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You may unsubscribe from Lowy Institute newsletters at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
About the authors
Lydia Khalil
Lydia Khalil is Program Director of the Transnational Challenges Program at the Lowy Institute.
Peter Woodrow
Peter Woodrow is a leading thinker in the application of systems thinking concepts and tools of context analysis and program design in peacebuilding, anti-corruption, and democratic backsliding.
James Paterson
Dr James Paterson is the Research Associate for the Transnational Challenges Program at the Lowy Institute.
Robert Kaufman
Robert Kaufman is Distinguished Professor Emeritus in Political Science at Rutgers University.
The United States has experienced significant democratic backsliding in recent years, particularly under the second administration of President Donald Trump. Polarisation is not the only culprit, but it is a large part of the story.
Partisanship has arguably become one of the country’s most salient identities — it has fused with geography and lifestyle, and to some extent race and religion. A range of identities have increasingly aligned with two opposing camps that often see each other as threatening, and at times even immoral. For many, partisan affiliation has become a form of tribal identity.
In 2022, Pew Research Center polling recorded a sharp escalation in partisan hostility. It found that 72% of Republicans and 63% of Democrats described the opposing party as more immoral than other Americans, up from 47% and 35% respectively in 2016.
Democrats, particularly those on the party’s farther left, do more than reject the policies of the Trump administration and its MAGA (Make America Great Again) base; they regard their opponents with a fear and distrust that can cross into demonisation. The MAGA right returns this animus, embracing Trump’s agenda largely uncritically and casting the left as “evil-doers” deserving of retribution”.
These patterns illustrate the affective polarisation feedback loop. Each insult or injury from one side provokes retaliation from the other, and the cycle accelerates, intensifying with each exchange. The result has been both a dysfunctional government, where opposing sides block legislation, and social harm, where citizens excuse or justify anti-democratic or unconstitutional behaviour if it suits their cause. This dynamic fosters the attitudes and actions that further erode democracy.
These divisions have been deepened by a media ecosystem that draws people into disparate information bubbles. Americans increasingly watch, listen to, and read — and are targeted by — news and commentary that confirm their partisan biases. Partisan leaders and influencers have made demonising the opposition a deliberate political strategy, contributing to affective polarisation and increasing the chances of political violence.
Such violence, including high-profile assassinations, has featured throughout US history and appears to be on the rise. A significant number of Americans (one poll shows as high as 30%) now think that “violence might be necessary to get the country back on track”. The recent assassination attempts on President Trump and the rising number of violent political attacks in the United States (and the celebrations that followed) suggest such views are far from hypothetical. According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), targeted violence in the United States grew by more than 30% between 2024 and 2025.