Turning on the lights in Tokyo, seen from the International Space Station (Alex Stoken/NASA Visible Earth)
Japan wants satellite sovereignty
Public funding and Japanese control underpin Rakuten’s new satellite venture. American technology will make it work.
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When an earthquake knocks out mobile towers, a working phone becomes a lifeline. Satellite connections could keep people in touch with rescuers and relatives. But a government preparing for that emergency needs more than coverage on a commercial map. It needs confidence that capacity will be available when it matters.
Japan is putting substantial public money behind that assurance.
The venture expects up to ¥148 billion (approximately US$1 billion) in government support over about three years. Rakuten will hold 51% of voting rights versus AST’s 49%. Japan is seeking greater authority over essential communications through a partnership whose technical foundation remains American.
That arrangement makes this more than another satellite announcement. It gives practical substance to a question facing governments across the Indo-Pacific: how much control over critical infrastructure can a country secure without building the entire system itself?
Majority ownership alone does not answer those questions.
The government’s selection predates this week’s announcement. The Communications and Information Network Association of Japan, which administers the funding, selected the Rakuten proposal (Opens in new window) on 30 June. The November agreement gives that public commitment a corporate structure and exposes more of the bargain behind it.
The attraction is straightforward. Direct-to-device communications dispense with a separate satellite terminal, potentially extending mobile coverage into mountains, islands and disaster zones. Rakuten describes (Opens in new window) a network managed and operated in Japan, with priority domestic use and a framework for emergency roaming between mobile operators. These are promised capabilities; the constellation still has to be deployed and the service delivered.
The more revealing details appear in AST’s financial filing (Opens in new window). The American company expects to provide approximately US$1.4 billion through preferred shares to meet deployment costs, on top of the Japanese government grant. Those shares would take priority over common shares if the venture were to be dissolved. Japanese majority voting control therefore sits alongside a substantial American financial commitment with different economic rights. That creates a second test for public funding: whether the incentives of the government, the local operator and the technology supplier remain aligned once the initial subsidy has been spent and the network needs renewing.
The venture’s funds will buy satellites, launch-support services and software licences from AST.
Japan’s Rakuten technology conglomerate spans online shopping to communications (Kiyoshi Ota/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
The US$75 million mission-control software licence (Opens in new window) permits the venture to use AST’s software, but not to transfer the licence or sublicense it to another operator. AST would also use remaining constellation capacity outside the venture’s allocated markets for its global customers, paying the joint venture a low-single-digit percentage of qualifying revenue under terms not fully disclosed.
Japan is buying greater authority over a service while continuing to rely on its foreign supplier’s technology. That may be a sensible bargain: developing a wholly domestic system could delay useful coverage and consume resources better spent elsewhere. But the distinction becomes important when public money is justified in the language of sovereignty. Japanese voting control does not, by itself, establish who can keep the system working if the partnership falters.
Yet the disaster scenario sharpens the test. Who decides which users receive scarce capacity when demand surges? Can emergency agencies obtain service across competing mobile networks? What happens if essential software requires modification or the supplier encounters financial difficulty? Majority ownership alone does not answer those questions.
The disclosures do not explain all the arrangements for board vetoes, emergency operations or continuity if a partner cannot perform. Such protections may exist in the agreements. Until they are disclosed or demonstrated, however, outsiders cannot assess how far Japanese control extends under pressure.
Other Indo-Pacific governments need not match Japan’s expenditure to apply the same test. A government buying satellite coverage could specify emergency capacity, arrangements for access across mobile networks and procedures to rehearse before disaster strikes. The bargaining question is what authority accompanies the service and whether public agencies can exercise it when commercial networks are overwhelmed.
Affordability counts too. A connection that technically exists but is inaccessible to vulnerable users offers limited resilience. Governments should ask who can use the service, on what devices and at what cost, alongside questions about ownership and national registration.
There is also a regional opportunity. Countries with modest resources need not replicate Japan’s investment to learn from its approach. They can negotiate access, develop compatible emergency arrangements and build the expertise to scrutinise contracts. Cooperation becomes more valuable when customers understand which decisions remain theirs.
Rakuten AST will ultimately be judged by whether it delivers useful, dependable communications. For policymakers, however, the lesson begins before the first satellite launch. Sovereignty is assembled through funding conditions, operating rights and enforceable obligations.
When the towers fall silent, the decisive question will be whether the people who need a connection can get one, and who has the authority to ensure they do.
Richard de Grijs (Opens in new window) is Professor of Physics and Astronomy at Macquarie University and former Executive Director of the International Space Science Institute–Beijing.