The latest version of the US National Defence Strategy (NDS), released on 23 January, offers China a deal for a “stable peace.” The Chinese government, however, is not likely to respond the way the NDS authors seemingly hope.
The 2026 NDS is a qualified victory for the “prioritiser” faction in the US policy-making community (which wants to reduce US foreign commitments to Europe and the Middle East but maintain a strong position in Asia) over the “restrainer” faction (which wants to reduce all commitments outside the Western Hemisphere). The victory is qualified because the NDS’s approach to China is less hawkish than is typical of the prioritisers.
As part of conciliatory approach, the NDS says the US will not try to “dominate” China’s neighbourhood and doesn’t seek “regime change.” This differs greatly from the first Trump administration, during which then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for a united effort by regional governments to overthrow the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.
Instead, says the NDS, the US will seek the more modest goal of “ensur[ing] that neither China nor anyone else can dominate us or our allies.” To accomplish this, the US will organise the building and maintenance of “a strong denial defence along the First Island Chain,” which is comprised of Japan, Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan and the Philippines.
But Washington will do this in a nice way – “respectful” toward China, “not unnecessarily confrontational,” with no intent to “strangle or humiliate.” The only concrete operational change the NDS mentions is to seek better communication between the US and PRC militaries to facilitate “deconfliction and de-escalation.”
A sweet spot in which both Washington and Beijing are content may simply not exist.
The Chinese will see this not as a manifestation of goodwill, but rather as America grudgingly acknowledging that it can no longer “speak to China from a position of strength,” as China’s most senior foreign affairs official Yang Jiechi told his US counterparts in 2021. Indeed, China’s military buildup and modernisation has produced a war machine that is quantitatively superior and technologically nearly equal to the US armed forces. Additionally, China enjoys a larger capacity for armaments production and geographic proximity to the strategic hotspots in eastern Asia.
Offering to cease US support for Taipei would add substance to a peace offer, but the NDS does not do this. It is true that the word “Taiwan” is conspicuously absent from the document, but this probably reflects a decision by the White House to avoid antagonising China over a controversial issue while negotiations for a bilateral trade deal are underway. Furthermore, Beijing will not fail to conclude that drawing the US bloc’s defensive perimeter along the First Island Chain makes no sense without Taiwan, the anchor of the chain.
The NDS assumes both the US and China could accept an Asia-Pacific region in which both have influence but neither dominates. That assumption is questionable.
From the PRC’s point of view, any attempt by a country outside the region to limit what the Chinese see as their natural and entitled leadership over eastern Asia is objectionable in principle. An American plan to hem China in along the First Island Chain confirms the widespread Chinese belief that US policy is still “containment,” allegedly intended to suppress China’s national power. Beijing could hardly accept a “peace” that does not recognise China’s vast territorial claims, including Taiwan, most of the South China Sea, and parts of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea claimed by US allies Japan and South Korea. Yet US acquiescence on these issues out of a desire to avoid “confrontation” would propel China a long way toward the regional domination that the NDS says America will not tolerate. A sweet spot in which both Washington and Beijing are content may simply not exist.
The NDS’s expression of hope of “de-escalation” through increased military dialogue is surprising given the record of failure of this approach, epitomised by the Chinese side often declining even to answer the military-to-military “hotline” phone during a crisis. Beijing doesn’t accept the American logic that crisis management should be de-linked from specific strategic disputes. Rather, the Chinese see the US fear of crisis escalation as a weakness to be exploited. Hence the many cases of dangerous and aggressive manoeuvring and other actions by PRC pilots and sailors directed against the US, Australia and other countries. Beijing’s idea of de-escalation is to frighten the US military into staying away from Chinese-claimed territory or Chinese ships and aircraft. US appeals for de-escalation are evidence the Chinese tactic is working.
The Chinese will welcome Washington’s renunciation of American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific – but as an invitation to push their own campaign for influence harder and farther afield, not to lock in a peaceful status quo that leaves Chinese aspirations half fulfilled. And in the meantime, the US still talks of continuing the fight from more defensible ground. Its friendly tone notwithstanding, the NDS reinforces the Chinese view that America is a declining superpower but still an adversary.
