Cambodia, explained.
Countries are seeking deeper partnership with Australia not to avoid alignment, but because they see alignment as inevitable (Getty Images)
Disquiet about Beijing’s growing presence is motivating countries across the region to seek deeper cooperation with Canberra.
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China’s rise in Southeast Asia is bringing in a golden age for AustraliaChina’s rise in Southeast Asia is bringing in a golden age for Australia
Few close observers of Southeast Asia would dispute the claim that China’s influence across the region is growing. Beijing’s assiduous diplomacy and the promise of future economic rewards are pulling most of the region closer in. At the same time, Washington’s approaches, including economic protectionism, support for Israel over its war on Hamas, and continued diplomatic inattention, are pushing countries away.
As worrying as this picture is to Canberra, it is paradoxically creating a new golden age in Australia’s ties with the region. Because as China’s influence grows, so too do anxieties about its presence, even in countries such as Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia, that have largely not seen China as a threat over the past two decades.
This disquiet about China’s growing presence is in turn motivating individuals and groups from across the region to seek deeper cooperation with Australia. All countries want more economic investment and presence by Australian businesses. The Malaysian and Indonesian defence establishments both want more cooperation with Australia, as demonstrated by the recent signing of a defence cooperation agreement between Canberra and Jakarta. Cambodia’s new generation of leaders is reaching out. Australia’s partnerships with Singapore and Vietnam are flourishing.
Some will point to this record as evidence that countries in the region are still “hedging” and avoiding alignment with any partner. But the better interpretation is that they are seeking deeper partnership with Australia not to avoid alignment, but because they see alignment as inevitable. There is simply no evidence for the proposition that any country in Southeast Asia, except for the Philippines and to a lesser extent Vietnam and Singapore, is willing to incur any costs from China in the interest of remaining non-aligned. Partnering with Australia (or the United States or Japan) will sit alongside, rather than lessen ties with China.
This distinction between avoiding alignment and managing the consequences of alignment might sound abstract. After all, if countries want to work with us, who cares why?
Partnering with Australia might be the geopolitical equivalent of the “lipstick effect” – a theory that cash-strapped consumers during tough economic times are likely to splurge on small affordable luxuries like makeup or cosmetics.
One reason to care is that unless we understand why countries are working with us, we risk misinterpreting the impact of such cooperation. For example, if we believe that Malaysia seeks closer defence cooperation with Australia to avoid aligning with China, then it follows that such cooperation can have an effect in shaping Malaysia’s overall strategic outlook. If, on the other hand, we judge that the Malaysian defence officials seek closer ties with Australia because they are anxious that it is aligning with China then the wider effect of such cooperation will be limited. Relationships with the Malaysian Armed Forces may be stronger and friendlier, the two countries may carry out more sophisticated combined exercises, but Australia will not be able to increase – or could even still lose – access, basing and overflight rights.
Likewise in the case of Cambodia. If we assess that Hun Manet and his new generation of technocratic leaders are seeking to avoid aligning with China then it follows that investing more in the relationship will yield a dividend, with the country more willing to resist pressure from China in regional forums or to prevent China from gaining exclusive access to Ream Naval base. If, on the other hand, Hun Manet and his coterie are merely belatedly responding to the realisation that Cambodia has become too dependent on China and would like to retain other partners in the mix, then whatever resources Australia might bring to bear will have little effect in preventing Phnom Penh from becoming a proxy for Beijing.
This isn’t to say we should turn off the tap. Most of what we do is in our own interests. Encouraging Australian businesses to invest more in the region isn’t just about responding to a demand signal from political leaders, but about seizing an economic opportunity. Political and defence cooperation with countries in our own region promotes a range of Australian interests, such as countering transnational crime, maintaining situational awareness of the region’s maritime domain, and collaborating on shared regional issues.
In terms of the broader geopolitical dynamic in the region, however, partnering with Australia might be the geopolitical equivalent of the “lipstick effect” – a theory that cash-strapped consumers during tough economic times are likely to splurge on small affordable luxuries like makeup or cosmetics. When China’s influence is rising, cooperation with a smaller and capable partner such as Australia might help Southeast Asian countries feel less anxious, but it’s unlikely to change anything much.
About the author
Susannah Patton
Susannah Patton is Director, Asia Engagement at RMIT and a Nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute.
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