The independent review of Australia’s intelligence agencies, publicly released last month, found them to be highly capable and performing well as a community. It did, however, recommend better integration of intelligence and policy-making in an era of heightened risk and contest.
Managing what can be called the intelligence-policy interface is not a new challenge for government. But, as the review notes, the areas are expanding where intelligence is needed in support of policy. Economic decisions with a national security dimension are highlighted where “gaps in processes to support government are the greatest.” The review recommends a system re-design for the interface between intelligence support and the Treasury department.
The review occurred before Donald Trump was returned as US President. The past few months have already seen significant shifts for intelligence agencies. Technology impacts are accelerating. Increasing uncertainty in international trade only underscores the recommendations made in the review.
In my book, Big Data, Emerging Technologies and Intelligence Production: National Security Disrupted, I devoted a discussion to the often-underappreciated importance of the intelligence-policy interface. “The relationship between intelligence producers and users – those that make political calculations about national security – is critical and interconnected,” was my conclusion. Incredible technology, focusing on the right threats, providing insightful or possibly ground-breaking intelligence are worth little if the decisionmaker doesn’t listen or doesn’t use the advice.
So, with this in mind, the emphasis on the policy-intelligence interface may come to be seen as one of the review’s most consequential dimensions. The review also recommends that the Office of National Intelligence and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation provide dedicated in-person briefings to the full cabinet on shifts in Australia’s security environment with implications for the operation of government, such as espionage and foreign interference. It suggests increasing support to ministers in a timelier fashion and outside of Canberra, as well as regular exercises between intelligence and policy agencies to test and improve preparedness for regional crises or conflicts.
Higher levels of intelligence literacy among elected officials are important – to understand the structure and foundational principles of the National Intelligence Community (NIC) and how it can support statecraft. This, I’ve argued, should involve increasing education for political leaders. There are limited requirements for elected officials to access, consider – and weigh – intelligence advice.
Incredible technology, focusing on the right threats, providing insightful or possibly ground-breaking intelligence are worth little if the decisionmaker doesn’t listen or doesn’t use the advice.
It was pleasing to see this included in the review, albeit by briefing from the NIC, rather than academic institutions. There’s space for both. There are many checks and balances in Australia’s national security agencies. However, relying only on the NIC to educate politicians about the NIC – and only once they are in office – assumes continuity in age old norms of behaviour by elected officials and their advisers. In strategically difficult circumstances, with a radically different information proposition (abundance instead of scarcity), exponential technological change, and a more diverse cohort of elected officials, this seems like a risky assumption.
Continuity is being challenged in the US intelligence community, with leadership including individuals who hold ideologies that appear to run counter to American national security. The “Signalgate” episode, using a commercial app for a White House group chat ahead of bombing Yemen, shows a diminished approach to security protocols, as does the scepticism about alliances such as NATO or support for Ukraine.
Noting the many structural differences between the intelligence systems in Australia and the United States, a future review could consider recommendations to enhance resilience of public service and leadership roles of the intelligence community to political influence.
Speaking before the Signal saga, ex-CIA veteran Carmen Medina told me why intelligence delivery matters. Information must reach leaders where they are, when they need it, in formats they’ll use – even if that includes text, although not on personal devices! Otherwise, intelligence risks becoming redundant.
The latest review is a good move to better communicate a return for government on investment in intelligence. Conducting evaluations such as this for public release is also important for transparency. The intelligence and policy interface measures join other significant recommendations such as improved contestability, skills, technology and oversight. The review found that a need for a strong central coordinating role for the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet of the entire national security agenda. It seems to make the case for, but does not ultimately (re)recommend, a national security adviser. Perhaps that was a missed opportunity for strengthening and refining the relationship between policy and intelligence.
