1979 all over again? Iran and US Indian Ocean strategy transformed

Recent reporting (Opens in new window) in the aftermath of Iran’s attacks on US bases in the Gulf suggests that the United States may not rebuild its presence in the northwest corner of the Indian Ocean region. While this outcome is far from certain, the US had ramped up its Indian Ocean presence in the first place also due to Iran, back in 1979. Just as that crisis nearly 50 years ago catalysed a new US approach to the region, the current crisis is an opportunity for the US to reassess its Indian Ocean strategy.

The turning point for Washington in 1979 came when Iran’s revolution changed the country from a top US partner under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to a main adversary under Ayatollah rule. A combination of factors such as Iran’s oil reserves, ambition for expansive regional leadership, and purchases of American weapons had made Iran a strong partner against the backdrop of the Cold War – a relationship that grew to its heights under President Richard Nixon. But the Shah’s authoritarian rule and economic policies eroded his standing at home. He fled Iran in early 1979 after a year of growing instability.

US policy had already begun inching toward more frequent naval presence and examining the potential for a regional rapid (Opens in new window) deployment force beyond the small Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) of three ships (Opens in new window) – one command ship based in Bahrain, two rotating ships – operating in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. But the taking of US embassy personnel as hostages in November 1979, sanctioned by the new leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, came as a shock to Washington that exposed its regional vulnerability.

Soon the US conducted its first (Opens in new window) deployment of two aircraft carriers to the Middle East, with USS Kitty Hawk (Opens in new window) joining USS Midway which was in the Indian Ocean. In fact, before USS Nimitz replaced Kitty Hawk in 1980, a photo-op (Opens in new window) of the three aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean augured greater US presence in the coming decades. The USS Eisenhower carrier battle group was deployed to the Indian Ocean for most of 1980 setting a modern US Navy record (Opens in new window) at the time, with naval aviators flying over the north Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman for months.

Something similar may be unfolding again today: experience with Iran in 1979 dramatically shifted US strategy in the Indian Ocean region. The Soviet Union’s subsequent invasion of neighbouring Afghanistan in December 1979 was an additional shock that emboldened the US in its decision to ramp up forces. President Jimmy Carter announced in January 1980 what became known as the Carter Doctrine, that the US would not tolerate an external power trying to gain control of the Persian Gulf. Carter (Opens in new window) stated the threat of “Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz.” He discussed the response of strengthened US naval presence and pursuit of naval and air access in the region including the Gulf and northeast Africa. A failed operation to rescue hostages in April 1980 further exposed the need for greater US military capability in the region. By 1983, US Central Command (CENTCOM) was formally established, including Naval Forces Central Command, whose base (Opens in new window) in Bahrain was attacked by Iran this year.

In the decades since, CENTCOM has been occupied with various US operations including in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even before the conflict with Iran, The Washington Postreported (Opens in new window) the Pentagon was considering sweeping changes to its unified command plan that would affect multiple combatant commands, including CENTCOM.

To be sure, the waters of the Indian Ocean have seen changes in military planning over the years with three US combatant commands bearing responsibilities currently. To what extent the US will use this moment in its Iran operations to reflect on the nation’s roughly 50-year journey into the waters of the Indian Ocean is unclear. Still, Iran may be serving to catalyse shifts in US strategy toward the Indian Ocean as it did decades ago.

The views expressed are solely those of the author and not of any organisation with which she is affiliated.