In October 2024, Indonesia entered a new era under President Prabowo Subianto, whose assertive diplomacy style, military modernisation and defence-first agenda marked a departure from Joko Widodo’s decade of infrastructure-driven pragmatism.
Almost simultaneously, Japan experienced political turbulence. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida resigned and Shigeru Ishiba took over. Now Ishiba too is gone, and Sanae Takaichi has emerged victorious in Japan’s long ruling Liberal Democratic Party leadership race, with Japan now likely, albeit with a parliamentary hurdle to overcome, to have its first female prime minister.
Takaichi’s ascent signals a rightward shift in Japanese politics. A protégé of Shinzō Abe, she champions constitutional revision to expand Japan’s military capabilities, increased defence spending and stricter immigration control – all while doubling public spending to revive Japan’s economy. If she is confirmed as prime minister, her foreign policy is likely to reflect a hawkish stance on China and North Korea, emphasise the Japan–US alliance, strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, and efforts to ensure supply chain resilience and technology protection.
So, with Japan and Indonesia each experiencing a change of leadership styles, how would Japan’s conservative resurgence under Takaichi align with Prabowo’s assertive but non-aligned diplomacy?
For much of the postwar era, Japan’s diplomacy with Indonesia was anchored in economic assistance. From war compensation and reparation loans, to official development assistance and an Economic Partnership Agreement, Japan built its reputation as development partner.
Under Abe, Tokyo began to link infrastructure diplomacy with strategy. Abe promoted the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept, aligning it with Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum.
With Takaichi in the top job, Japan’s role as a security actor would be expected to expand. Her emphasis on economic security and defence cooperation aligns with Prabowo’s modernisation agenda, especially in maritime security and defence-industrial collaboration.
Prabowo’s foreign policy blends military assertiveness with Indonesia’s traditional “free and active” doctrine. While he inherits Jokowi’s economic pragmatism, Prabowo welcomes defence cooperation, while cautious about alignment, especially amid US–China rivalry. Preferring to cultivate multiple partnerships while guarding autonomy, his administration seeks modernisation without entanglement, and Japan offers a partner that respects this approach.
Indonesia remains cautious about being perceived as part of a bloc opposing China, especially as Takaichi can be expected to strengthen Japan’s ties with the United States and the Quad grouping.
In bilateral meetings, Prabowo has emphasised food and energy self-sufficiency, industrialisation, and resource downstreaming, inviting Japanese participation in important sectors such as nickel and rare earths. For Indonesia’s president, Japan offers a valuable partner for both infrastructure and security, but cooperation will be carefully framed to avoid perceptions of alignment against China.
The changing leadership contexts have transformed Indonesia–Japan relations from a single-track partnership centred on development to a dual-track relationship encompassing both infrastructure and security.
On the development side, Japan remains a vital partner. The Jakarta Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) train system, Patimban port development project, and ongoing involvement in the Nusantara new capital project demonstrate continuity in Japan’s role as a builder.
Japanese firms remain central to Indonesia’s industrial upgrading, knowledge transfer, energy transition, and critical infrastructure development.
On the security side, the agenda has expanded rapidly. Japan’s relaxation of defence export rules and defence-industrial push open possibilities for arms sales, joint production, and maritime cooperation. Jakarta has already worked with Japan on coast guard capacity, maritime domain awareness and patrol vessel provision. Indonesia’s nickel resources and role in the global electric vehicle supply chain are increasingly crucial to Japan, and Takaichi, with her emphasis on economic security, would make resource diplomacy another arena of convergence.
On the opportunity side, there is a notable alignment between Japan’s defence normalisation, expected to be accelerated under Takaichi’s conservative leadership, and Prabowo’s push for military modernisation. This convergence opens doors for deeper cooperation in areas such as maritime security, defence technology, and joint training. Additionally, both countries share interests in green energy development, critical mineral processing (especially nickel), and digital infrastructure, which are vital for economic security and industrial upgrading. Their mutual commitment to reinforcing ASEAN centrality also provides a platform for maintaining regional stability amid growing geopolitical competition.
However, tensions persist. Indonesia remains cautious about being perceived as part of a bloc opposing China, especially as Takaichi can be expected to strengthen Japan’s ties with the United States and the Quad grouping. Her push for tougher counterintelligence laws, warning about Chinese espionage, reflect Japan’s growing unease with Beijing’s expanding security measures.
On wartime historical issues, often sensitive for Japan’s regional ties, Prabowo adopts a more forward-looking tone, emphasising partnership while avoiding contentious debates. His attendance in Beijing last month for the military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory over Japanese aggression may signal symbolic acknowledgment of wartime history, though framed within broader strategic cooperation with China rather than direct criticism of Japan.
Takaichi’s foreign policy orientation and priorities strongly suggest that she would be receptive to expanding Japan’s role in minilateral security frameworks. She has expressed interest in deepening Japan-US-Korea and Japan-US-Philippines security cooperation. One analyst has gone further, suggesting Takaichi could foster new multilateral security cooperation, one without the United States, an “Asian Quad” of Japan, India, Australia and Indonesia.
For Indonesia, this would present a timely opportunity. As Prabowo navigates a foreign policy landscape increasingly shaped by economic engagement with Beijing, deeper involvement in regional security frameworks could serve as a counterbalance, allowing Jakarta to diversify its partnerships, reinforce ASEAN centrality, and maintain its “free and active” diplomacy. This “Asian Quad” can focus on flexible, issue-based coalitions that support inclusive regional collaboration in maritime safety, disaster response, supply chain resilience, and economic security. Such an approach would allow Jakarta to balance its economic engagement with Beijing while maintaining its strategic autonomy and asserting its role as a bridge-builder in the evolving Indo-Pacific order.
