Africa, explained.
A member of the South Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition, a group that last year banded with fighters in Sudan (Luis Tato/AFP via Getty Images)
Sudan’s civil war has drawn in Gulf states, Russia and the US – but the deeper fault line runs through the Nile.
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The spillover from SudanThe spillover from Sudan
After nearly three years of fighting, Sudan’s war is no longer an internal conflict. Fuelled by several intertwined factors – including regional rivalries, Gulf ambitions as well as great-power competition – the war has metastasised into a multi-layered contest. It now risks becoming a proxy theatre in the long-running struggle between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile, a dangerous prospect for both countries and the region.
With Iran now threatening to further extend the present conflict in the Gulf region to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait – the choke point at the base of the Red Sea – the regional dynamics are becoming harder for the world to ignore.
Sudan’s geography explains much of this external attention. Placed at the intersection of the Red Sea and the Sahel, and bordering seven countries, Sudan sits at the crossroads of Africa’s most volatile regions. Its agricultural potential, mineral resources and important Red Sea coastline have drawn in actors ranging from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to Russia and the United States. Each has pursued its own vested interests, often at the expense of Sudan’s elusive transition to civilian rule.
Sudan’s civil war has attracted the interest of Gulf countries in securing food and investment corridors, leading them to back competing factions. Russia, initially through the Wagner Group and now via the Africa Corps, has sought to entrench itself in Sudan’s mining sector, especially gold. Russia is also keen to have a naval facility in Port Sudan, which can host Russian troops, as an attempt to secure the passage of Bab al-Mandeb.
The United States made early efforts to exert some influence by pushing the leaders towards a ceasefire. Initially aloof, US President Donald Trump later expressed his interest in mediating in cooperation with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as part of his pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize.
The risk of a proxy war looms large ... Sudan, caught in between, risks becoming the theatre where these competing interests collide.
The war began after a power struggle between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and General Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The conflict expanded last year, drawing in militants from neighbouring South Sudan.
Yet the war is no longer centred in Khartoum or Darfur. It is moving eastward, toward Sudan’s sensitive frontier region with Ethiopia. This lies dangerously close to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), where for over a decade, Egypt and Ethiopia have been locked in a tense standoff over the Nile’s waters. The war has already pushed over a million Sudanese refugees toward Egypt’s borders, while the proliferation of armed groups in northern Sudan has heightened security concerns. But Cairo’s deeper anxiety lies in the implications for Nile politics. A fractured or hostile Sudan would undermine Egypt’s leverage in negotiations over the GERD, which it sees as an existential threat to its water security.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in Guba, Ethiopia, in September 2025, after Ethiopia inaugurated Africa’s biggest hydroelectric dam (Amanuel Sileshi/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
This explains Egypt’s shift from cautious observer to active stakeholder. In recent months, Egypt has reinforced its southwestern border, enhanced surveillance capabilities, and, according to multiple reports, conducted strikes against RSF-linked supply routes in northwestern Sudan. Cairo’s support for Burhan is less about any ideological alignment and more about preserving a unified Sudanese state that can act as a stable partner in Nile diplomacy.
Ethiopia, meanwhile, regards the GERD as a cornerstone of national development – both a symbol of national pride and a potential vulnerability. Its location in the Benishangul-Gumuz region near Sudan’s border makes it sensitive to cross-border instability. Ethiopian officials have long accused Egypt of backing insurgencies near the dam – claims Egypt has dismissed. Now, Sudanese authorities have alleged that Ethiopian territory has been used to facilitate RSF logistics and movement. These accusations and counter-accusations only highlight the extent of mutual suspicion.
The risk of a proxy war looms large. Egypt seeks to prevent Sudan from drifting into instability or aligning with Ethiopia. Ethiopia seeks to avoid encirclement and protect the GERD. Sudan, caught in between, risks becoming the theatre where these competing interests collide.
The involvement of Gulf actors adds another layer to this dynamic. The RSF’s war effort has reportedly relied on supply networks linked to the UAE, while Egypt has found support among partners such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar in backing Sudan’s state institutions. As traditional smuggling routes through Libya and the Red Sea come under pressure, there is a risk of new corridors emerging through Ethiopia and the Blue Nile.
For Sudan, the consequences are dire. External backing reduces incentives for compromise, encourages military escalation, and accelerates fragmentation. The RSF’s declaration of a parallel government in South Darfur already points toward de facto partition. A full-fledged proxy war would deepen these divisions, making any political settlement far more elusive.
Sudan’s war is no longer just a civil war. It is fast transforming into the fault line of Northeast Africa, where water politics, border disputes, and great-power alignments are intertwining, reinforcing and amplifying one another. Sudanese instability threatens Red Sea security, disrupts trade routes, and creates openings for non-state actors and external powers alike. It also complicates efforts to address humanitarian crises, as fragmented authority and external interference undermine coordination.
The Nile, long a source of life and civilisation, is fast becoming a line of division.
About the author
Samir Bhattacharya
Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi, India where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing global order.
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