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India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar with his French counterpart Jean-Noël Barrot, right, and Australia’s Penny Wong on the sidelines of the G20 meeting in Johannesburg in February (@DrSJaishankar/X)

Time to reboot the India-France-Australia trilateral

Three Indian Ocean powers must institutionalise their partnership or risk becoming another underused diplomatic forum.

Rushali Saha

20 August 20254 min read

When senior officials from Delhi, Canberra, and Paris announced in 2020 that they had held a first trilateral meeting involving India, Australia and France to boost cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, it was met with considerable optimism about the potential of such a grouping to reshape regional dynamics.

The following year, Foreign Ministers from the three countries met in person for the first time on the sidelines of the G7 ministers meeting. They “shared mutual concerns regarding the strategic, security, economic and environmental challenges” in the Indo-Pacific and pledged to work together.

Even before the official trilateral dialogue materialised, the idea of a “Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis” was quite popular, with French President Emmanuel Macron in 2018 among the first to call for a “strategic alliance” to collectively respond to growing Chinese assertiveness in the region. Although initially there were doubts surrounding the utility of such a grouping, especially in Australia, Canberra has grown increasingly receptive to the idea, aligning with its intent to play a more active role in the Indian Ocean region.

However, all that optimism evaporated in September 2021 with Australia’s surprise announcement of the AUKUS pact and decision to renege on a deal to buy French submarines. France subsequently cancelled a ministerial meeting of the trilateral grouping over Canberra’s secret negotiations with the United Kingdom and United States to obtain nuclear-powered submarines.

After a two-year hiatus, the three-way dialogue resumed, in a Track 1.5 (officials and non-officials) format in March 2023 on the sidelines of the Raisina Dialogue. A few months later, officials then held a second “focal points” meeting to steer the agenda of the grouping. The following year, officials reaffirmed discussions for cooperation on maritime safety and security, environmental issues, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mechanisms.

The latest gathering in February this year again featured ministers from the three countries, held on the sidelines of the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in Johannesburg. While no official joint statement about the trilateral was released, India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar later said in a social media post that the three countries had “shared interests in the Indo-Pacific and the potential to strengthen each other’s position.”

At a time of growing concern about US–China competition, a trilateral grouping could provide a counterweight to fears of binary great power influence dominating the region.

Now that the trilateral dialogue has revived, the question remains open on how the grouping should develop. The Indo-Pacific region already features a thick – and ever-increasing – web of minilateral groupings. In the context of finite diplomatic and economic resources, some analysts have advocated narrowing the range of memberships and placing participation within a hierarchy to ensure maximum utilisation of scarce resources.

The India-Australia-France trilateral is special for multiple reasons. It brings together three of the most powerful Indo-Pacific countries with a special focus on the Indian Ocean sub-region. France has territorial interests while India and Australia look across the water from their respective coastlines. By identifying practical problems and offering pragmatic solutions, the trilateral has the potential to have a tangible impact, on challenges ranging from maritime criminal activity to environmental management.

The three countries also share concerns about China’s activities in the region. With a trilateral arrangement, they can feed into other groupings with overlapping memberships, such as the Quad, as well as existing institutions, such as the Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The India-Australia-France trilateral could also serve as a tool to manage their respective relationships with the United States. At a time of growing concern about US–China competition, a trilateral grouping could provide a counterweight to fears of binary great power influence dominating the region.

However, for the India-Australia-France trilateral to have a lasting influence, there is an immediate need to institutionalise and formalise coordination mechanisms. This will ensure consistent efforts by all members to achieve shared objectives. To begin with, the trilateral ministerial meeting must become a permanent feature of the trilateral relationship, where members conduct political consultations and coordinate diplomatically.

Members should explore opportunities to extend security cooperation, including exchanging information and intelligence, conducting military exercises and sharing technology – much of which is already conducted by the countries bilaterally.

Finally, the grouping should become a forum for the countries to coordinate cooperation in the western region of the Indian Ocean, which is plagued by the type of maritime security challenges that are already on the grouping’s agenda. India and France have an active presence in the region, making the group an excellent platform for coordination and implementation of regional initiatives.

At a time when India’s relations with the United States are sallow – and the upcoming Quad summit possibly facing cancellation – India should capitalise on the restoration of and renewed momentum in Australia-France ties to push this trilateral to new heights.

About the author

Rushali Saha

Rushali Saha serves as the Asia Desk Team Lead at Horizon Intelligence, a Belgium-based threat intelligence firm, and is an independent researcher specialising in Indo-Pacific geopolitics.

Topics

India Australia France