China, explained.
A supply mission by Philippines Coast Guard to Sabina Shoal is confronted by Chinese vessels, 26 August 2024 (Jam Sta Rosa/AFP via Getty Images)
But pressure on the Philippines means that its key partners must step up more.
Subscribe to The Informer for monthly expert analysis, and to Events for advance notice of visiting world leaders and distinguished guests.
You may unsubscribe from Lowy Institute newsletters at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
South China Sea: The “transparency initiative” success is plain to seeSouth China Sea: The “transparency initiative” success is plain to see
The spectre of conflict continues to haunt the South China Sea. After months of harassing Philippine naval vessels near the contested Second Thomas Shoal, Chinese maritime forces are now squeezing in Philippine Coast Guard vessels near the Sabina Shoal. In yet another troubling sign of China’s growing aggressiveness, Chinese Coast Guard forces intentionally rammed into and collided with the Philippine flagship vessel, BRP Teresa Magbanua, on multiple occasions.
Eager to remind the Philippines of its preponderance of force in the contested waters, China has parked the largest armada yet in the Spratly group of islands area. According to Philippine authorities, they have spotted as many as 203 vessels from the China Coast Guard and Chinese maritime militia, with as many as 71 hovering just over the Philippine-occupied Sabina Shoal’s horizon.
A month earlier, the People’s Liberation Army Airforce also flexed its muscles by harassing a Philippine patrol aircraft just over the Scarborough Shoal, another contested land feature that falls within Manila’s Exclusive Economic Zone but fell under China’s de facto control following a months-long naval standoff in 2012.
The Philippines has signalled its unwillingness to budge under pressure, and, crucially, primarily rely on its own resources in standing up to China.
On the surface, China seems to be imposing its will on its far weaker rival claimant. With the Philippines looking vulnerable, if not hapless, its US ally and other partners have felt compelled to publicly offer direct assistance, including escorting Philippine patrol vessels in the area. Meanwhile, some analysts have openly questioned the utility of the Philippines’ famed “transparency initiative”, which has repeatedly exposed China’s unlawful and excessive use of force in contested waters.
Upon closer examination, however, it’s clear that the Philippines has had considerable success, most notably in fortifying its de facto naval base, the grounded vessel BRP Sierra Madre, in the Second Thomas Shoal in the face of constant Chinese harassment and warnings. If anything, China’s recent actions near Sabina Shoal are likely born out of its fears of yet another successful military fortification effort by the Philippines.
More broadly, the Southeast Asian nation has signalled its unwillingness to budge under pressure, and, crucially, primarily rely on its own resources in standing up to China.
Nevertheless, the Philippines is also paying a heavy cost, with China steadily degrading the Southeast Asian nation’s limited pool of high-calibre patrols vessels. Beijing’s swarming and “mission kill” tactics also saw Filipino personnel injured. Thus, there is an urgent need for key allies, especially Washington and Tokyo, to expeditiously provide practicable and effective assistance, including cutters, fast boats and recently-retired warships. Moreover, it’s also high time to review the Philippine-US Mutual Defence Treaty, which has singularly failed to deter China’s “grey zone” tactics in the South China Sea.
After almost six years under the pro-Beijing Rodrigo Duterte presidency, the Philippines has steadily upped the ante in the past two years under a more sober-minded Ferdinand Marcos Jr. administration. While welcoming a “new golden era” of bilateral relations, Marcos, unlike his predecessor but similar to his namesake father, signalled an assertive and increasingly uncompromising stance in the South China Sea early in office.
Mistaking Duterte’s successor as yet another subservient Filipino leader, China refused to offer any concessions during Marcos’ state visit to Beijing last year. In response, Marcos doubled down on his country’s defence cooperation with key security partners – most notably the United States, Australia and Japan – and also adopted a more proactive stance in the disputed waters.
The upshot was the birth of the “transparency initiative”, which sought to rally international public opinion by exposing China’s unlawful behaviour in adjacent waters. While the policy clearly failed to radically alter China’s approach, it successfully mobilised domestic public opinion and, crucially, sidelined pro-Beijing narratives by influential figures such as the Duterte family along with China’s disinformation campaign.
Manila and Washington should, per advice of top Philippine officials, now begin a proper “review” of the obligations under the Mutual Defence Treaty – in particular, reconsidering thresholds for “armed attack” to encompass potentially lethal grey zone tactics by China. The two allies should also consider, as a “last resort”, joint patrols and resupply missions to hotly contested areas to ward off any Chinese armada.
The path ahead is risky, and there is always the potential for unwanted escalation involving two major powers. But what’s clear is that the Philippines, along with its key partners, needs major tactical and logistical adjustments to sustain momentum and see off an aggressor in the South China Sea.
About the author
Richard Javad Heydarian
Richard Javad Heydarian is a Manila-based columnist, academic, and author.
The most-pressing world events explained by Lowy Institute experts and global contributors, in your inbox, every Thursday.
You may unsubscribe from The Interpreter at any time. For information on our privacy practices and how to unsubscribe, see our Privacy Policy.
