Why bother with a second-class seat at the Security Council?

Buried towards the end of the recent India–Australia Joint Statement (Opens in new window) was a small detail. The two countries reaffirmed their support for each other’s candidacies for non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council – India for 2028–29, and Australia for 2029–30. In addition to the mutual endorsements, the statement also reiterated the need for urgent reform of the Security Council, including greater permanent and non-permanent representation.

The system of rotating membership is as old as the Security Council itself. The 1944 Dumbarton Oaks proposals (Opens in new window) envisaged an 11-member Council comprising five permanent members (P5) and six members elected for two-year terms. But decolonisation and the rapid expansion of UN membership soon put pressure on this limited representation. In 1963, the General Assembly approved an amendment to the Charter (Opens in new window) expanding the Council from 11 to 15 members, increasing the number of non-permanent seats from six to 10.

These non-permanent members lack the veto enjoyed by the five permanent members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Despite this subordinate position within the Security Council, states campaign years in advance, spend millions (Opens in new window) of dollars through development assistance, court votes in the General Assembly, and make reciprocal commitments of the kind contained in the India–Australia statement all in a bid to win a place at the table.

Yet the Security Council is widely regarded as outdated (Opens in new window) and in need of reform. Clearly, the appeal of a temporary seat lies in more than the powers it formally grants.

In fact, non-permanent membership offers different things to different states.

For smaller countries, a two-year stint on the Council provides something otherwise difficult to acquire: visibility. It places them at the centre of deliberations over international peace and security and gives their diplomats access to negotiations and actors that would be harder to reach under normal circumstances.

Membership entitles elected states to assume the rotating monthly presidency (Opens in new window) of the Security Council, placing them, albeit briefly, at the centre of the Council’s work. As the president, relatively small states can convene meetings, shape the program, preside over debates and draw international attention to issues they consider important. Recent presidencies held by countries such as Malta, Mozambique, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, and Guyana illustrate (Opens in new window) how non-permanent membership can provide smaller and developing states with a rare opportunity to exercise diplomatic leadership in the world’s foremost security forum.

For middle and rising powers, the attraction is different. These countries already possess substantial diplomatic reach and international visibility. For them, Council membership can provide recognition of their status (Opens in new window) and an opportunity to showcase leadership.

Australia’s pursuit (Opens in new window) of elected membership is consistent with its conception of itself as a consequential middle power with interests extending beyond its immediate neighbourhood. Ambitions of countries such as India, Japan, Brazil, and Germany (Opens in new window) go further. Elected membership boosts their claim to permanent membership in a reformed Security Council. In their view, the existing Council fails to reflect contemporary geopolitical realities. Hence, their demographic weight, economic capabilities, contributions to UN operations, and expanding global responsibilities justify permanent representation. Election to the Security Council, therefore, provides an opportunity to demonstrate that they already behave like permanent members in waiting.

The prestige associated with elected membership should not be underestimated. Germany’s unsuccessful (Opens in new window) bid in the 2026 Security Council election, in which it lost to Austria and Portugal, prompted criticism at home and was widely portrayed as a diplomatic embarrassment (Opens in new window). If a temporary, non-veto-bearing seat were merely symbolic, electoral defeat would hardly have generated such a response.

Interestingly, there is another group of middle powers who not only support the principle of rotating membership, but also seek to expand it. The Uniting for Consensus group (Opens in new window), popularly known as the Coffee Club, comprising countries including Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico, South Korea, Canada and Türkiye, opposes the creation of new permanent seats because doing so would merely expand an already unequal system. Instead, the group envisages enlarging the Council to as many as 27 members through additional elected seats, including a new category of longer-term, renewable seats.

Finally, the system of rotating membership also serves the interests of the P5 in a less obvious way. By periodically opening the Council to a changing group of elected members, it channels the ambitions of a wide range of states into competition for periodic access to the Council rather than sustained challenges to its underlying structure. Yet the institutional hierarchy remains intact: the veto is untouched, permanent membership remains exclusive, and ultimate authority continues to reside with the P5.

Perhaps that explains the Security Council’s enduring resilience as an institution despite strong criticisms. In a sense, the non-permanent membership functions as an institutional safety valve. For small states, that table offers visibility. For middle and rising powers, it offers status and leadership credentials. And for the permanent five, the rotating seats help sustain an institutional order that broadens participation without surrendering their privileged position.