In an unprecedented political comeback, former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte won the race to be mayor of Davao City during the May elections, a post he held for over two decades before he ascended to the top post in 2016. His landslide victory presents a dilemma. Can he govern while in detention at the International Criminal Court in the Hague, facing charges of crimes against humanity during his so-called “war on drugs” during his presidency?
Duterte can potentially be sworn in as mayor by proxy or in absentia, but only if the court from the Hague allows it. In the interim, his son, vice mayor-elect Sebastian Duterte, will act in the mayor’s role in his father’s absence.
Duterte’s case points to his family’s staggering political clout in the Philippines. His daughter Sara is the country’s current vice president. Duterte’s other son, Paolo, was reelected as Davao’s congressional representative in the first district. Grandsons Omar and Rigo (Paolo’s children) were elected as second district representative and city councilor, respectively.
The Dutertes are just one of many political dynasties that hold considerable influence in Philippine politics. These elite families can be characterised between “thin” and “fat”, according to a useful study into political dynasties. A “thin” dynasty has a family member succeed another member sequentially in a particular political post. A “fat” dynasty has family members simultaneously holding different government positions. Over time, political dynasties in the Philippines have become so entrenched and notorious that they have become “obese”, like the Dutertes.
As the Philippines grapples with the prevalence of political dynasties, its neighbours are producing their own.
The Marcoses, led by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., son of the former president, is a further example of an obese political dynasty. His own son Sandro sits in congress, elder sister Imee Marcos serves as a senator, while relatives Michael Marcos Keon is mayor of Laoag, Cecilia Araneta Marcos as governor, and Matthew Manotoc as vice-governor of Ilocos Norte.
As political science professor Julio Teehankee puts it, “if you exceed four or five [family members in politics], that’s already obese. It’s not good for the health of democracy”.
The exponential growth of political dynasties puts an unfavourable spotlight on the Philippines as an elite democracy. In the provinces, members of political dynasties control at least 71 of the country’s 82 provincial governments. When power is repeatedly passed on within families, it limits democratic representation and political diversity. Elections have been reduced to a formalised process of intra-elite competition and political succession among family members. As sociologist Nicole Curato has described, such election technically “legitimises political dynasties by giving the illusion that the public has the power to choose its leaders, even though the pool of electable candidates is generally limited to members of elite families”. Genuine political competition is made virtually impossible, stopping qualified individuals from entering public service given the incumbency advantage for political dynasties and family name recall.
The result of political dynasties is poor governance, patronage politics, widespread nepotism, and, at times, unrestrained corruption. One study explains that the Philippines’ continued high rate of poverty is linked to poor governance by its leaders, mostly stemming from political dynasties. Ronald Mendoza, who specialises in the study of Philippine political dynasties, sums it up: “The fatter the dynasty, the poorer the community.”
Although the 1987 Philippine Constitution prohibits political dynasties, there is no enabling law that will ban them altogether. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives are unwilling to pass a bill that would eliminate most of them and their relatives from their positions. They instead seek to prolong their hold on power or widen their family’s political influence by continuously participating in elections – sometimes with new faces but mostly with similar surnames.
As the Philippines grapples with the prevalence of political dynasties, its neighbours are producing their own. Across Southeast Asia the children of veteran politicians are taking over top positions once held by their parents. Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Manet ascended to power in 2023 after his father Hun Sen handed over the office he’d held for 38 years. Indonesia’s Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka came to power in 2024 after his father former president Joko Widodo paved the way for his election. Thailand’s Shinawatra family had a string of prime ministers: its patriarch Thaksin (2001–06), his sister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011–14), and his brother-in-law Somchai Wongsawat (2008). Current prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra is the youngest child of Thaksin, having assumed office in 2024.
Yet nobody personifies the predominance of political dynasties better than the Dutertes, with the patriarch Rodrigo continuing to enjoy public adoration and command political influence despite being imprisoned. Their popularity is a testament of the endurance of political dynasties in the Philippines, much to the detriment of its democracy.
