Bangladesh, explained.
Crowds at a Kolkata market, India (Sudipta Das/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
Bangladesh’s constitutional overhaul and India’s culture wars are reshaping a once-settled identity.
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Is Bengali identity changing across India and Bangladesh?Is Bengali identity changing across India and Bangladesh?
More than half a century after the birth of Bangladesh, the question of Bengali identity is entering a new phase. For decades, the narrative appeared settled: linguistic nationalism drove the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, while Bengali culture remained a powerful regional identity in India’s eastern state of West Bengal. Yet recent political developments suggest the meaning of being Bengali is again being debated – constitutionally in Bangladesh and politically in India.
The roots of Bengali nationalism stretch back to the 19th century, when language and literature helped forge a shared cultural consciousness across the region. Under British colonial rule, Bengal became a centre of education, publishing, and reformist thought. Intellectuals and writers promoted a distinct identity grounded in language and history, laying the foundations for a broader political awakening.
That cultural identity became a powerful political force after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Although Bengali speakers formed the majority of the new state’s population, the central government attempted to impose Urdu as the sole national language. The protests of the Bengali Language Movement (1952) transformed linguistic identity into a symbol of political resistance. That sentiment reached its most intense expression two decades later when mass mobilisation against military rule culminated in the creation of Bangladesh.
For decades, the ruling narrative of Bangladeshi politics was built on that legacy. The Awami League derived much of its political legitimacy from the liberation struggle and the ideology of Bengali nationalism associated with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. During its long period in power after 2009, the party frequently framed its authority around the historical memory of 1971.
The debates unfolding in Dhaka and Kolkata may reshape how Bengali identity is expressed – a familiar pattern in which being Bengali continues to evolve.
That political order collapsed dramatically in 2024. Weeks of student-led protests over governance and political repression escalated into a nationwide uprising that forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign and leave the country. The fall of the Awami League government ended more than 15 years of uninterrupted rule and opened a turbulent transition in Bangladeshi politics.
The reform framework known as the July Charter was produced during that transition by an interim government. Negotiated among political actors after the uprising, the charter proposes a series of constitutional changes aimed at reshaping the country’s political institutions. One of the most consequential proposals concerns national identity. The charter suggests replacing the constitutional description of citizens as “Bengalis” with the term “Bangladeshi”, reflecting the country’s multi-ethnic composition, as well as recognising local tongues spoken in the country within the constitutional framework alongside Bangla.
The subsequent election brought the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to power, marking the return of a party historically associated with the doctrine of “Bangladeshi nationalism”. Unlike the Bengali linguistic nationalism championed by the Awami League, the BNP’s political tradition places greater emphasis on territorial identity, sovereignty and the country’s Islamic heritage.
The shift in political leadership therefore adds another layer to the evolving identity debate. If the Awami League era tied state legitimacy closely to the historical narrative of 1971, the new government now faces the challenge of redefining national identity in a political landscape shaped by the 2024 uprising and the constitutional reform agenda emerging from the July Charter.
The proposals also reflect a deeper shift in Bangladeshi political discourse. While Bangla remains the dominant language of public life, younger generations increasingly frame politics around governance, democratic accountability, and institutional reform rather than liberation-era narratives. The protests that brought down the government in 2024 illustrated this change. Their slogans were less about historical identity and more about corruption, political concentration of power, and demands for a more accountable state.
Unloading cargo along the shore of the Buriganga River in Dhaka Bangladesh (Mohd Rasfan/AFP via Getty Images)
If Bangladesh is reconsidering the constitutional meaning of its national identity, the pressures shaping identity in West Bengal are different but equally significant.
Within India, Bengali identity operates primarily as a regional cultural identity rather than a national one. Bengali remains the dominant language in West Bengal and one of the most widely spoken languages in India overall, with more than 80 million speakers nationwide according to census data. Yet debates about language and cultural identity have intensified in recent years.
National political narratives, disputes over migration from Bangladesh, and the growing influence of Hindi-language in media and Hindutva nationalism have all contributed to anxieties about the place of Bengali culture within India’s broader national framework. Regional leaders frequently frame linguistic and cultural protection as a political issue, reflecting concerns that Bengali identity could gradually lose prominence in a highly centralised national media environment.
Yet the evidence of cultural vitality remains overwhelming. Bengali literature, cinema, theatre, and music continue to shape public life across the region. Festivals such as Durga Puja in Kolkata draw millions every year, while Bangla remains one of the most widely spoken languages in the world.
Bengal once represented one of South Asia’s most cohesive cultural spaces, united by language and intellectual traditions. Today that same civilisation is divided between two countries and two political systems that shape identity in different ways.
Yet Bengali identity has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to adapt to political change. Its roots lie not only in the institutions of a state but in a linguistic and cultural tradition that transcends borders. The debates unfolding today in Dhaka and Kolkata may reshape how that identity is expressed – a familiar historical pattern in which the meaning of being Bengali continues to evolve alongside the political transformations of the region.
About the author
Saqlain Rizve
Saqlain Rizve is a Bangladeshi journalist and photographer who writes and documents Bangladesh's politics, society, and its regional dynamics.
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