Unlike the Quad, where the United States’ overwhelming presence skews agendas, the IJA grouping rests on a more equal distribution of interests. Each member has faced the realities of China’s rise firsthand, and each has developed its own strategies for coping with Beijing’s assertiveness. What unites them is a shared need for strategic autonomy vis-à-vis both Washington and Beijing.
Japan’s position illustrates this well. Under successive governments, Tokyo has been cautious about aligning too closely with any US-led containment strategy, preferring instead to build coalitions with like-minded partners in Asia. It’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision predates Washington’s adoption of the term, and Japan has invested heavily in regional infrastructure as an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Australia, for its part, has endured punishing Chinese economic coercion, from tariffs on wine and barley to restrictions on coal imports. While Canberra remains a US ally, and has expanded defence ties via the AUKUS pact, it increasingly sees value in engagement with South Asian partners where it can exercise greater agency.
For India, the logic of this trilateral is even stronger. Unlike Washington, which views the Quad largely through the prism of great-power rivalry with Beijing, India finds greater alignment with Japan and Australia – partners that, while wary of China, prioritise resilience, rule-making, and regional stability over outright confrontation. Moreover, Trump’s 50 per cent tariffs on imports from India highlight the structural fragility of relying on Washington. The Quad might still be useful as a platform, but as a long-term pillar of strategy, it leaves India exposed to American unpredictability.
A rebooted trilateral could begin by anchoring itself in one of the most urgent issues of the day: supply chain resilience. The Covid-19 pandemic laid bare the dangers of over-dependence on China-centered supply networks. India, Japan, and Australia have already floated a Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) in 2021, but the effort has largely languished. Reviving it could give the trilateral a tangible purpose. Coordinated incentives for industries, joint financing of critical infrastructure and digital connectivity projects would allow the three countries to build economic muscle independent of both China and the United States.
Maritime security is another natural area of cooperation. All three nations depend on the stability of sea lanes across the Indo-Pacific. They already conduct naval exercises in various formats, often alongside the US Navy. But a trilateral framework could allow for more focused efforts in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, from joint patrols to capacity-building for smaller littoral states. Unlike the Quad, which is inevitably read in Beijing as an anti-China bloc, the trilateral can be framed as a practical security arrangement among middle powers.
The trilateral also carries symbolic weight. At a time when middle powers across Asia are hedging between the United States and China, a visibly independent partnership among India, Japan, and Australia would send a signal that regional order is not entirely hostage to great power rivalry. It would offer smaller Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean states an example of coalition-building rooted in autonomy.
The trilateral cannot match the Quad’s heft without US power. That is true if the goal is to militarily deter China. But the purpose of the IJA grouping need not be deterrence in the narrow military sense. Its value lies in building resilience, reducing vulnerabilities, and shaping the regional agenda in ways that middle powers can sustain. Even if Washington shifts course, negotiating a bargain with Beijing or retreating into protectionism, India, Japan, and Australia would still have a foundation to build on.
Trump’s decision to skip the Quad summit in India shows how easily US priorities can shift. Hence, a trilateral comprising India, Japan, and Australia offers a chance to diversify the bets of these three middle powers and to carve out a sustainable partnership in an uncertain Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, the Indo-Pacific is too important to be left to the vagaries of US politics.