Ten years have passed since the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process came to an end in March 2016 in Washington DC. Initiated by US President Barack Obama in 2010, the biennial process convened four summits that drew much needed attention to evolving nuclear security risks. Attended by over 50 states and various international organisations, the NSS process resulted in some innovative commitments and proposals enshrined in summit communiqués, work plans and voluntary commitments in the form of gift baskets by the participating states to strengthen global nuclear security measures.
One notable contribution of the NSS process was a change of pace from what had been a slow, incremental development of nuclear security measures. This was possible because heads of states engaged directly with the issues. The talks also maintained a practical focus to avoid becoming entangled in complex issues that would impede any progress, such as addressing nuclear weapons and military stockpiles security.
While nuclear security momentum at the leadership level has waned considerably since the fourth summit in March 2016 in Washington DC, the NSS process helped sustain the work beyond its conclusion, directing the mandates for international organisations such as the IAEA.
Ten years later, nuclear security risks have evolved markedly – in the cyber domain, through emerging technologies, and in the context of nuclear power plants in active war zones. Existing nuclear security measures are weak. Legal frameworks at the national and international levels need to be strengthened, while physical protection systems require upgrades.
Effectiveness is demonstrated by the absence of incidents, but that makes it difficult to sustain political attention and investment to a seemingly abstract threat.
Two main processes are currently facilitating renewed attention and concrete progress on nuclear security at the IAEA. First is the review conference of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, first held in 2022. The second is the initiation of a review process for four key publications in the Nuclear Security Series. The process started in 2019 with the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) approving revision of all four publications at the end of 2024. These two avenues offer an opportunity, albeit with some inherent limitations, to take stock of the existing measures, assess their efficacy against the emerging risks and propose amendments and upgrades.
With a deteriorating global security situation – many nuclear power plants are now in active war zones – nuclear security deserves equal priority alongside nuclear safety and safeguards. A single incident, whether originating in safety or security domain, may risk billions of dollars of investment in global nuclear market. Nuclear security’s reliance on voluntary funding within the IAEA reflects a lack of priority and creates uncertainty.
In this regard, it is worth noting the fundamental difference between nuclear security and physical protection. Nuclear security is broader in scope and goes beyond guards and barriers. Nuclear security is a national responsibility, so lacks a standardised approach due to differences across various facilities and territories. While it is challenging to establish a standardised approach in nuclear security, a technical assessment of physical protection measures will allow more unified progress, underpinned by legal requirements.
The stakeholders for nuclear security are also expanding. The emergence of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), for example, goes beyond the challenges of traditional nuclear power plants. The prospect of floating nuclear power plants will require close coordination between countries, maritime authorities and potentially private companies. Establishing trust in a widening group of actors will be a considerable challenge.
Finally, it is worth underlining the competing requirements of nuclear safety and security at their interface. Given the potential impact on nuclear power plants in conflict zones, it is essential to outline emergency preparedness and response mechanisms from both a security and safety perspective.
Nuclear historian Francis Gavin, in his essay “History and America’s Atomic Future: Four Questions on Nuclear Statecraft”, highlights the difficulty of assessing the dangers of a phenomenon that has not yet occurred. Gavin’s arguments refer to the challenges of nuclear statecraft and the perils of thermonuclear war, but they apply equally to nuclear security risks, which face the same paradox. Its effectiveness is demonstrated by the absence of incidents, but that makes it difficult to sustain political attention and investment to a seemingly abstract threat.
Nuclear security demands renewed focus and attention to ensure a successful achievement of nuclear energy goals across the world. The nuclear security summit process of the 2010s built a norm against nuclear terrorism and created momentum for countries to discuss risks frankly. While reinventing the NSS model may not be feasible, channeling that work and spirit in the available avenues will be a critical step forward.
