North Korea, explained.
North Korea's Ri Won Ju competes in the men's 70 kg weightlifting final at the 2026 Asian Games in Nagoya, 26 September 2026 (David Gray/AFP via Getty Images)
As North Korea abandons unification, its Chongryon organisation in Japan could be repurposed for something more long-term.
Subscribe to The Informer for monthly expert analysis, and to Events for advance notice of visiting world leaders and distinguished guests.
You may unsubscribe from Lowy Institute newsletters at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
Pyongyang’s quiet foothold in JapanPyongyang’s quiet foothold in Japan
When North Korea confirmed it would send more than 100 athletes to the 2026 Asian Games in Japan, the news did not first appear through North Korean media, but in an interview (Opens in new window) with the Choson Sinbo, the Tokyo-based newspaper of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, better known as Chongryon.
The choice of outlet is a reminder of something that is easy to overlook. Pyongyang maintains an organised, funded and ideologically aligned presence (Opens in new window) in a country that it still regards as an enemy. With the Games underway, it is worth asking what that presence is, how it is changing, and what Kim Jong-un might want from it.
About 2 million ethnic Koreans lived (Opens in new window) in Japan at the end of the Second World War. Most returned after liberation from Japanese rule, but hundreds of thousands stayed. Chongryon became the main organisation for those who supported the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its goal of reunifying the peninsula.
Chongryon is affiliated with Pyongyang’s ruling party, acts as North Korea’s de facto embassy in Japan, and has received aid from the Kim family for decades. It runs its own schools, where children are taught under a quasi-North Korean education system. Chongryon members and students also travel to North Korea for cultural and educational exchanges.
Pyongyang maintains an organised, funded and ideologically aligned presence in a country that it still regards as an enemy.
The organisation has been under growing strain, however, and its position has only deteriorated (Opens in new window) in recent years. The heaviest blow came in late 2023, when Pyongyang abandoned the goal of unification with South Korea. Chongryon schools were forced to rewrite their teaching materials, removing references to unification and to South Koreans as “compatriots”, and some textbooks were withdrawn altogether. The changes reportedly (Opens in new window) left teachers scrambling, and some students even considered leaving. Nevertheless, the changes were made official (Opens in new window) in May, with the organisation revising (Opens in new window) its charter at its 26th General Assembly to remove all references to unification.
Besides the challenges brought about by Pyongyang’s change in unification policy, other issues remain. Enrolment at the Chongryon-affiliated Korea University in Japan has reportedly fallen (Opens in new window) by a third, with a growing number of ethnic Korean youth marrying Japanese nationals or even choosing South Korean citizenship. Chongryon schools have also long been excluded from the free-tuition program extended to other private schools, and Japanese public opinion of the Zainichi (ethnic Koreans resident in Japan) community and Chongryon schools has long been poor (Opens in new window).
Pyongyang has responded by investing more in the organisation. Last year, Kim met Chongryon students visiting (Opens in new window) Pyongyang for a New Year’s concert, with state media referring to them as “valuable sons and daughters”. Earlier this year, North Korea also sent (Opens in new window) nearly $2 million to support the “democratic national education” of Chongryon students, marking a 10% increase from the previous year.
Last month, delegations of Chongryon educators and officials attended (Opens in new window) North Korea’s first national teachers’ conference in seven years. There, Kim called them “patriots” and thanked them for “stoutly” bringing up “the rising generation of the Korean community”. The message is clear: Pyongyang intends to keep Chongryon functioning and, where it can, growing.
North Korean students who study at the Korea University in Japan, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, known as Chongryon, arrive at Pyongyang International Airport in August 2024 as they visit on a school trip (Kim Won Jin/AFP via Getty Images)
Most of Chongryon’s activities remain cultural or educational, and for decades they have been largely symbolic. But its affiliated institutions still give North Korea a valuable base in Japan.
In the future, Chongryon’s mandate may matter more to Pyongyang as North Korea tries to expand its influence abroad, maximise its sources of income, and increase its leverage over adversaries.
There are signs this is already happening in the information space. In February, a new Japanese-language website (Opens in new window) promoting North Korean policy lines went live. Reportedly run (Opens in new window) by a research group made up of staff from the Choson Sinbo and professors at the Chongryon-affiliated Korea University, it publishes full Japanese translations of Kim’s policy speeches and statements by his sister, Kim Yo Jong. The site even allows users to receive updates via Line and runs an account (Opens in new window) on X, which remains active as of September 2026.
Kim has several other ways to widen the organisation’s role. He could send more Zainichi students to North Korea, or give them specialised training before they return to Japan, including in the cyber field. North Korean hackers already operate (Opens in new window) worldwide (Opens in new window), so a similar effort aimed at Japanese institutions, or even the Japanese government, is easy to imagine.
The timing is also notable. Pyongyang has sharply criticised (Opens in new window) what it sees as Japan’s militarisation and has consistently backed (Opens in new window) Beijing’s position on the issue. If both China and North Korea see the threat from Japan as growing, Kim may decide that is reason enough to expand North Korea’s footprint there. That could mean cyber operations, espionage, or more exchanges of delegations across various fields.
With North Korea still refusing (Opens in new window) to help resolve the decades-long abduction issue and rejecting (Opens in new window) Japanese talk of a possible summit, relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang are likely to stay poor for the foreseeable future.
Even though the North Korean athletes will go home when the Games end, the Chongryon organisation and its members will remain in Japan. Its shrinking membership may tempt Tokyo to treat it as an old relic that is quietly fading. However, Pyongyang’s spending and Kim’s rhetoric suggests it sees something different: a small yet increasingly relevant foothold.
About the author
Gabriela Bernal
Dr Gabriela Bernal is a Korean affairs analyst based in Seoul, South Korea, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies.
The most-pressing world events explained by Lowy Institute experts and global contributors, in your inbox, every Thursday.
You may unsubscribe from The Interpreter at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
