“Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!! Open the Fuckin’ Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell – JUST WATCH!” President Trump, Truth Social, 5 April 2026
On Easter Sunday, the President of the United States formally announced that his military would destroy Iranian power plants and bridges on Tuesday unless Iran reopened the Strait of Hormuz. The post was signed with his full name and title. It was, by any reasonable definition, a declaration of intent to conduct a specific category of military strike against civilian infrastructure on a specific day.
At a press conference on 6 April, Trump doubled down on these threats, while also offering deluded statements about Iranian communications being intercepted saying “please keep bombing”.
The potential legal and ethical problems are grave. The US Department of Defense Law of War Manual permits strikes on power grids and bridges when they make an effective contribution to enemy military action and when the military advantage outweighs civilian harm. But it also requires that the advantage be military, not political. Threatening to destroy a country’s power supply to force a diplomatic concession is not a military advantage under any honest reading of that standard.
Those words are now the measure by which America's own threatened campaign will be judged, by allies, adversaries – and history.
More damaging still is the precedent set by the Pentagon’s own senior leadership. In November 2022, General Mark Milley stood alongside Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin and declared that Russia’s deliberate targeting of Ukrainian energy infrastructure was a war crime. Austin called it “deliberate cruelty”. Those words are now the measure by which America’s own threatened campaign will be judged, by allies, adversaries – and history.
There is also a question about whether Trump’s bridge and power strategy would actually work. Russia’s infrastructure campaign against Ukraine since 2022 has been the most extensively documented in recent history. At times since 2022, more than half of Ukraine’s power capacity has been taken offline by Russian attacks. None of it broke Ukrainian political will. Ukraine adapted, dispersed, repaired, while drawing on Western partner support and extraordinary national resilience.
The Islamic Republic of Iran, whose political identity is built around resistance to American coercion, is unlikely to respond differently. “Bridge and Power Plant Day” is unlikely to change the Iranian regime’s strategic calculus and would not reopen the Strait of Hormuz. It would, however, give the Iranian government its most powerful propaganda tool of the war.
The Iranian response is also likely to be severe. Parliament Speaker Bagher Ghalibaf has already stated publicly that strikes on Iranian power plants would make “energy and oil infrastructure across the entire region” immediate retaliation targets, to be “irreversibly destroyed”. Iran has already struck petrochemical facilities in Kuwait, oil storage in Bahrain, Dubai International Airport, and Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG terminal. An adviser to Iran’s new supreme leader has threatened to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait in addition to Hormuz, which would create a dual chokepoint blockade strangling global energy and trade flows. Iran’s cyber capabilities would also come into play, and the justification for attacking US and Gulf critical infrastructure digitally would expand dramatically.
The deepest damage may be to civil-military relations and to the professional norms that underpin American military effectiveness. Eliot Cohen’s concept of “supreme command”, the idea that effective wartime civilian leadership involves an active, deliberate, and intelligent engagement with military affairs, bears little resemblance to what an Easter Sunday Truth Social post represents. David Whetham, whose work on military ethics education is used to train thousands of officers annually including in Australia, reminds us that the law of armed conflict is not an optional courtesy for professional militaries; it is the bedrock of who they are. The Trump Easter post and his 6 April press conference may place American service members in exactly the position that military ethics education is designed to prepare them for: the moment when a received order might violate the laws they have sworn to uphold.
For Australia and other US allies, the political consequences of this trajectory are already severe. The war was launched without consultation with NATO allies and without a UN Security Council resolution. Germany’s Defence Minister Boris Pistorius put it with admirable bluntness: “This is not our war. We did not start it.” Japan and Australia have both declined to send forces to assist. Italy denied access to its Sicilian air bases. The United States has responded by threatening to withdraw from NATO.
Russia’s state media are openly celebrating the Trumpian announcement and criticism of allies. And well into the future, every time an American diplomat raises Russian atrocities in Ukraine, or Chinese threats to Taiwan, they will now be met with a single retort: Remember Iran?
The Strait of Hormuz remains closed. The Easter Sunday post and 6 April press conference did immense harm to America’s standing. Trump’s position on the war constantly shifts, and it appears he has started a war that he has no idea how to end despite being desperate to do so. Trump’s behaviour is also doing harm to America’s alliance relationships, institutional integrity, and the professional norms of the American military. Whether he carries through with his “bridge and power” and “take out Iran in one night” threats or not, the harm from Trump’s intemperate behaviour over the Easter long weekend will have impacts for the Middle East, America and its allies well into the future.
