COP30: A climate for change?

One of the major developments at COP30 in Brazil was Australia signing the “Belém Declaration to Transition from Fossil Fuels”.

What does this mean for relations with Japan, Australia’s largest energy export market?

Japan has played a pivotal role in the development of Australia’s resources industry from iron ore in the 1960s to being the foundation customer of the North West Shelf gas project in the 1990s and still regards LNG as the cornerstone of its energy security.

I first visited Japan at the turn of the century. It was like going to Disney’s Tomorrow Land. The Shinkansen was the fastest regularly operating high-speed train in the world. The Toyota Prius had the world’s most efficient vehicle power train. Japan had shown leadership in climate change negotiations, hosting COP3 in 1997 that adopted the Kyoto Protocol.

But then Japan lost its climate change mojo.

In one word, the reason was “Fukushima”.

Japan switched off its nuclear power plants after the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster.

Despite a fleet of Nissan Leafs turning up to stricken communities to provide power and emergency responders, Japan had to ration electricity, even creating a new summer dress code, and in the years after went slow on the renewable energy transition and electric mobility.

Panasonic was the original battery supplier to Tesla but Toyota sold its Tesla shares and doubled down on its “plug-free” and plug-in hybrid technologies, as well as hydrogen powered fuel cell vehicles which barely register on global sales charts.

Japan’s fixation on hydrogen is illustrated by the request by Japan’s ambassador to Australia, Kazuhiro Suzuki, at his 12 November 2025 National Press Club address, to sequester captured carbon dioxide from imported LNG into depleted Australian oil and gas fields. Similarly, Japan has been slower than South Korea in deploying solar panels, betting on thin-film perovskite solar cells that are still in the early stage of development, instead of rapidly deploying super cheap silicon-based solar PV to replace fossil fuels now.

So what can Australia do to help Japan decarbonise?

The first approach would be to encourage Japan to be a foundation customer and investor in future mineral and metal ore processing in Australia powered by renewable energy. Green metals and minerals could then be exported to Japan for further processing and value adding into batteries, magnets, power electronics, robots, ships, vehicles and wind turbine parts, industries of the future.

For example, 90% of the energy used to make steel is expended in the initial iron making process which could be done in Australia. Meanwhile, 90% of the value of steel comes from final fabrication, which could be done in Japan to meet customer demand.

The second idea would be to urge Japan to prioritise electrification, powered by renewable energy, including the rapid deployment of silicon-based solar PV – incorporating Australian technology – and offshore wind, possibly even through the joint development of floating offshore wind platforms which both our countries need. Japan’s focus on hydrogen fuel cell technology has ceded its first-mover advantage to China and South Korea where original equipment manufacturers are accelerating the electrification of all forms of ground transport.

If Japan electrified its vehicle fleet, it would slash fossil fuel use and could even enable the country to regain the lead in power electronic technologies like vehicle-to-grid.

The third area is to work with Australia in supporting regional decarbonisation. Japan is the largest energy donor in both the Pacific and Southeast Asia, the two priority regions for Australia’s overseas development assistance.

Too often Australia and Japan’s objectives are at loggerheads.

In Southeast Asia, Australia’s main energy goal is to support the development of an ASEAN grid by 2045 to expand the potential customer base for new renewable energy projects given existing take-or-pay thermal power arrangements make it difficult to launch new projects.

On the other hand, Japan has been selling surplus LNG it contracts from Australia and encouraging countries to add ammonia to their energy mix, requiring new infrastructure that usually has a 20-year payback period.

Australia should encourage Japan to put the bulk of its US$8 billion Asia Zero Emission Community financial support into projects that support the development of an ASEAN grid powered by renewable energy.

In the Pacific, Australia has a $75 million off grid renewable energy program, trialling the retrofit of outboard motors with battery electric kits from Australian company eClass Outboards and is entering into strategic energy partnerships. Australia should urge Japan to back the region’s goal of 100% renewable energy, including by supplying battery electric vehicles and outboard motors like the Yamaha HARMO through its regional network of distributors, enabling banana boats to be electrified.

While Japan will continue to make its own energy decisions in its national interest, Australia can help Japan regain its climate change mojo and slow global warming.

As the dust settles on the deal struck between Australia and Türkiye over next year’s COP31 climate summit, what does this mean for the Pacific? The island states, not part of the Western Europe and Other Group of the United Nations, were never eligible to host the summit independently. Australia had offered a co-hosting arrangement to put Pacific priorities at the centre of the talks, but with Türkiye now confirmed as host and Australia only steering the formal negotiations, that possibility has narrowed.

The arrangement places Türkiye in charge of the Action Agenda, the space for voluntary coalitions and high-profile pledges that some observers regard as the real engine of progress when formal negotiations stall. Without Australia at the helm of the full agenda alongside Pacific nations, the influence of the region risks being diminished at a critical moment to act as climate impacts intensify.

Even so, the Pacific retains important openings. Australia has secured agreement for a pre-COP meeting to take place in the Pacific, which world leaders will be invited to attend. Although such an event will not command the global spotlight of the main event, it still offers a meaningful platform to place the region’s priorities directly in front of international decision-makers. COP31 in Türkiye will also feature a dedicated session on the climate finance needs of Small Island Developing States.

A rare moment of concentrated global diplomatic attention on the Pacific could secure significant contributions.

The decision is still fresh, and many details of this hurried compromise are yet to be worked out. So far, what is clear is an emphasis on fundraising for the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF). The PRF is a region-owned fund that has been years in the making, now formally established, and focused on community-level climate and disaster resilience across the region. It has struggled to reach its capitalisation target of US$500 million, having secured only around US$167 million to date.

The fund is poised to become an important mechanism for reaching communities directly. But it’s not everything the region wants or needs. The PRF seeks modest sums in global terms, and a rare moment of concentrated global diplomatic attention on the Pacific could secure significant contributions. A further question however is whether Australia – already the largest donor with a US$63 million pledge – will now be expected to increase its own contribution with the hope to bring others along.

But COP31 should be about more than landing pledges. Under what Australia envisaged for the summit had it been hosted in Adelaide, Pacific leaders would have had the opportunity to shape the global debate on issues stretching well beyond a single regional fund. That opportunity now looks smaller, but it has not disappeared. Australia and the Pacific should resist a sole focus on the PRF and instead concentrate on where substantive gains – for the region and the global system – remain possible.

Reforming the global climate finance architecture, in which the PRF will ultimately be only a small player, should top the list. Pacific Island countries rank among the world’s most climate-vulnerable yet face some of the steepest barriers to securing adaptation funding. Pushing for reforms that serve Small Island Developing States and other climate-vulnerable countries is one of the clearest avenues for Pacific influence. This could involve efforts to streamline access procedures across multilateral funds and even fold together funds with overlapping mandates, so that increasingly scarce resources are delivered faster and with fewer administrative hurdles.

A further priority should be protecting adaptation finance from being squeezed out as public funds increasingly focus on mobilising private capital. Adaptation is already chronically underfunded relative to mitigation and rarely generates financial returns, particularly in the most vulnerable countries. Private investment is unlikely to help. COP30 made some headway by securing an agreement to triple adaptation funding from wealthy countries by 2035, but maintaining the momentum and delivering on this as public budgets tighten is far from certain.

The hosting deal has altered the stage, but not the stakes. With the right strategy this new arrangement can still allow the Pacific to shape the outcome of COP31.

Australia’s withdrawn bid to host COP31 may look like a diplomatic setback. In reality, it has handed Canberra one of the most powerful climate opportunities it has had in years.

The cost of hosting the global climate negotiations in Adelaide was estimated at $1-2 billion, with revenues from the event expected to cover around $500 million. So that means roughly $1 billion is now sitting unallocated – money that could deliver far more impact for Australia than a three-week summit in South Australia ever would.

Rather than treating the withdrawal as a hiccup, Canberra can use this moment to pivot toward something the region has long called for: serious, sustained investment in climate-resilient infrastructure in the Pacific. Redirecting the funds originally reserved for COP31 into projects that directly protect lives, economies and ecosystems would generate far greater diplomatic and environmental gains than hosting the conference itself.

Australia’s COP31 proposal was driven as much by geopolitics as by climate ambition. Hosting would have allowed Canberra to signal seriousness about what Pacific leaders consistently call the region’s “single greatest security threat.” The Australian and Pacific pitch was meant to highlight alignment with island priorities at a time of rising regional competition.

Pacific governments backed the bid early, hoping it would amplify their voices on the global stage. Canberra’s withdrawal therefore carries political costs, with Pacific leaders watching carefully to see how Australia responds.

The compromise reached with Türkiye salvaged an important outcome: a major pre-COP gathering will now be held in the Pacific, giving the region a chance to push for climate finance, including for the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF). Some of the funding originally earmarked for COP31 might be redirected to support this gathering.

But more can be done.

The Pacific’s climate reality makes the case for reinvestment compelling. Climate change is not a distant future risk but an accelerating disaster. Rising seas are swallowing coastlines. Stronger cyclones repeatedly destroy infrastructure. Saltwater intrusion threatens freshwater sources. More frequent flooding undermines food security and wipes out years of economic gains.

The challenge is not the lack of viable adaptation projects; it is the lack of predictable, long-term financing.

At a time when global development budgets are tightening, Pacific governments face rising adaptation costs and shrinking fiscal space. Dollars that would have been spent hosting COP31 in Adelaide could instead fund a seawall, a resilient port, a climate-proofed energy grid, a flood-resistant road or an early-warning system that saves lives. In the Pacific, $1 billion goes an extraordinarily long way.

Australia must choose the kind of climate leadership it wants to project.

Australia already has well-established mechanisms to channel such investments. Its traditional aid program provides grant financing, while the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP) blends grants and loans, including through its dedicated climate window, the Pacific Climate Infrastructure Financing Partnership. However, as explained in a recent Lowy Institute paper, concessional resources in these facilities are rapidly depleting, even as climate pressures intensify. Injecting COP31-equivalent funding would immediately allow Australia to expand its portfolio of “hard” adaptation investments. And for domestic audiences concerned about spending overseas, project delivery could prioritise Australian contractors, mirroring how COP31 hosting itself was expected to benefit the Adelaide economy.

Increasing support for the PRF is another option. Australia has already committed $100 million to the Facility, which aims to raise US$500 million by 2026 and US$1.5 billion by 2030. Yet the PRF has struggled to attract major donors. A deeper Australian contribution would send a powerful signal of confidence and could catalyse others to follow.

The diplomatic benefits would be equally important. Redirecting the COP funds would be one of the clearest signals that Australia listens to Pacific priorities. It would convert broad climate commitments into tangible outcomes, help rebuild trust damaged by earlier policy disputes – Adani, Kyoto carryover credits – and signal that Australia is serious about shared stewardship. It would also support Canberra’s ambition of becoming a preferred infrastructure partner at a time when China’s regional presence continues to grow.

Ultimately, Australia must choose the kind of climate leadership it wants to project. Hosting a COP may be diplomatically valuable, but investing in Pacific climate resilience delivers tangible, lasting impact. It strengthens partnerships, supports regional stability and advances Australia’s strategic interests far more than a single summit could.

Australia now has a rare second chance. The funds originally set aside for COP31 do not need to go back into consolidated revenue. Redirecting it toward Pacific climate resilience would turn a diplomatic disappointment into a strategic win, strengthening relationships, supporting island priorities and advancing real climate action.

The government should seize this opportunity. Australia shouldn’t retreat from ambition. It should reinvest, where it matters most.

In the sweltering Amazonian city of Belém, the gateway to the rainforest known as the “lungs of the planet”, the air is thick.

Within the venue for COP30, the United Nations summit on climate change, officials hurry down cavernous corridors, clutching reams of paper. Activists chant slogans as they pass, decrying ecological destruction and failures of resolve. Not far away, country pavilions showcase renewable energy projects, businesses and lobbyists stitch up deals, while politicians proclaim national successes. At the gates of the venue, as an afternoon tropical downpour eases, small groups of indigenous peoples from the Amazon call for forest protection, inclusion, and land rights, as heavily armed military police watch on.

Widespread international support for the Australia-Pacific bid to host next year’s climate negotiations did not translate into a clear win.

COP31 deal

Amid this cacophony, Australia has been at the centre of global interest. Widespread international support for the Australia-Pacific bid to host next year’s climate negotiations did not translate into a clear win. Türkiye, also seeking the rights, forced a compromise.

The draft deal – yet to be formally adopted in Belem – falls short of what Australia sought. Türkiye will hold the presidency and host the meeting in the Mediterranean city of Antalya, meaning Australia will miss out on a large part of the investment and trade opportunities that go with hosting. Türkiye will also run the “action agenda”, which sets out voluntary commitments – and has become one of the more consequential parts of the COP in recent years.

But Australia has secured some concessions, too. Climate and Energy Minister Chris Bowen has carved out a role as “president of negotiations”, allowing him considerable sway on the formal outcome of the conference. A pre-COP summit in the Pacific Islands, where foreign leaders will be asked to pledge funding for the Pacific Resilience Facility, also retains some value and focus on the region.

This is an unprecedented arrangement between two very different countries, with different priorities, on opposite sides of the world. It will require much more fleshing out – and plenty of goodwill between Australia and Türkiye – if it is to operate well.

Multilateralism on the ballot

With next year’s hosting arrangements all but settled, Brazil, this year’s COP president, wants to turn to weighty matters of the moment.

The international system is buckling with geopolitical tensions, protectionism and distrust, while for the first time ever this year, the United States – the world’s second largest emitter – has boycotted the COP.

Brazil is hoping COP30 will show that the world is carrying on with the task of fighting climate change – and that multilateralism can deliver outcomes that matter to people.

Emissions reduction: do the numbers stack up?

The sharpest test of COP30’s success will be whether countries’ 2035 emissions reduction commitments, known as Nationally Determined Contributions, are collectively enough to keep global warming in check. With most of the world now having submitted their updated NDCs, three points are becoming clear.

First, the world is largely staying the course. No other country has followed the United States out of the Paris Agreement, the landmark treaty underpinning climate negotiations. The 2035 targets submitted largely maintain the trajectory to longer-term net zero commitments.

Second, the system is working. Over the past 30 years, COPs have helped alter the course of a world heading towards 4°C or more of global warming to about 2.3– 2.5°C now.

Brazil, highly regarded for its diplomatic finesse, is proving true to form.

Third, this progress still isn’t anywhere near sufficient. In the Paris Agreement, parties committed to limit global warming to “well below” 2°C, and pursue efforts to keep it under 1.5°C. The latter figure became a rallying call for global action, particularly among vulnerable small island states. But this year, it has become clear that overshooting this goal is all but assured. The question is how quickly countries will act to bring temperatures back down below that threshold.

Signs of change

Brazil, highly regarded for its diplomatic finesse, is proving true to form. It has coaxed parties closer to agreement on the “big four” negotiating items of temperature, money, trade and transparency – though there is still some way to go on these issues.

Potential progress is also in sight on one of the most controversial issues at COPs – a landmark commitment at COP28 in Dubai to “transition away from fossil fuels”. This language was so contested that at COP29 in Baku last year, Saudi Arabia and other major fossil fuel producers succeeded in expunging any explicit reference to it in the outcome text. In Belém, however, more than 80 countries have so far backed the idea of a “roadmap” away from fossil fuels to be a key outcome of the conference.

Momentum in the real world appears to be growing, too. In a significant change under its new leadership, South Korea, currently the fourth largest importer of thermal coal in the world and a major customer of Australia, announced this week at the conference it would close 40 coal-fired power plants by 2040.

COPs are many things to many people. They are messy, loud, and can feel like a circus at times. But here in the Amazon, a signal is emerging from the noise: progress is hard fought, but it is coming.

The climate summit, COP30, unfolding this week and next at the edge of the Amazon rainforest in Brazil, is a big one as far as UN meetings go. A decade after the historic Paris Agreement was signed, countries are due to submit their updated pledges to reduce national emissions by the year 2035.

The aggregate of those commitments, or Nationally Determined Contributions, will give us the answer to a crucial question – is the world on track to keep dangerous climate change in check?

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres opened the summit with a stark message:

“The hard truth is that we have failed to ensure we remain below 1.5 degrees … This is moral failure – and deadly negligence.”

As a number of Interpreter contributors have pointed out, large implementation gaps remain even where countries have made commitments, and the world’s second largest emitter, the United States, is now running in the opposite direction.

These are indeed serious challenges. But there are reasons for optimism, too.

Despite jitters over costs and the not inconsiderable risks of holding the meeting, the potential rewards for a country in Australia’s position are far greater.

Early analysis from Climate Resource indicates that based on commitments as of October, countries have, in aggregate “affirmed the ambition to broadly follow a straight line to net zero targets”. In other words, countries are broadly sticking with their climate action commitments, rather than following Trump for the exit.

This means that the Paris Agreement is working, even if we must pick up the pace.

In the UN’s latest synthesis of submitted targets, another striking picture emerges. Should countries fulfil their targets, total greenhouse gas emissions are projected to fall to around 12% below 2019 levels. That is a stark contrast to the trajectory the world was on before the Paris Agreement was adopted, which would have seen emissions increase by between 20–48% by 2035.

Another way of putting it is temperature. While overshooting a 1.5°C rise is now almost inevitable, the COP process has bent the trajectory down from a world which was heading to 4°C or more of global warming to about 2.3– 2.5°C now.
Obviously, still more needs to be done. But climate change debates can often fall into a nihilistic assumption that it’s too late to make a difference, or that the rest of the world is quitting the fight.

In fact, the opposite is true.

Overshooting the 1.5°C target doesn’t mean temperatures can’t be brought back down with concerted action. It just requires action now on this long-term goal.

Further, temperature goals should not be seen as a simple pass or a fail. As Guterres said in his statement, “every fraction of a degree means more hunger, displacement, and loss – especially for those least responsible.”

Australia is in a unique position. Nationally, the country contributes about 1% of total greenhouse gas emissions. But, if you take into account the emissions “shipped” overseas as the world’s third largest fossil fuel exporter, its carbon footprint rises to about 4.5%. Australia also has a direct stake, acutely exposed to droughts, floods, bushfires, coastal inundation, heatwaves, and damage to infrastructure by extreme weather – risks which are all amplified by climate change.

The emissions embedded in Australian fossil fuels – regardless of where they are burned – are of direct consequence to the wellbeing of Australians.

Economics further bolsters the imperative as fossil fuels enter a period of structural decline. The International Energy Agency shows that, based on stated policies, fossil fuel demand will peak by 2035. Recently released Treasury modelling in Australia suggested Australia’s coal production would decrease by 72% to 2050, while gas and LNG production would decline by 67%.

This means Australia is well positioned to benefit from the global energy transition. As the world decarbonises, energy-intensive industrial manufacturing – such as of iron and steel – will relocate to where energy costs are the cheapest. Australia’s mineral and renewable energy wealth, as well as its proximity to the world’s largest and fastest growing source of energy demand – Asia gives it an edge in the race to become one of the world’s leading suppliers of green goods. By some estimates, in doing so Australia could also contribute to a reduction of up to 10 per cent in global emissions and more than replace the value of our annual fossil fuel exports.

So, what of Australia’s bid to host COP31 with the Pacific? Hosting a COP, which has been likened to the diplomatic Olympics, is no easy feat, let alone doing a credible job of it in less than a year.

Australia’s bid remains locked in a standoff against Türkiye. With a decision due by the end of next week, the pressure is on.

Despite jitters over costs and the not inconsiderable risks of holding the meeting, the potential rewards for a country in Australia’s position are far greater.

Australia’s ability to establish the green industries of the future will be determined by our leadership, our diplomatic engagement, and our trade partnerships across the region and world. Presiding over the COP puts us in the box seat.

Leading would also strengthen two key relationships in our region: by amplifying the voice of some of the world’s most vulnerable Pacific island nations, and helping the world’s economic engine, Asia, decarbonise.

With a direct stake in mitigating the worst impacts of climate change, as well as the chance to position our economy for the future, COP31 can be the catalyst in bringing together the interests of our nation, our region, and the world.

This year’s UN climate summit – a decade after the world sealed the historic Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 1.5°C by the end of this century – should have been a moment to showcase how far the world has come. Instead, the talks in Belém threaten to expose continuous delaying tactics by oil-producing nations and many developed countries, resulting in insufficient progress to date.

Updated national climate plans by countries, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), to be delivered at the talks in Brazil should include enhanced commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions aligned with the Paris temperature goal. But the outlook is dire. Many governments have yet to file their updated plans. Those that have offer little reassurance.

An assessment of those plans by the UN acknowledges incremental progress, but no country’s submission, other than the United Kingdom, aligns with a 1.5°C temperature trajectory. The previous round of NDCs in 2020 pointed to an average global warming of 2.8°C by the end of the century. The latest UN Emissions Gap Report trims this to 2.6°C – a marginal gain after 10 years.

Moreover, large implementation gaps remain. While countries’ plans commit to achieve their stated pledges, there is no guarantee that they will follow through. Many developing nations’ commitments, for example, remain conditional on uncertain external finance.

Complicating matters further is the withdrawal of the United States, the world’s second-largest carbon polluter and a key source of climate finance. So far, no other country has chosen to follow Washington. Still, aware of the scale of the task ahead, COP30 President Corrêa do Lago has floated the idea of a “Globally Determined Contribution”. The initiative attempts to widen formal participation in the pledging process beyond national governments and include cities, Indigenous Peoples, youth and businesses, as a means circumnavigating the lobbying of vested interests that makes it difficult to pass domestic climate legislation.

The United States supplied almost 10% of total climate finance in 2024 but has since dismantled much of its climate-related foreign aid.

At this stage, US President Donald Trump is not planning to send a US delegation to Brazil. A COP without Washington’s direct involvement would, in theory, remove one of the biggest roadblocks to progress, given America’s history of slowing consensus. Yet, Trump could still interfere with the outcomes at COP30.

During recent negotiations at the International Maritime Organisation over a global deal to tax shipping fuels, Trump reportedly threatened supportive countries with sanctions, visa restrictions and port levies, resulting in a deferral of an agreement until next year. It would surprise few if he sought to influence COP30 with similar tactics from the sidelines or decides to send a delegation with the sole purpose to stymie the talks.

Two major tasks left unresolved at last year’s COP29 in Azerbaijan also fall to Brazil: finalising the details of a new climate finance goal (NCQG) and reaching agreement on how to transition from fossil fuels.

Last year’s summit wrapped up with a pledge to provide US$300 billion a year in climate finance for developing countries by 2035, tripling the previous target of US$100 billion. A broader call sought to lift total flows to at least US$1.3 trillion annually. At the time, the first aim seemed achievable, with developed countries expected to take the lead. That prospect is now slipping out of reach. The United States supplied almost 10% of total climate finance in 2024 but has since dismantled much of its climate-related foreign aid. European donors have also begun to scale back their financial commitments. How to achieve the second goal of US$1.3 trillion was left vague, giving Brazil the job to fill in the gaps through what became known as the “Baku to Belém Roadmap”. The five action pillars in the Roadmap contain little that is not known about scaling up financial resources and questions remain about how achievable the ideas are in the timeframe needed.

Hopes that COP30 in Belém will finally end the impasse over the phase-out of fossil fuels will be tested. COP28 in Dubai marked the first time that fossil fuels were explicitly named in a UN decision text. This victory proved fleeting. At subsequent talks, Saudi Arabia led efforts to undermine that decision, going as far as meddling with negotiating text, and forcing the postponement of an outcome until this year.

Belém needs to deliver well beyond updated national climate pledges that are aligned with the Paris goal. It inherits negotiations weighed down by unfinished business and fading trust in global cooperation, and must steer talks through a moment when wars, protectionism, and economic headwinds threaten to crowd out climate priorities.

The launch of the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF) has been hailed as a landmark in global climate finance – a new model to protect tropical forests through long-term, market-backed funding. Managed by the World Bank, the plan will be a centrepiece at COP30 in Belém, Brazil, where expectations are running high.

The fund seeks to raiseUS$125 billion, with developed countries contributing one-fifth of that amount, or roughly $25 billion, in seed capital to attract four times as much from private investors. If fully funded, it would create a $125 billion investment pool designed to generate up to $4 billion a year in payments to around 74 tropical and subtropical countries as an incentive for protecting their forests.

It’s a hopeful vision, and one that deserves credit. After years of broken promises, this kind of ambition feels like progress. Developed countries finally seem willing to share the burden – at least on paper – and the proposal includes direct payments to Indigenous and forest communities, a crucial recognition of those who actually protect the planet’s lungs.

According to reporting by The Guardian, Brazil hopes to secure $25 billion in public investment and leverage that to attract $100 billion from private financial institutions. The combined $125 billion would then be invested in global markets, with expected returns of roughly $800 million annually distributed to forest nations that meet agreed-upon conservation benchmarks. The plan’s designers say this would make forest finance more predictable and self-sustaining than past donor-driven efforts.

But other analyses, including those cited by environmental economists, suggest the structure works differently in practice. The TFFF model relies on private investors – including banks, hedge funds, and asset managers – who will contribute capital that the facility will use to buy bonds issued by developing countries, many of which already carry substantial debt loads. These bonds typically pay higher interest rates, around 8%, reflecting market perceptions of risk. Under the TFFF, investors would receive roughly 5% in returns, while the remaining 3% would be directed toward forest conservation – a potentially transformative funding stream if markets hold steady.

The challenge is that this structure effectively links forest finance to the debt dynamics of developing nations. In practice, a portion of the money supporting conservation could be drawn from the same debt payments that already strain these economies. As Chien Yen Goh, legal advisor to the Malaysia-based non-profit Third World Network, notes, “It is developing countries’ onerous debt servicing that is paying for this scheme. They are being required to underwrite forest protection that benefits the entire planet.”

If financial markets weaken or countries face repayment difficulties, the funding available for forest protection could shrink, turning conservation finance into a function of bond market volatility and tying the TFFF’s success to the very repayments that constrain nations’ capacity to invest in their own development and resilience.

The very nations that keep the world’s forests standing could find themselves underwriting the cost of conservation through debt repayments, while investors benefit from stable returns.

The broader context compounds these worries. The UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025, aptly titled Running on Empty, finds that developing countries will need between $310-365 billion per year by 2035 to cope with worsening climate impacts. Yet international public finance for adaptation fell to just US$26 billion in 2023, down from US$28 billion the year before. Meanwhile, 59 least developed countries and small island developing states paid more in debt service in 2023 than they received in climate finance

This mismatch highlights a fundamental tension. The countries most vulnerable to climate change are being asked to finance resilience through additional borrowing. Only 15% of adaptation finance in recent years has been provided as grants, with the rest delivered as loans. For every dollar of “climate support”, developing nations are often paying back multiple dollars in interest and debt service.

The TFFF’s architects argue that market-based mechanisms can unlock far greater volumes of capital than traditional aid. This is a fair point, given the scale of global investment required. But unless such mechanisms include equitable risk-sharing, they risk deepening existing inequalities. The very nations that keep the world’s forests standing could find themselves underwriting the cost of conservation through debt repayments, while investors benefit from stable returns.

A more balanced approach would ensure that the TFFF incorporates grant-based financing and accountability to forest communities. Climate finance must move beyond leveraging debt and instead prioritise sustainable public finance and debt relief mechanisms for climate-vulnerable countries.

For tropical forest nations, the stakes are high. The Amazon, Congo Basin, and Southeast Asian rainforests are not just regional ecosystems; they are planetary carbon sinks vital to limiting global warming. Ensuring consistent, fair, and predictable financial support for their protection is a global responsibility.

The TFFF seems like a promising start but its long-term credibility will depend on whether it can align financial innovation with climate justice. If it succeeds, it could mark a genuine shift in how the world values standing forests. If not, it risks becoming another well-intentioned experiment where the burden of protecting the planet once again falls disproportionately on those least responsible for its decline.

Climate talks in Brazil have begun with the high-level COP30 general plenary and the attendance of more than 40 world leaders. The United Nations Climate Change Conference COP30 summit, scheduled to take place from 10-21 November, is set against the backdrop of intensifying climate impacts, geopolitical fragmentation, and a widening gap between climate ambition and action. For Australia, a fellow southern hemisphere power with parallel environmental vulnerabilities and regional responsibilities, COP30 is not just Brazil’s chance to shine. It can also be an Australian moment.

Brazil’s choice to host the talks in Belém, a gateway to the Amazon, the world’s largest tropical rainforest and a critical carbon sink, underscores the urgency. It places the preservation of tropical forests, vital to global climate stability, at the heart of the political agenda. Amid many strategies, Brazil will launch the Tropical Forests Forever Facility, a fund aiming to raise over US$125 billion to reward countries that protect their forests.

For Australians, the Amazon may seem distant, but the parallels with Brazil are striking. Both nations are vast, resource-rich democracies in the southern hemisphere. Both are custodians of globally significant ecosystems. From the Amazon to the Great Barrier Reef, both countries face acute climate risks, including bushfires, droughts, floods, and biodiversity loss. They are “ecological kin” with global stakes: regional powers with shared vulnerabilities and transformative potential.

Both countries are engaging in climate diplomacy to elevate the voices of the Global South.

These ecosystems are not merely national treasures. They are global commons. The Amazon regulates rainfall across continents. The Great Barrier Reef is a bellwether for ocean health. Their preservation is not just a moral imperative. It is a planetary necessity.

Brazil and Australia also share a dual identity: regional anchors in Latin America and the Indo-Pacific, respectively, and aspirant middle powers on the global stage. Their climate choices reverberate beyond their borders. Brazil’s stewardship of the Amazon affects rainfall patterns as far as southern Africa. Australia’s energy policies shape the climate resilience of Pacific Island nations, whose very survival hinges on global temperature trajectories.

COP30 goes beyond being a test of middle power diplomacy. Australia’s bid to co-host COP31 in June 2026 with Pacific Island nations underscores its desire to reclaim climate leadership after a decade of policy paralysis. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has framed climate change as an “existential threat” in stark contrast to the climate denialism resurging in the United States. Hosting COP31 would be Australia’s largest diplomatic summit ever: a chance to showcase its clean energy transition and amplify Pacific voices.

Nevertheless, leadership is not conferred solely by hosting. It must be earned through follow-up actions. Australia’s updated 2035 emissions target, expected soon, will be scrutinized at COP30. The Climate Change Authority has recommended a 65–75% reduction below 2005 levels, but anything less risks undermining Australia’s credibility. As the world gathers in Belém, Australia must demonstrate that it is not merely a future host, but a responsible actor. This is an opportunity to move from spectatorship to leadership.

With shared opportunities also come shared challenges. Brazil and Australia face the dilemma of how to reconcile economic reliance on extractive industries with the imperative to decarbonise. In Brazil, the 10th-largest economy in the world, agribusiness and deforestation continue to be major drivers of emissions. In Australia, the 13th-largest economy in the world, coal and gas exports continue to be the dominant sources of revenue. Yet both countries are also poised to lead in the green economy. Brazil’s historical biofuels and hydropower expertise, and Australia’s potential in green hydrogen and critical minerals, position them as key players in the global energy transition.

Moreover, both countries are engaging in climate diplomacy to elevate the voices of the Global South. Brazil is pushing for reforms to climate finance mechanisms to serve vulnerable nations better. Australia has pledged more than $150 million to Pacific climate resilience and rejoined the Green Climate Fund. These moves reflect a shared understanding: climate justice, Pacific resilience, and Global South equity are inseparable from geopolitical stability.

COP30 and COP31 are calls for southern hemisphere stewardship. Climate action is increasingly polarised. The US retreat under Trump exemplifies this. Moreover, the internal divisions of the European Union resulted in arriving in Belém with a diluted climate deal that allows the use of foreign carbon credits and delays the launch of its carbon market. It means that Brazil and Australia have a unique opportunity that goes hand in hand with the 80th anniversary of their bilateral diplomatic relationship. As southern hemisphere democracies with global reach, the timing offers a unique momentum to forge a new axis of climate leadership rooted in equity, resilience, and regional solidarity.

Thus, COP30 is not just Brazil’s “window to the world” (“Janela para o mundo”) as repeatedly expressed by Lula. It is a mirror for Australia.

Bill Gates’ recent essay “Three tough truths about climate” carried a warning worth heeding in the Pacific: don’t let the urgency of climate change overshadow the slow, vital work of investing in people’s health. The reminder comes as the world prepares for the COP30 climate negotiations in Brazil, and as Australia, alongside the Pacific, bids to co-host COP31. For a region where human security is shaped as much by preventable diseases as by rising seas, this message hits close to home.

Today, up to 10% of the world's total ocean surface comes under the exclusive economic zones of 23 Pacific Island countries, who also hold some of the planet’s richest biodiversity and cultural heritage. Yet their development needs are as diverse as their geography and populations. For smaller atoll nations, the climate crisis is existential. For larger Melanesian states, the quieter crises of health, population growth, education and inequality are just as destabilising.

In his essay, Gates cautioned that climate change is serious but that “we can’t cut funding for health and development to [address] it.”

Every statistic tells the same story: where literacy and education are weak, health and climate vulnerability deepen.

While Gates speaks to the importance of investing in health, the deeper layer of resilience lies in literacy – the ability of people to read, reason and act on information. Across the region, literacy rates reveal deep inequalities. According to UNESCO data, Vanuatu’s adult literacy stands at 89% and Fiji’s at 99%, while Papua New Guinea lags well behind at approximately 70%. The consequences of these poor outcomes in PNG are stark. The country records one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world; 189 women die per 100,000 live births due to pregnancy-related causes. PNG’s WASH Policy 2015–30 shows that just 33% of rural residents have access to safe drinking water and only 13% to basic sanitation, which results in high rates of waterborne diseases and diarrheal deaths.

Without health literacy, which is the capacity to use reading, writing, speaking and numeracy to make informed health decisions, people are unable to understand vaccination messages, nutrition advice and disaster warnings. Every statistic tells the same story: where literacy and education are weak, health and climate vulnerability deepen.

The Lowy Institute’s 2025 Pacific Aid Map shows that development financing in the region has tilted heavily towards infrastructure projects, driven by strategic competition among donors, which has in turn diverted resources away from human development. Donor support for education is close to a record low. In 2023, only US$216 million was spent on education and US$364 million on health, compared to more than US$1 billion spent on climate change projects. The chart below shows that since 2008, investment in health and education has remained steady, while climate-related spending has tripled.

This trend raises concerns about the long-term foundations for the region’s development. While philanthropists such as Gates have played a crucial role in strengthening global health systems, solving these challenges remains a sovereign responsibility. For too long, Pacific governments such as PNG have relied on churches and non-governmental organisations to deliver basic services despite being resource-rich. As climate finance grows, so too must the ambition of Pacific governments to deliver quality education and health outcomes for its people.

The recent surge in climate activism has revived a regional spirit reminiscent of the anti-nuclear campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, it was a group of law students from Vanuatu who spearheaded the push for the landmark UN resolution on climate change through the International Court of Justice. This type of action shows precisely what can be achieved when we invest in education – an integral component of the Pacific’s future resilience.

With COP30 about to begin, the global balance of power looks even less familiar than it did a year ago. Economic nationalism is no longer the exception – it’s the organising principle of the world’s two largest economic and geopolitical superpowers. The United States is doubling down on reshoring and protectionist policies. China, grappling with a projected economic slowdown, poses risks to countries that are relying on its demand for raw materials.

The era of open markets and predictable trade flows is at risk. For middle powers such as Brazil and Australia, the temptation may be to cling to old formulas, exporting commodities to whichever superpower is buying. However, current economic uncertainties may prompt some rethinking.

The next two COPs – COP30 in Brazil and COP31 in Australia, assuming that the country can secure the COP hosting rights with the Pacific – will be the defining test of whether middle powers can rise as big players in the climate and economic transition. COP30 will show whether emerging economies can lead with ambition and mobilise resources, while COP31 will challenge Australia to demonstrate that a developed, resource-based nation can reinvent itself as a clean industrial power.

COP30, to be held in Belém, Brazil, will be the first major test of how developing and emerging economies can turn climate ambition into industrial transformation. As host, Brazil is positioning itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South – with a focus on forest conservation, renewable innovation, and financing a just transition.

The summit is also expected to sharpen the global conversation on climate finance. Many developing nations are still struggling to mobilise funds for adaptation and mitigation. Brazil’s push for reform of international finance institutions, including fairer access to concessional finance and debt relief, will test whether climate diplomacy without the involvement of the superpowers can deliver tangible results.

Meanwhile, Australia’s economic over-reliance on commodities is well-known, but rarely addressed with the urgency it deserves. Harvard’s 2023 Economic Complexity Index ranks Australia 105th out of 133 countries (dropping down from 62 in just two decades) – far behind other high-income countries, such as Japan, Germany, and the United States. Australia can do better to prepare to thrive in a volatile, high-tech, climate-conscious global economy.

If Brazil and Australia position themselves as partners of choice – providing technology, investment, and reliable clean supply – they can lock in decades of regional integration and economic security.

China alone buys 38% of Australia’s exports. That’s a staggering concentration risk – and one made worse by Beijing’s slowing economy, faltering property sector, and strategic diversification of supply. At the same time, Washington’s protectionist tilt means that even Australia’s closest security partner is putting its own industries first. Australia risks being stranded between two superpowers whose economic agendas rapidly diverge from its own interests.

Brazil and Australia share strikingly similar challenges: both are resource-rich economies seeking to pivot from extraction to innovation. Brazil’s focus on biofuels, sustainable agriculture, and forest-based industries complements Australia’s emphasis on renewables and green manufacturing.

Australia possesses some of the world’s best renewable endowments – abundant sunlight, wind, and land – enough to power both domestic industries and clean exports across the Indo-Pacific. The challenge isn’t resources but building the industrial ecosystem around them: renewable energy precincts, green industrial hubs, and export pathways for hydrogen, ammonia and low-carbon materials.

For both hosts, strategic partnerships across the Global South will be critical. Demand from countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia for sustainable energy and infrastructure is surging. If Brazil and Australia position themselves as partners of choice – providing technology, investment, and reliable clean supply – they can lock in decades of regional integration and economic security.

While the headlines often focus on solar panels and hydrogen, middle powers have another card to play: the circular economy.

Closing material loops, reusing resources, and extending product lifecycles all boost economic complexity. Brazil’s expertise in bio-based materials and waste-to-energy systems, combined with Australia’s advances in materials science and recycling, could define a new wave of “green manufacturing” leadership.

In battery technology, for example, production is dominated by global giants. But recycling and refurbishment remain open territory. With their combined industrial capacity and policy frameworks, Brazil and Australia could lead in battery life extension and critical minerals recovery — a niche that’s both environmentally and strategically valuable.

Policy clarity and strategic turning points

If COP30 and COP31 are to succeed as turning points for middle powers, they must be backed by pragmatic and forward-looking policies. That means:

• Industrial policy that builds economic complexity in clean technologies, critical minerals processing, and sustainable manufacturing.
  
   
• Investment frameworks with clear taxonomies to attract and de-risk global green capital.
  
   
• Trade diversification to deepen ties across East Asia, Europe, and the Global South.
  
   
• Skills and innovation programs to cultivate the workforce and intellectual property needed to compete in high-value supply chains.

Middle powers now have opportunities to pick the race they want to run – and make sure they’re not running behind, but setting the pace. COP30 and COP31 will be critical moments to make this shift.