Southeast Asia, explained.
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Indonesia's President Prabowo Subianto at the BRICS Summit in New Delhi on 12 September 2026 (@narendramodi/X)
New Delhi’s careful diplomacy gives Southeast Asian capitals room to sit inside BRICS without picking a side.
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India’s role in Southeast Asia’s BRICS betIndia’s role in Southeast Asia’s BRICS bet
A certain déjà vu accompanied the buzz leading up to India’s BRICS summit held last week – India’s turn as G20 chair in 2023 offered similar fanfare and great expectations. The geopolitics might have changed from three years ago but the same messages about India’s convening power and framing a public goods agenda for the organisation carried through.
Southeast Asia’s engagement was another theme. Official ties to BRICS were recently marked by Indonesia joining as a full member and Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam being inducted as partner countries in 2025. This set off some alarm bells, given it meant four of the 11 ASEAN countries had partnered with BRICS, especially when coupled with US President Donald Trump’s threat (Opens in new window) of 100% tariffs against BRICS members if they acted to undermine the US dollar.
But the ASEAN members in BRICS are careful to show they are not “taking a side” against the West – an approach compatible and palatable with that of India, too.
To Southeast Asia, India’s presence in BRICS brings balance to the grouping, helping shed the perception that it is “anti-West” or solely China- and Russia-driven.
India’s emphasis on inclusive multilateralism has shaped its brand of Global South mobilisation, a phenomenon gaining traction in Southeast Asia, centred on conscious regional cooperation for the delivery of public goods. The BRICS New Delhi Declaration (Opens in new window) emphasised “the key role of the G20 as the premier global forum for international economic cooperation” and one that “provides a platform for dialogue of both emerging and developed economies on an equal and mutually beneficial footing”.
This points to the continued relevance of Global North enterprise in Global South mobilisation. What makes India’s commitment to this more pronounced is its functional relations with the West – within frameworks such as the Quad, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, and enhanced (Opens in new window) ties with the European Union – despite its increasingly erratic (Opens in new window) relations with the United States.
These conditions and optics appeal to Southeast Asian standards, where the broader association wants to avoid any perceived antagonism towards the West. Nowhere was this more apparent than by Philippines’ attendance at the BRICS summit in its capacity as ASEAN chair. The Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States, one growing closer in the last few years, and there was indeed an inherent understanding that participating in the BRICS summit in New Delhi would not in any way signal a retreat in the Filipino position in its relations with the US and China. It was notable that US ambassador to India Sergio Gor, who travelled to Manipur during the start of the BRICS summit, made it a point to return to the New Delhi to meet with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.
Modi meeting with Malaysia's Anwar Ibrahim (@narendramodi/X)
India will be a key enabler to how Southeast Asia will view BRICS in the long run. India has (Opens in new window) an Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Vietnam, Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with Indonesia and Malaysia, and a Strategic Partnership with Thailand. There have been sustained efforts over the last few years at cultivating bilateral relations and making them fit for purpose. This includes initiating cooperation and joint efforts in areas including semiconductors, defence industry and connectivity.
Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has previously stressed (Opens in new window) that India’s distinct and influential role within BRICS is of particular importance, as Malaysia recognises that bilateral ties strengthen the dynamics of the grouping. This was a compelling indicator of the value Malaysia holds to its relationship with India, more so within cooperative frameworks and one which is often viewed as a Chinese-led regional bloc. To Southeast Asia, India’s presence in BRICS brings balance to the grouping, helping shed the perception that it is “anti-West” or solely China- and Russia-driven.
India’s homegrown initiatives also help – such as the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) which is distinctly aimed at addressing shared endemic challenges and gained BRICS endorsement in the New Delhi Declaration. Notably the Philippines officially (Opens in new window) joined the CDRI as its 71st member on the sidelines of the BRICS summit – a signal that India’s brand of Global South mobilisation has gained traction.
India’s approach to BRICS has a Southeast Asian flavour – slow and calculated. New Delhi has reinforced its brand of Global South mobilisation and this will impact how ASEAN as a regional organisation with its own structures will choose to engage with BRICS in the long run.
About the author
Yanitha Meena Louis
Yanitha Meena Louis is Analyst at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.
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