China, explained.
An engraved wooden plaque for the Nauru-Australia treaty (@AlboMP/X)
Australia’s Nauru deal is a victory for preventive diplomacy, closing off any possibility of a Chinese security presence.
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An ounce of prevention: Nauru deal puts defence spending in a different lightAn ounce of prevention: Nauru deal puts defence spending in a different light
Sydney Morning Herald national security correspondent Matthew Knott paired two unlikely stories yesterday. The headline to his piece reads: “Australia fires Tomahawk missile for first time, spends $140m to China-proof Nauru”.
These two developments are treated mostly separately in Knott’s story, though China is the underlying connection. Australia’s efforts to strengthen its defence force, and to secure its place as regional leader in the Pacific, are both tied to anxieties about China’s rise as a strategic power.
But we can be a bit more specific than that. I think both these developments relate to Australian worries about Chinese military basing in our neighbourhood.
Let’s start with the Tomahawk missiles, one of which was test-fired for the first time last week from a Royal Australian Navy destroyer.
Why does Australia need these missiles? To quote Knott’s story:
“The government has said it is necessary to increase Australia’s long-range strike capability because of challenges to the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, including through China’s rapid military build-up and aggressive actions in the South China Sea.”
But the idea that the Royal Australian Navy would sail one of these destroyers off the Chinese coast to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles onto the landmass is far-fetched. Those destroyers would be unacceptably vulnerable to China’s huge battery of anti-ship weapons.
Sure, Tomahawk is a long-range weapon – the Australian Defence Department even claims it has the longest-range version (although this is in doubt). But China has anti-ship ballistic missiles of far longer range, so our destroyers would still be at risk. These ships have 200 crew aboard and cost $3 billion a piece. If we include the cost of operating the ship over its lifetime, that figure doubles or even triples. This does not make for a favourable balance of risk and reward.
A more plausible use-case for Tomahawk is to neutralise a Chinese military base in the Pacific, should Beijing ever acquire one. Such a base wouldn’t be anywhere near as well defended as the Chinese mainland, so a Tomahawk could get through and the ship it is fired from would have a much better chance of survival.
Australia will be first on hand so long as it maintains the right military and disaster-response capabilities.
Still, it’s an exorbitantly expensive solution to a problem that can be addressed in other ways. Which brings us to Nauru, and Australia’s agreement with its government to effectively block any Chinese attempt to establish a security presence on the island. Quoting Knott, “Third parties would not be able to use Nauru’s critical infrastructure for security purposes under the agreement.” A similar deal has been struck with Tuvalu.
In exchange, the Australian government has offered Nauru $140 million of much needed financial support. No doubt, this won’t be the last such payment, but with this deal, Australia effectively closes off any possibility of Chinese military basing. Not bad, when weighed against the $1.3 billion Australia is spending on 200 Tomahawks. And keep in mind, that’s just the cost of the missiles, and doesn’t include the ships they are fired from. As your grandmother used to say, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of the cure.
You often hear the phrase “whack-a-mole” used to describe Australian efforts to keep Chinese influence at bay in the Pacific. Agreements such as these effectively end that game. So, congratulations to the Australian government, and continued success in securing more such agreements.
Of course, securing deals with Nauru and Tuvalu doesn’t mean Australia’s job is done. The contest for Pacific influence continues, and $140 million doesn’t scratch the surface of what it takes to compete, as the Lowy Institute’s Pacific Aid Map shows.
But even when playing whack-a-mole, Australia can be confident because it holds important advantages. It is physically closer, which means that in the event of a disaster (natural or otherwise) Australia will be first on hand so long as it maintains the right military and disaster-response capabilities. Australia also has closer economic, cultural and sporting connections with the Pacific. It is a member of the Pacific Island Forum. And most of all, Australia enjoys a favourable balance of resolve because the Pacific will always be a higher priority for Canberra than it is for Beijing.
About the author
Sam Roggeveen
Sam Roggeveen is Program Director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program. He is the author of The Echidna Strategy: Australia's Search for Power and Peace (Opens in new window), published by La Trobe University Press in 2023.
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