The Democratic Republic of Congo is again at the centre of one of the world’s most severe humanitarian and security crises. Since January this year, more than 7000 people have been killed and nearly 150 000 have fled into neighbouring countries. Over seven million remain internally displaced.
Despite the public headlines and claims from the Trump administration in Washington about a peace agreement being in place, clashes between the March 23 Movement (M23) and the Congolese armed forces continue. In the space of just two weeks in July, more than 300 civilians were killed, many of them women and children sheltering in fields during planting season.
The crisis in eastern areas of Congo is not new. For decades, the region has been plagued by recurring cycles of violence, driven by weak governance, porous borders, and ethnic divisions. More than 100 armed groups operate across North and South Kivu, feeding off instability and mistrust.
Among them, M23 has emerged as the most powerful threat. Initially defeated in 2013, the group re-emerged in late 2021, establishing control of territory. By December 2024, it had captured the cities of Goma and Bukavu, with the support of Rwanda. The Congolese army (FARDC), long weakened by corruption, poor discipline, and low morale, has proven unfit to halt the advance.
The risk is that Congo becomes a stage for global competition rather than genuine stabilisation.
In 2023, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployed troops from South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania under the SAMIDRC mission, authorised through its Mutual Defence pact. This deployment followed the earlier deployment of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) in 2022, which failed to deliver the stability DRC President Félix Tshisekedi had hoped for, leading him to request their withdrawal and turn to SADC. However, logistical weaknesses, inadequate funding, and mounting casualties forced the premature termination of the SADC mission in March 2025, followed by a phased withdrawal.
The collapse of SAMIDRC mirrors earlier regional interventions that lacked coherence, clear objectives, and sustainable financing. A similar pattern played out in Mozambique, where the withdrawal of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) left communities in Cabo Delgado vulnerable and led to renewed attacks by the Islamic State in Mozambique (IS-M). Both cases highlight how fragile progress can be when regional forces withdraw without long-term political commitment or plans for stability.
The instability in Congo is inseparable from its substantial mineral wealth. The country hosts more than 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves, along with copper, coltan, and lithium, which are essential for electric vehicles and other renewable energy technologies. Rather than serving as a pathway to prosperity, these resources have become both a magnet for conflict and a fault line for geopolitical rivalry.
Additionally, M23 rebels frequently target mining routes in North Kivu, cutting off humanitarian access and exploiting resources to finance operations, while weak governance allows corruption and the mismanagement of resources.
The pursuit of resources has put Congo at the heart of US-China rivalry. Currently, China controls most of the cobalt supply chain in the country’s southern provinces through firms such as China Molybdenum, including the massive Tenke Fungurume mine. Reports from mining towns such as Kolwezi highlight unsafe labour conditions, child exploitation, and environmental degradation in Chinese-run projects. China has coupled its mining dominance with infrastructure investments and expanding security cooperation, hoping to reinforce its wider presence.
Meanwhile, the United States has sought to counterbalance China’s dominance by promoting “responsible sourcing” and offering Congo new investment partnerships and security, with President Felix Tshisekedi hinting at providing the US access to the country’s resources in exchange for military support. However, the United States does not have a big mining footprint in Congo, and reports suggest it is now exploring partnerships with South African mining companies to help overcome logistical challenges and strengthen its position in the country’s mineral sector.
Although headlines in June announced a US-brokered peace deal between the Congo and Rwanda, no formal agreement was reached, apart from the United States encouraging Rwanda to cease its support for M23 and Congo to commit to reintegration efforts. Still, the peace deal narrative has unravelled, with missed deadlines in follow-up talks in Qatar and little change on the ground. M23 has maintained its hold in North Kivu, cutting supply routes and executing attacks against civilians.
US and China’s involvement in Congo has been viewed as a stabilising force, with both powers pledging investment, infrastructure, and security. Yet past engagements have downplayed the needs of fragile states. For the United States, countering China is as much about securing clean energy supply chains as fostering stability in the Great Lakes region. For China, access to resources will promote its technological ambitions, but its development promises will likely minimally address governance failures and community grievances.
The risk is that Congo becomes a stage for global competition rather than genuine stabilisation. Looking at Mozambique as a cautionary tale, despite the promise of economic transformation from its gas investments, international companies operating in the north have only deepened local marginalisation and resentment, perpetuating the instability. Congo risks a similar outcome if its mineral wealth is treated as a prize rather than a foundation for inclusive growth. It is critical that any external interventions around peace deals or economic development work hand-in-glove with domestic and regional entities to build sustainable solutions. Interventions that prioritise market share or transactional interests will only have short- to medium-term effects and will not benefit local people.
