Roosevelt equally hated authoritarian bullies on the international stage who he likened to gangsters. Such regimes could not be trusted – and for Roosevelt this was a major problem. Ever the optimist, he believed any problem could be resolved if the parties thought the other side would keep its word. But a self-professed realist, he also deemed it pointless to negotiate with a regime like Hitler’s who viewed agreements as merely a breathing space to regroup for a new round of fighting.
Animated by these concerns, Roosevelt decided after the Munich crisis in 1938 to adopt a policy of all aid to democracies short of war. A little over two years later, this morphed into making the United States “the arsenal of democracy,” with lend-lease, he breezily remarked, akin to giving a neighbour a hose to put out a fire.
While critics complained of a “big give away” that “will ruin this country”, Roosevelt proved to be correct. Lend-lease not only stiffened the British war effort. It also sparked a monumental US economic achievement, which dragged the nation out of depression and helped to make it the global hegemon, so that by 1945 it produced half the world's goods and services, including 46 per cent of its electric power, 48 per cent of its radios, and 54 per cent of its telephones.
For Roosevelt, great power came with great responsibility. This basic belief was symbolised by two aspects of his foreign policy. In the wake of Adolf Hitler’s stunning military successes in 1940, which resulted in both Western Europe and most of Scandinavia coming under Nazi rule, he expanded the boundary of the Western Hemisphere to include “all of Greenland, all of the islands of the Azores, the whole of the Gulf of St Lawrence, the Bahama Islands, the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico”.
This move was a precursor to sending troops to Iceland and building a base in Greenland in 1941, but there was nothing of the blustering bully in these moves. Denmark was under Nazi occupation. These islands were exposed to Nazi invasion. Their inhabitants favoured a greater US presence. And Roosevelt moved with diplomacy and tact, intimating that both Greenland and Iceland would revert to neutrality after the war.
It was a consensual approach to international politics that he tried to adopt when contemplating the postwar world. While Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan wanted a New World Order based on “might makes right”, Roosevelt pushed for a rules-based order. In 1944, he convened two conferences, one at Dumbarton Oaks, which drafted the outlines of the United Nations system for international security, the other at Bretton Woods, which created the International Monetary Fund to stabilise currencies and keep international prices stable and predictable.
In the wake of the destruction bequeathed by the Second World War, it was a vision that many around the world fully bought into. Thus, a final ingredient in Roosevelt’s ability to make America so great: his model of US power was based not merely on economic success but also on shared political values. For the past 80 years, key ingredients of the Rooseveltian model have remained intact. The current effort to destroy what remains threatens to weaken the United States. It also promises to spark the type of global instability that Roosevelt worked so hard to overcome.
Steven Casey’s new book, The Sceptic Isle: How the British Government Sold the Second World War, will be published by Oxford University Press in August 2025.