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You may unsubscribe from Lowy Institute newsletters at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
About the authors
Lydia Khalil
Lydia Khalil is Program Director of the Transnational Challenges Program at the Lowy Institute.
Peter Woodrow
Peter Woodrow is a leading thinker in the application of systems thinking concepts and tools of context analysis and program design in peacebuilding, anti-corruption, and democratic backsliding.
James Paterson
Dr James Paterson is the Research Associate for the Transnational Challenges Program at the Lowy Institute.
Robert Kaufman
Robert Kaufman is Distinguished Professor Emeritus in Political Science at Rutgers University.
Hungary’s post-communist transition initially embraced multi-party elections, constitutional protections, and institutional checks. However, by 2010, widespread disillusionment with a scandal-ridden government, combined with economic hardship following the global financial crisis, created conditions for Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party to gain power.
Orbán appealed to these grievances and disaffections in subsequent elections through a campaign of ethno-nationalism and anti-establishment populism, scapegoating refugees and migrants, and so-called elites. At times, the party
pushed campaigns of disinformation and media manipulation.
Fidesz was able to obtain and maintain a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority, which allowed Orbán to enact significant transformations and amend the constitution at will to restrict institutions responsible for constraining executive power. A new Fundamental Law was enacted in 2011 that restructured every significant institution of accountability. The Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction was curtailed and its appointment process brought under parliamentary control. The judiciary was reorganised to expand executive influence over court administration.
Fidesz was able to change electoral laws and redraw the electoral boundaries,
gerrymandering to systematically advantage Fidesz and forestall any opposition regardless of their political appeal. The independent electoral commission was replaced with bodies staffed by Fidesz loyalists.
New media regulatory bodies were created under direct Fidesz control and critical media outlets were removed through legal and financial pressure, while oligarchs allied with Fidesz acquired major news organisations. Rather than jailing journalists, engaging in blatant censorship, or simply shuttering hostile media, Orbán controlled outlets through economic and regulatory pressure. In 2023, the government passed the Defence of National Sovereignty Act, establishing a Sovereignty Protection Office with powers to investigate organisations receiving foreign funding; it was a mechanism used to target independent investigative media and civil society. A fragmented opposition became further weakened by the legal limitations Orbán and Fidesz were able to enact once in power.
Democracy in Hungary under Orbán was eroded to such a degree that the country crossed the threshold from democracy to electoral autocracy in 2019. However, despite Orbán remaining in power for 16 years, the 2026 electoral victory of Péter Magyar shows that opposition to entrenched power is possible. Whether Magyar will deploy his electoral mandate towards democratic renewal is yet to be seen.