In the coming months, the Department of Defence will release its 2026 National Defence Strategy. The previous document, released in 2024, reaffirmed Australia’s defence strategy of deterrence by denial, and cast the foundations for an ADF whose force structure is now heavily influenced by the increasing costs of the AUKUS submarine program.
The strategic environment has changed more in the past two years than it has in the past 20. The relatively certain environment of the post-9/11 era, where threats were largely understood (even if we were still surprised at times) has given way to the globalisation of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the acceleration of Chinese military aggression and economic coercion, and a new US presidential administration focused on the Western hemisphere and more demanding of its allies. At the same time, the re-elected Albanese government has shown little inclination to increase defence spending commensurate with the growing strategic uncertainty.
The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have shown that perhaps the most transformative aspect of modern conflict has not been drones or AI, but the power of new, technology-supported learning and adaptation systems. The adaptation battle in Ukraine alone is moving at a pace that is incomprehensible to the low-risk bureaucrats and politicians in Canberra. A larger “adaptation war” has emerged with Russia, China and North Korea sharing insights in near real time. The most critical element of the forthcoming NDS will not be budget or technology – it may well the enhancement of our nation’s adaptive capacity in a rapidly changing world.
The first level of adaptation is tactical. The ADF must be able to adapt more rapidly to a budget situation where AUKUS submarines consume a larger proportion of the defence pie. At the same time, air, land, sea, space and cyber domain experts need to be able learn directly from their operating environment more rapidly and combine this with insights from allies overseas. This must result in more operational analysis capacity, evolved structures, warfighting doctrines, and training methods.
The next level of adaptation is strategic. The ADF as an institution will need to be able to rapidly adapt its force structure to take account of the large-scale penetration of uncrewed systems in the land, air and sea domains, noting that there is no one size fits all solution. Different environments and missions will demand different balances of crewed and uncrewed systems. This will also demand adaptations to force structure, and at a minimum, the formation of multiple new drone – and counter-drone units in the army, navy and air force and their reserve components.
Beyond force structure, the ADF will need to prepare to adapt its force for limited or broader national mobilisation. It is becoming increasingly clear that China’s military aspirations extend beyond Taiwan. PLA deployments have extended beyond the first island chain with aircraft carrier battlegroups, deep into the South China Sea, joint naval and bomber patrols in the North Pacific and in activities around Australia. The size of the full-time force in Australia must be able to be augmented through mobilisation, but this will demand adaptations to training, infrastructure, force structure and leadership models. The new national mobilisation entity in Taiwan, the All Out Defence Mobilisation Agency, may offer Australia insights into this process.
While Australia may have escaped the worst of the Trump administration’s “freeloading” accusations directed at Europe and Canada, this may not always be the case.
The third level of adaptation is political. The Australian government must adapt its capacity to communicate to the Australian people the accelerating pace, and wider array, of physical, cognitive and societal threats this nation faces. Releasing the NDS quietly on the night before Anzac Day, as occurred in 2024, will not cut it in 2026. A broader and open conversation with the nation is required.
At the same time, the Australian political system must adapt rapidly to an environment where our principal security partner might no longer be described as a security guarantor. America henceforth will be a more transactional and demanding partner. While Australia may have escaped the worst of the Trump administration’s “freeloading” accusations directed at Europe and Canada, this may not always be the case. Government would be required to adapt the Australian federal budget for a heavier defence burden.
The final type of adaptation required in the NDS is to the adaptation of the current peacetime mindset in defence. The slow, zero-risk management model that has been transferred into the ADF from the public service – which lacks elements such as the need for rapid decision-making under duress and the concept of unlimited liability – is not survivable in a future war. This should be addressed through evolved promotion systems with incentives that select, as Andrew Gordon describes in The Rules of the Game, more rat catchers and fewer regulators.
Adaptation in war, and the ability to rapidly adapt a military institution and its society from peace to war, builds upon the adaptation culture, processes and leadership established in peacetime. The forthcoming NDS could make a significant contribution to Australia’s defence in this regard. It could provide the government, Department of Defence and citizens of Australia a firm foundation for learning how to learn better, and more rapidly adapt, should the worst occur.
