The Indo-Pacific’s other security map

Over the past decade, China has become the organising principle of Australia’s understanding of Indo-Pacific security.

China is unquestionably Australia’s defining strategic challenge. The return of great-power competition has demanded a stronger focus on deterrence, defence and regional partnerships. That shift has been both necessary and overdue.

But it has also narrowed how we think about security.

Read Australia’s strategic documents (Opens in new window) and the Indo-Pacific appears dominated by military modernisation, deterrence and great-power rivalry. Read the daily news from across the region and a different picture emerges. Bangladesh’s (Opens in new window) government falls after weeks of mass protests. Myanmar (Opens in new window) fragments into rival systems of authority. Pakistan (Opens in new window) confronts the convergence of insurgency, political instability and climate stress. Tribal violence persists in Papua New Guinea (Opens in new window). Criminal economies have turned parts of Southeast Asia (Opens in new window) into global scam hubs. Across the Pacific (Opens in new window), climate change is reshaping livelihoods, migration and state capacity.

At first glance these appear to be separate crises.

They are not.

They are different expressions of the same underlying challenge. While Canberra increasingly views the Indo-Pacific through the lens of geopolitics, much of the region experiences security through state fragility.

None of these crises are primarily about China.

Yet together they form the Indo-Pacific’s other security map.

Most insecurity in Asia and the Pacific now comes from within states, not between them. State fragility – driven by weak governance, political exclusion, climate stress, organised crime, economic insecurity, misinformation and declining trust (Opens in new window) in public institutions – has become the region’s defining security challenge.

These pressures rarely occur in isolation. They reinforce one another. Climate shocks deepen economic hardship. Economic insecurity fuels political instability. Weak institutions create opportunities for organised crime and corruption. Criminal economies erode state legitimacy. Misinformation accelerates social division. External actors exploit these weaknesses through political influence, cyber operations and economic leverage.

State fragility is not driven by one threat. It emerges from the interaction of many.

Pakistan shows how political instability, insurgency, climate stress and economic pressures can combine to generate chronic insecurity, even where state institutions remain strong. Myanmar demonstrates how prolonged conflict can fragment the state itself, creating competing systems of authority that exercise different degrees of legitimacy and control. Papua New Guinea illustrates how weak state presence allows local violence to become chronic. Across the Pacific, climate change is placing growing pressure on the capacity of states to provide security, sustain livelihoods and maintain resilience.

Different countries.

Different contexts.

The same pattern.

This matters because strategic competition increasingly exploits state fragility (Opens in new window).

External actors rarely create instability from nothing. They exploit existing grievances, weak institutions and social divisions. Countries with resilient institutions and legitimate governments are far better placed to absorb external pressure than those already struggling with state fragility.

Australia has become very good at analysing the Indo-Pacific through a geopolitical lens. It now needs to become just as good at understanding state fragility and the resilience of the states in which that competition unfolds.

This is not an argument against focusing on China. Nor is it an argument for replacing defence with development. It is an argument for broadening Australia’s understanding of security.

Military capability, alliances and deterrence remain indispensable. But they are only part of the picture. Understanding the resilience of neighbouring states – their ability to withstand shocks, maintain legitimacy and resist the pressures that drive state fragility – is now a strategic capability in its own right.

Australia’s security will be shaped not only by the balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific, but by the strength – or weakness – of the states in which that power is exercised.

Australia has become very good at reading the geopolitical map of the Indo-Pacific. It now needs to become just as good at reading its fragility map.

Because the region’s future will be shaped not only by the balance of power, but by the resilience of the societies in which that power is exercised.