Australia, explained.
Grappling with how to defend a continent spanning 7.7 million square kilometres can seem overwhelming (Jake Badior/Defence.gov.au)
Consolidating maritime departments, and coordination across defence, civil and industry is where the wins will be made.
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Beyond AUKUS: The maritime strategy Australia needsBeyond AUKUS: The maritime strategy Australia needs
There is growing concern about the shifting geopolitical environment, the increasing use of military force to settle disputes, and what this means for Australia’s future security and prosperity. Grappling with how to defend a continent spanning 7.7 million square kilometres, and national interests that extend far beyond our shores can seem overwhelming. Since the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, Australia’s defence strategy has rightly focused on protecting the nation through the maritime domain: defeating potential threats before they reach our coastline and safeguarding the maritime trade routes that sustain both our economy and our warfighting effort.
But what does that actually require? Much more than AUKUS or Australia’s investment in nuclear-powered submarines and continuous naval shipbuilding. It demands consolidation of the nation’s maritime departments, greater coordination across defence, civil and industry elements, and investment in enabling capabilities, from mine-warfare and seabed monitoring to logistics and sustainment. As argued in A Maritime Strategy for Australia 2035 – a new report from the University of New South Wales Naval Studies Group – these flagship programs will only deliver their intended impact if Australia transitions to a genuine national maritime strategy. Without the less headline-grabbing investments in reform, coordination and enabling capabilities, warships and nuclear-powered submarines won’t be enough.
As Australia looks across the geopolitical landscape, the trend is clear: states are increasingly willing to use force to achieve their aims.
Why does this matter? Because as Australia looks across the geopolitical landscape, the trend is clear: states are increasingly willing to use force to achieve their aims. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, renewed conflict in the Middle East, and this year’s fighting between India and Pakistan, and Thailand and Cambodia, all reflect a world where the post-war multilateral system, once kept in check by institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, is breaking down.
Closer to home, China has developed one of the most formidable militaries in the world. Central to this has been the expansion and modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, now boasting more than 370 battle-force ships, around 70% launched in just the past decade. Its actions around Taiwan and increasingly assertive behaviour towards Australian and other nations’ ships and aircraft in the South China Sea underscore the risks. The recent firing of flares near an Australian maritime patrol aircraft in international airspace could, in extreme circumstances, have caused catastrophic engine failure and loss of life. And earlier this year, China’s naval task group circumnavigated Australia, an unmistakable demonstration of its growing long-range maritime capability and a reminder of our vulnerabilities across a vast maritime domain on which our national prosperity depends.
Australia's vast maritime domain and dependence on seaborne trade make the country exposed (Getty Images)
In the face of such global instability and China’s overwhelming military power, it can seem daunting to consider how Australia should protect its national interests. But the answer is not to try to match China’s military strength. It begins with understanding what those interests are, where Australia’s vulnerabilities lie, and how best to protect them in the event of a crisis or conflict. This requires a genuinely national approach to security, one that extends beyond defence and the military to include economic, industrial and societal resilience. Australia is not about to be invaded, but it remains acutely vulnerable across the maritime, cyber and space domains.
While many commentators argue that Australia’s geography protects it, that same geography is a double-edged sword. Our vast maritime domain and dependence on seaborne trade make us exposed. A Maritime Strategy for Australia 2035 argues that Australia must urgently close capability gaps and strengthen naval readiness, but also that reducing vulnerability requires more than high-end military hardware.
As an island nation dependent on maritime trade, our defence strategy has finally recognised the centrality of the sea.
The report sets out how to make this national approach real: from rebuilding mine-warfare and hydrographic fleets and investing in uncrewed aerial vehicles that can operate from naval platforms, to creating a ministerial-level maritime governance body to coordinate Australia’s defence, industry and civil maritime efforts. It also calls for a coastguard-style body to take over policing and border-protection tasks, freeing the Navy to focus on high-end warfighting, alongside an independent costing of the nuclear-powered submarine program and a push to standardise ship designs and supply chains. Practical reforms that turn strategy into capability.
We must also recognise the importance of civilian maritime capability. That means developing policy settings to encourage Australian-flagged ships capable of carrying critical supplies during crisis or conflict and rebuilding a national mariner skills base.
In the history of Australia’s strategic debate, we have long grappled with what it takes to defend both our continent and our interests. As an island nation dependent on maritime trade, our defence strategy has finally recognised the centrality of the sea. But this cannot rest on warships and nuclear-powered submarines alone. It requires a truly national maritime strategy, one that integrates defence, industry and civil capability. The UNSW Naval Studies Group report sets out how we can begin that essential task. Australia’s future security and prosperity depend on it.
About the author
Jennifer Parker
Jennifer Parker is a Nonresident Fellow at the Lowy Institute and Adjunct Fellow in Naval Studies at the University of Western Australia.
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