New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon hosted his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi in July (@chrisluxonmp/X)
Beyond the Quad: India–New Zealand relations find purpose
Trade and maritime cooperation are filling in a relationship people-to-people ties alone could not sustain.
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|Beyond the Quad: India–New Zealand relations find purpose
Beyond the Quad: India–New Zealand relations find purpose
For four decades, no Indian prime minister visited New Zealand. That changed in July 2026, when Narendra Modi made the first such visit (Opens in new window), and the two countries elevated ties to a “Strategic Partnership”. Two months later, New Zealand's parliament approved (Opens in new window) the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which was signed (Opens in new window) in April 2026. Meanwhile, the two countries are moving towards their first bilateral naval exercise, with Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Krishna Swaminathan’s recent visit (Opens in new window) adding momentum to maritime cooperation.
These changes have come in quick succession. Two reasons explain why this matters.
The first is economic. The FTA gives greater weight to a previously underdeveloped commercial relationship. It also gives both countries a framework to expand trade and investment beyond the relatively narrow base (Opens in new window) that has characterised their economic relationship so far. The second reason is security. Maritime cooperation is creating links between two countries whose defence relationship has historically been limited. New Zealand gives India a stronger connection to Oceania, extending the geographical reach of India’svision of a free, open, inclusive, and secure Indo-Pacific. This helps India to build an Indo-Pacific presence beyond the Quad through this network of bilateral partnerships.
Once fully implemented, the FTA will eliminate (Opens in new window) or reduce tariffs on about 95% of New Zealand's exports to India, while Indian goods will receive duty-free access to New Zealand. The two countries have also set a target of doubling (Opens in new window) their bilateral trade to US$4.0 billion by 2030. India provides New Zealand with access to a sizable and expanding market at a time when economic diversification is becoming crucial.
New Zealand gives India a stronger connection to Oceania, extending the geographical reach of India's vision of a free, open, inclusive, and secure Indo-Pacific.
At the same time, New Zealand is a developed Pacific economy with potential for India in a number of areas, including advanced research, education, investment, and agriculture and food technology. For New Zealand, closer ties with India add another major market to a trade portfolio still heavily concentrated (Opens in new window) around China and other traditional partners such as Australia and the US. With India accounting (Opens in new window) for just 1.8% of New Zealand's exports in 2025, the FTA is likely to substantially increase this percentage.
For years, India–New Zealand ties had strong people-to-people connections (Opens in new window), particularly through the Indian-origin community in New Zealand, but comparatively limited economic weight. That imbalance made the relationship vulnerable to diplomatic drift. A stronger commercial relationship gives businesses, investors, students, and professionals a reason to keep the relationship moving.
HMNZS Aotearoa and a Seasprite helicopter (NZDF)
The second reason that India and New Zealand ties matter is their agreement to cooperate (Opens in new window) on maritime security, hydrography, logistics, and information exchange. New Zealand joining (Opens in new window) the maritime-security pillar of India's Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative gives two geographically distant countries practical ways to cooperate on issues such as maritime awareness, secure sea lanes, disaster response and wider security of commons. For India, this fits into a broader effort to build maritime partnerships across the region.
Bringing New Zealand into this network also has a clear geographical logic. It lies in the South Pacific beyond India's traditional Indian Ocean focus, thus making it relevant (Opens in new window) to the wider maritime outlook of India's MAHASAGAR vision. Closer ties with Wellington can therefore extend India's engagement further into Oceania, a region where its presence has historically been more limited.
As India looks beyond the Quad (Opens in new window), New Zealand adds a deeper connection to Oceania, now central (Opens in new window) to the politics of the Indo-Pacific. The Pacific Island countries sit astride vast maritime spaces and face challenges (Opens in new window) involving climate change, fisheries, disaster resilience, connectivity, and security. India has already engaged (Opens in new window) the Pacific Islands through the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC), development assistance, capacity building, disaster resilience, and climate initiatives. But India's presence remains considerably less developed there than that of Australia, New Zealand, or the United States. Bringing their strengths together could allow the two countries to support Pacific Island states in areas where their interests already overlap.
The two countries still have considerable work to do to turn political commitments into sustained trade and naval interaction. Their maritime relations will depend on whether they develop into regular habits of cooperation. The FTA agreement also carries domestic sensitivities. Immigration has become part of the domestic debate, with opponents (Opens in new window) arguing that the agreement gives too much away on immigration and labour access.
Questions around market access, agriculture, immigration, and the distribution of its gains mean that closer economic ties with India will need to be politically sustained at home as well as negotiated between governments. The disagreements cannot be brushed aside because the success of the FTA will ultimately be measured not only by the tariff reductions negotiated by governments but also by whether businesses, farmers, workers, and consumers in both countries see tangible benefits.