’s recommendations for translating the GRA’s success to post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, [94] the following may form the key elements of operation of the proposed Bougainville Development Authority:

• The BDA should operate as a coordinating mechanism and implementing body for all projects aimed at socio-economic development that are in line with the priorities of the Bougainville Integrated Strategic Development Plan.
• The BDA should be the conduit for development funding and technical assistance from sources such as donor partners, the National Government, and the Autonomous Bougainville Government. The BDA should also directly receive and be the disburser of the PNG Government’s Restoration and Development Grant, which is the national government’s single biggest fiscal contribution to Bougainville.
• A combination of Bougainvillean and external experts should be appointed based on merit to manage BDA operations. Crucial to this management will be ensuring operational independence from undue political interference, while maintaining clear accountability to Bougainville’s elected leaders. [95]
• The BDA should be seen as an auxiliary entity that can perform tasks related to socio-economic outcomes for the Autonomous Bougainville Government, alleviating pressure on the National Government and allowing it to focus on internal capacity-building for service delivery.

A Bougainville that seeks to achieve independence without a meaningful foundation for development is at risk of replicating the conditions it is seeking to escape. The path to prosperity, and the reforms proposed in this brief, must be supported through a forward-looking partnership with the National Government. The roadmap for Bougainville’s future should not be singularly defined by independence, but must be grounded in development and prosperity for its people.

This research was supported through a grant from the Foundation for Development Cooperation.

The author thanks all those who generously gave their time for interviews and consultations, as well as the peer reviewers for their valuable feedback. Appreciation is also extended to the Foundation for Development Cooperation (FDC), the Office of the State Solicitor of Papua New Guinea, and others whose support made the FDC Pacific Research Fellowship possible. Finally, the author thanks Ian Bruce, Clare Caldwell, Sam Roggeveen, and Mihai Sora of the Lowy Institute for their invaluable contributions to the paper.