India, explained.
Narendra Modi and Anthony Albanese during a 2023 visit by India's PM to Sydney (Dean Lewins/Getty Images)
A stocktake of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
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Five years is a long time in Australia-India relations, but there is still more to doFive years is a long time in Australia-India relations, but there is still more to do
It has been five years since Australia and India signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and decided to make their relationship stand for more than just the familiar three C’s of Commonwealth, curry and cricket. Despite the incredible people-to-people dividend that cricket diplomacy delivers, the two nations struggled for decades to go beyond it. Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles visited New Delhi this week – the first cabinet minister from Australia to visit India in 18 months – to mark the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the agreement.
Much has changed since the deal was struck on 4 June 2020 at that virtual summit between then prime minister Scott Morrison and Narendra Modi in the early months of the Covid pandemic. The Indo-Pacific region has become more contested, giving added impetus for the bilateral relationship, defined by the partnership agreement as “based on mutual understanding, trust, common interests and shared values”, to broaden and mature. Many of the initiatives promised five years ago have also been realised, yet there is work still to do.
The partnership committed Australia and India to work together to achieve some ambitious goals. It kick-started long stalled talks about a bilateral trade deal, promised new schemes to facilitate more intense engagement in science and technology, cyber-security and strategic minerals, agriculture and water resources, as well as education and people-to-people ties. It signalled enthusiasm in both Canberra and New Delhi about further cooperation between the armed forces, and in areas including maritime security, defence science and technology, and regional diplomacy.
In defence and security, more could and should be done to adapt to changing regional dynamics.
Many of these objectives were soon realised. In 2020, Canberra launched a Cyber and Critical Technology Partnership to support collaborative work between institutions in both countries. A year later, Australia and India joined Japan in a new initiative to build resilience into regional supply chains. In 2022, a bilateral Critical Minerals Investment Partnership was formed. This was swiftly followed by the announcement that an Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement had been concluded. New migration arrangements were agreed in 2023, enabling more skilled Indian workers to come to Australia, a Centre for Australia-India Relations established and the Australia-India CEO Forum was reconstituted.
In parallel, Australia and India were also active in deepening defence cooperation and diplomatic coordination. A military logistics deal was signed alongside the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, with agreement to hold annual 2+2 foreign and defence minister meetings. Reflecting shared interests in maritime security, Australia sent its first liaison officer to India’s Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean in 2021. The following year Indian fighters took part in Australia’s Pitch Black air defence exercise and then in 2023 Australia hosted the multilateral Malabar naval exercise in which India’s navy plays a central role. A new exchange program for young Australian and Indian officers, named after India’s first Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat, also began that year. Within the Quad and outside, the two have coordinated their responses to maritime security and the resilience of smaller regional states, for example at the Indian Ocean Conference in Perth in early 2024, addressed by both foreign ministers.
All this activity has produced results – and helped both governments navigate the challenges of an upsurge in Sikh separatism in Australia and tensions it has generated within the diaspora, as well as the “nest of spies” controversy.
Perhaps the most obvious gain is the boost to bilateral trade, which grew to almost $50 billion in 2023, twice what it was when the partnership agreement was signed in 2020. Other areas of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership have however been harder to progress. Enticing Australians to invest in India has proved a challenge. Indian ministers and experts in the diaspora have made repeated appeals to Australian superannuation funds and financial institutions, but the results have been disappointing. In 2023, India accounted for only 0.6% of Australia’s total foreign investment, with little sign that the trend will improve without government guarantees to mitigate risk. Efforts to establish a robust critical minerals partnership have proved difficult, as Australia struggles to find a way to support an industry distorted by Chinese state subsidies and fluctuating prices. Worryingly, some initiatives intended to enhance people-to-people ties remain lopsided, with too few Australians travelling to India. All these issues will require sustained attention to make the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership deliver all that it should.
In defence and security, more could and should be done to adapt to changing regional dynamics, by providing the necessary resources and sharing of information and intelligence. Making better and more frequent use of each other’s bases for maritime patrols might help too as well as developing our defence industries and defence technology ecosystems. Yet from where both nations found themselves in 2020, this milestone is a worthy one. The challenge now will be how Australia and India want to define their ties over the next five years amidst the ever changing and uncertain region we live in.
About the authors
Ian Hall
Ian Hall is the acting director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University and a Professor of International Relations at Griffith University, Australia, and an Academic Fellow of the Australia India Institute at the University of Melbourne.
Lisa Singh
Lisa Singh is a former Australian Senator and was the first woman of South Asian heritage to be elected to the Australian Parliament. She is currently the CEO of the Australia India Institute at the University of Melbourne.
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